Note: Most of those posts exceeded Occam’s 10 line rule.
I apologize for having a limited understanding in this discourse, but I need to walk through some of these responses slowly. I want to get a grasp of what I am missing.
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 10:17 AM
You can think of many universally-applicable moral truths. Here’s one: No-one ought to be treated as the mere instrument of another man’s good. Sure, that was widely disbelieved in the pre-modern world, and is not universally *applied* even today - but being applied is not what makes a moral universal, only that it is applicable - people just haven’t cottoned on to that moral yet, or haven’t applied it to women, or children, or the poor, or the outlander, etc.
A case where your moral universal example may not apply: I value my survival over the temporary discomfort of another person, thus I am willing to lie to a person who would not otherwise help me survive in order to meet this goal. I made an instrument out of another man in order to do the good (my survival).
Is it part of metaphysics to rank morals and allow trumping? Identify all the infinite exceptions to the rules? In this case I say we are at the disposal of our relative creativity or the potentially infinite varieties of circumstances. In some case moral A trumps moral B and in other cases moral B trumps moral A.
As to my question of how do know if your moral is a truth I get a little lost.
If I understand you correctly, you say that ethical & moral theory doesn’t follow empirical evidence like science, but we can make progress by classifying them into subjects (moral claims).
What does that have to do with establishing truth?
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 10:17 AM
There was a firm core, or foundation, of subset or whatever of facts and old theories that remained, and remain today. You’re just focussing on the occasional failures while the unsung data-gatherers and data-sorters do their incremental, positive, ever-increasing work.
Does this mean that truth is established by the success and failures of our past? If so, what falls in the parameters of success or failure? How is success & failure decided? Isn’t that a little like saying we would be better off with 6 fingers?
I understand that evolution has lots of gaps, yet there is enough evidence for the scientific community to put stock in that theory (as do I). I am having trouble locating a single fossil on moral truths, let along a chain that supports moral realism.
Hm. Yeah, I’ll take that. Because all I wanted to prove is that to call anything a ‘moral issue’ is to say, among other things, that it’s universally applicable. Some moral statements are moral truths, others aren’t. How we know that is a different issue, tho’ not unimportant!
Not important? Then I truly am missing something. I thought it was the core issue here.
(1) Whatever moral truths are, I am willing to claim that they have defeater clauses like you suggest. The purported moral rule “Thou shalt never lie” is certainly false, since we can all come up with examples in which lying is clearly permissible.
So one should not start outlining purported moral rules with ones that are overly strong or overly weak.
(2) Re. finding “moral fossils”: certainly whatever moral rules are they are directions or rules of conduct. As such they are not instantiated in physical objects anymore than E = MC^2 is something one can find by digging rocks. They are abstracta.
(3) As for success or failure, well, this at the final instance must unhappily depend upon our intuitions. But then so too must our decision for what constitutes an adequate explanation for a physical event. If one asks, “How do you determine success or failure of a scientific paradigm like Newtonian mechanics?” Well, the answer is that you assemble all the evidence you can and see if it can be explained adequately by that paradigm. Some scientists will agree, some won’t. (See Thomas Kuhn). Yes, there are differences between physical sciences and ethical claims. For one thing, physical sciences all deal with “the way things are”, they are descriptive. Moral claims all deal with “the way things ought to be”, they are prescriptive.
But in the final analysis, all we have are our intuitions to decide theoretical success or failure. Even fossils must be evaluated by our intuitions.
Here’s *one* addition, to prevent Doug from being tied to every claim i’ve made:
(2) . . . on metaethics, . . . my feeling . . . is that I am in complete agreement with his take on the subject.
He’s agreeing w/ me on ‘meta-ethical’ issues - how to talk about all this shtuff about morals. He’s not explicitly agreeing with where I go with them. I claim morals are their own set of subjects, they’re universal truths, they’re facts, they’re non-natural facts, and so on. Doug may disagree with any of those positions, and still agree ‘yep, they’re each their own problem.’
Ok, I get the gist of this now. It is Your (Kirks) job to make a moral statement that cannot be reduced to non-ethical statements. I know you may have gone over the following question in your intro to this thread, but I would appreciate it if you would go into some more detail. How are moral views unrelated to our desires?
I claim morals are their own set of subjects, they’re universal truths, they’re facts, they’re non-natural facts, and so on. Doug may disagree with any of those positions, and still agree ‘yep, they’re each their own problem.’
... well yes, whatever moral facts are, I am going to claim they are natural facts, i.e. facts of nature. They do not involve any sort of mysterious cognitive perception of a non-natural realm of being. Indeed, moral intuitions are shared by animals, and basic ones are biologically heritable. This does not imply that moral facts reduce to facts about biology. They certainly don’t. But our moral intuitions do come from our biology plus our experience living together in complex social relationships.
I am enough of a Platonist to believe in abstracta. I am not enough of a Platonist to believe that we have special intuitive powers of some alternative nonnatural realm of being. Abstracta are known (or better, hypothesized) by our experience with natural objects and relationships.
As for the other issues, I’ll leave them to one side for now.
You can think of many universally-applicable moral truths.
Not really. Unless by “moral truth” you mean popular or common moral values.
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 10:17 AM
Here’s one: No-one ought to be treated as the mere instrument of another man’s good. Sure, that was widely disbelieved in the pre-modern world, and is not universally *applied* even today -
What makes this a moral truth? How was it tested to be true? Where is the evidence? What is the criteria for a moral value to be a moral truth?
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 10:17 AM
but being applied is not what makes a moral universal, only that it is applicable - people just haven’t cottoned on to that moral yet, or haven’t applied it to women, or children, or the poor, or the outlander, etc.
How is it applicable? What makes a moral value applicable? Does that make it true? If someone holds murdering people as a moral value, is it applicable, and therefore universal, and therefore a “moral truth?”
I appreciate you creating a new thread for this topic outside of the “introduce yourself forum,” but it’s easy to copy and paste an outline. And pardon my ignorance but I’m not even sure where you want to go with this. The title suggest a debate on “Are there moral facts?” For now, I am convinced that there are not. You have yet to address any of my posts in this thread. I’m still waiting for the debate.
It happens to be my outline. I didn’t merely copy and paste, I *made* it. It’s a compressed way to make my argument for moral realism. Anything I have to say is there, right now. It’s not *impossible* to read, just a bit scrappy. If it’s too hard, these arguments are elsewhere, and I’m sure you’re sharp enough to find a better-worded version out there. But the arguments aren’t bad, and there’s not a lack of argument from me, just because you can’t read my jerky style.
I’m not even sure where you want to go with this. The title suggest a debate on “Are there moral facts?” For now, I am convinced that there are not. You have yet to address any of my posts in this thread. I’m still waiting for the debate.
Some debate has happened, but it’s a fact that a lot of the debate has been just getting certain issues on the table. Doug has helped with that (it often takes two independent witnesses to establish the truth of something).
My positions are in the outline. (Shrug) I could take *more* type than i did to go through it all. But remember Doug’s pointed out this takes whole chapters, whole books, whole *shelves* of books. I’ve already done the best I can in the first two posts. It would be rather pointless of me to just repeat what i wrote there. But that’s where my own arguments are. There’s two informal arguments for moral facts, and reasonable answers to most of the typical arguments against moral facts. The Hume post does the same, tho’ i admit less clearly.
You’re not *required* to read my arguments, of course. And they *may* all be hooey.
It happens to be my outline. I didn’t merely copy and paste, I *made* it. It’s a compressed way to make my argument for moral realism. Anything I have to say is there, right now. It’s not *impossible* to read, just a bit scrappy. If it’s too hard, these arguments are elsewhere, and I’m sure you’re sharp enough to find a better-worded version out there. But the arguments aren’t bad, and there’s not a lack of argument from me, just because you can’t read my jerky style.
I’m not even sure where you want to go with this. The title suggest a debate on “Are there moral facts?” For now, I am convinced that there are not. You have yet to address any of my posts in this thread. I’m still waiting for the debate.
Some debate has happened, but it’s a fact that a lot of the debate has been just getting certain issues on the table. Doug has helped with that (it often takes two independent witnesses to establish the truth of something).
I know it your outline, and I am interested in the topic. You have different arguments laid out already within the first two posts. However, isn’t that what this thread is for, to discuss it, ask questions, come to a better understanding? It seems that it would be a more productive debate if not only did you start the topic, but that you also continue to participate in it with others that not only share your position, but also those that challenge it or question it. You did for some people, but you did not individually address any of my own posted comments. Also, just because you have another “independent witnesses” that shares your position, does not establish it’s verity. Just as the masses that believe in god does not prove gods existence. If you mean like a peer review that supports your position, I can understand what you mean, but I’m not convinced yet, and that might have to do with my comments not being addressed.
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 03:28 PM
Doug has helped with that (it often takes two independent witnesses to establish the truth of something).
Yes, Doug has helped get YOUR point of view on the table, but I and others have also raised some issues that have yet to be addressed.
inthegobi - 28 December 2007 03:28 PM
My positions are in the outline. (Shrug) I could take *more* type than i did to go through it all. But remember Doug’s pointed out this takes whole chapters, whole books, whole *shelves* of books. I’ve already done the best I can in the first two posts. It would be rather pointless of me to just repeat what i wrote there. But that’s where my own arguments are. There’s two informal arguments for moral facts, and reasonable answers to most of the typical arguments against moral facts. The Hume post does the same, tho’ i admit less clearly.
You’re not *required* to read my arguments, of course. And they *may* all be hooey.
cheers,
kirk
I read the arguments, but I often seem to gain more insight by actually participating in the arguments rather then just reading them. That’s what these forums are often used for. If I come off as having hard feelings, I don’t. I’m just interested in the topic and frustrated that my concerns with it haven’t been addressed individually even though they may be listed in your first two posts of arguments. If we can, let’s continue.
“They must find it difficult, those who have taken authority as truth, rather than truth as authority.” --Gerald Massey
Please, forgive me. So far - i blush to point out - there’s been a lot of attention to the style of the notes. But, well, they actually represent many man-hours of effort, just specifically for easy digestion by sophomores, some of whom are takign their first philosophy class. I can’t imagine making the arguments any clearer without being too lengthy. Of course they had a book that paralled that line of argument, and someone in person to explain it - over and over.
You may have all mistaken me, and thought you had to digest the whole of the darn things in one go. Nay! In the first post are two different arguments in favor of moral facts at number 2, lettered ‘a’ and ‘b’. A reader might pick one of those and start debating. After them, at number 3, there are five different arguments against moral facts, lettered a through e. There is at least one reply in favor of moral facts for each of those ‘con’ arguments. One could pick any single one of those, con or pro, and start debating. Someone mentioned Hume’s very popular claim that morals are a kind of desire, and not at all a kind of belief. That happens not to be a debate about moral realism, but I’m game to debate that one, too. So I think that I’ve done rather well on my end so far. I’m sorry i didn’t make it clearer that the posts can be cut up into bits and debated as such.
Btw: Doug is technically right to agree with me about ‘metaethics’ and being able to talk about moral facts without talking about what makes then so facutal. But secretly, really, truly, Brennan and retrospy and others here have a point: *ultimately* it’s hard to accept moral facts indefinitely, without at least a sketch of what those facts might look like. Without a good theory of the nature of morals, moral realism is depressingly mysterian.
But secretly, really, truly, Brennan and retrospy and others here have a point: *ultimately* it’s hard to accept moral facts indefinitely, without at least a sketch of what those facts might look like.
This is why I included a link to the Affirmations of Secular Humanism. They provide something of a sketch. As for whether or not truth claims about morality can be said to be ultimate, I seriously doubt that anything can be proven to be ultimate at the level of expectation that is demanded as proof of moral statements. All human knowledge is limited. Not just moral knowledge. However, that does not mean than certain moral claims cannot be demonstrated to be useful or irrational.
I still prefer the term “truths” over “facts” in reference to moral claims. The sorts of “facts” that physical scientists often talk about when they use the the term “facts” most certainly involve some parameters that are not present in moral truth.
Ok, I get the gist of this now. It is Your (Kirks) job to make a moral statement that cannot be reduced to non-ethical statements. I know you may have gone over the following question in your intro to this thread, but I would appreciate it if you would go into some more detail. How are moral views unrelated to our desires?
Scott
Moral facts are not unrelated to our desires. They either ground our desires but don’t of themselves motivate; or maybe desires and beliefs are two features of a single mental attidude. (FYI: I’m not really sure which I prefer, but maybe the second choice, for reasons unrelated.)
Hume makes three assumptions to prove that morals have to be beliefs:
A1. No beliefs are desires, and no desires are beliefs. (The fancy term is belief-desire theory. No, really.
A2. Morals by definition move a person to act. (This is called ‘internalism’ about morals)
C3. Therefore, no morals are beliefs.
I would dispute both assumptions.
For the second assumption: This confuses moral facts with how to instantiate them in a person. In fact we already have a word for a moral that’s instantiated in a human person - it’s a *virtue*, a habit or fairly permanent inner attitude of human action. So this assumption just assumes what seems arguable: the general rules can be facts, and their instantiations in people are as desires - desires which conform or are forged by moral facts. This *externalism* about morals explains how non-crazy people can know that stealing is wrong but steal anyway. It also makes sense of backsliding and thumbing one’s nose at rather over-obvious morals like harming people who haven’t harmed you, which are hard to explain if you dont’ have this two-part ambiguity about the word ‘moral’.
For the first assumption: It seems this is an artefact of our theorizing, and further, just empirically false. First, we make use of beliefs in making moral decisions even though a *mere* belief isn’t enough to move you to act; morals that are so exclusively about desires would seem insensitive to revision by any facts! Second, it seems obvious and plain observation that lots of beliefs move me to ‘act’ - in that they move me to think and believe certain things. For examples, once I believe firmly that the Sun is hot and yellow, and that fire burns, I’m ineluctably drawn to actively reject beliefs that the Sun is cold and green, and that fire is pleasant on the skin. There seems nothing absolutely bloodless and ‘desireless’ about even these humble judgments and intellectual rejections. Further, I find myself rather drawn to other beliefs, like that the Sun’s heat has something to do with life on the earth, or that fire would destroy this house of dry wood. So whatever we need to do to make a ‘neat’ category (it’s useful for computers, which have no sense of humor about vaguness and constructive analogy) the empirical fact seems rather that any belief can move me at least to some kind of action. So what’s so weird or absurd about a desire that has some kind of belief-structure?
My suggestion - which i haven’t looked up, but can’t be so original - is of a set of attitudes with two interlocking variables of being believed and being motivating mapped onto a shifting calculus, with beliefs activated or inactive as one consciously attends either directly to them or to some problem set before the mind. I have many attitudes, but just now I have a set of inactive desires and unconscious beliefs about coffee and cafes right now (well, okay, not *right* now), among a gazillion other attitudes; by 6:30 am I shall have their desires activated, and certain beliefs are conscious, influencing my action (Early, at the cafe on Fulton, so I can study online and be ready if they want me in for work tomorrow.) Some attitudes are at base just impulses, but still, they too can be attended to in principle, and their desirous quality or influence in thinking be called up, and even justified. Having a habit to steal doesn’t have to mean you seriously, consciously think it’s right to steal; witness the neurotic, remorseful yet repeat offenders, etc.
Hm. Yeah, I’ll take that. Because all I wanted to prove is that to call anything a ‘moral issue’ is to say, among other things, that it’s universally applicable. Some moral statements are moral truths, others aren’t. How we know that is a different issue, tho’ not unimportant!
Not important? Then I truly am missing something. I thought it was the core issue here.
Heh heh, not *un*important. How can I sound smart if I don’t use the ‘not un-X’ construction occasionally?
There are two ‘issues’. There’s your concern: what morals are on ‘the list’ as i like to call it. But then there’s a different level of argument, quesitons such as ‘is there a list for everyone? Is there any list? If there is, is it just part of the list of ‘customs’ or the list of ‘laws’ etc.?
So it’s very normal and useful to argue about moral realism, for instance, without getting down and dirty about which specific morals are real. (If we’re arguing whether unicorns are real, then asking ‘What about brown unicorns?’ doesn’t deal directly with that question.)
So that’s why it’s ‘not unimportant’ but not part of ‘the core issue’ of moral realism, or universal moral truths, or what ‘grounds’ morals (God? free-floating abstracta like moral rules? Goals? Brain-chemistry? etc.).
A1. No beliefs are desires, and no desires are beliefs. (The fancy term is belief-desire theory. No, really.
A2. Morals by definition move a person to act. (This is called ‘internalism’ about morals)
C3. Therefore, no morals are beliefs.
I missed one more premise to make it ‘tight’ - ‘Only desires move a person to act.’ That’s not the most controversial premise, however.
Heh heh, not *un*important. How can I sound smart if I don’t use the ‘not un-X’ construction occasionally?
Phew. I’ll just add careless reading to my list of shortcomings. :blushes with embarrassment:
So it’s very normal and useful to argue about moral realism, for instance, without getting down and dirty about which specific morals are real. (If we’re arguing whether unicorns are real, then asking ‘What about brown unicorns?’ doesn’t deal directly with that question.)
So that’s why it’s ‘not unimportant’ but not part of ‘the core issue’ of moral realism, or universal moral truths, or what ‘grounds’ morals (God? free-floating abstracta like moral rules? Goals? Brain-chemistry? etc.).
Yes, I get this. I guess I was a little thrown by what appeared to be a popularity contest for answering that deeper question: “No-one...” = moral and “Everyone...” = immoral because most people hold it to be so. Such a tool isn’t very useful when the issue is widely disputed. So it doesn’t seem useful in determining if there is a list or not. (Maybe I’m wrong in assuming that if there is a list for everyone then it is a complete list.)
