OK, so you’re saying thwarting desires is in itself morally bad, always? And as you develop the model, you’ll get to the question of how one evaluates the morality of thwarting a desire which, if fulfilled, thwarts someone else’s desire, as in the torturing children example?
[edit] Not always.
OK you are running ahead but that is good, if you get this. So lets look at this. If you, at least for this debate, accept this model of moral fact, then we can look at the above. Some formalism required as there is a not insignificant amount of recursion going on
1. It is internally bad if a desire is thwarted, the relation is the thwarting and I have stipulated (if you don’t accept this outside this debate) that this means generically bad.
The torturer has Desire that T, where T is true in States of the World W, so T is Fulfilled in W and Thwarted in ~W which is any world where ~T (not T or T is thwarted).
2. If an external examination of a desire compared to all other desire-fulfillment of all others affected ,means that at least some are thwarted then this desire is tentatively morally bad (more correctly it is whether the presence or absence of a desire brings about more thwarting or not) .
For children’s desires C, it is ~C in states of the world W, so children’s desires’ C are thwarted in W. So if states of the world W is brought about by desire T, that is desire T is a reason to act by the torturer to bring about W, then C (the only other relevant desires here) are thwarted, so T is morally bad. At least one of these C’ is the desire not to undergo undue suffering, these children are not cooperating adults, however this is only one desire in C, there are other desires that would be thwarted by being tortured too.
3. So you are suggesting a possibility is that we act against such a morally bad desire by thwarting it’s fulfillment.
That is, let us say for argument’s sake, that a judge has a desire J that is true in States of the World ~W’ ( some sub-set of ~W), and ~W’ implies ~T (since ~W implies ~T), so the fulfillment of J is the thwarting of T. (However this thwarting is done we can leave out for now, it is diversionary at getting at the core of this issue). So as far as the torturer is concerned this result is generically (or whatever they mean by it) bad. Similarly the fulfillment of J is internally generically good to the judge (us or anyone who has this desire, even through indirectly supporting and agreeing with the actions of the judge).
4. We are now questioning whether this desire J is morally good or bad?
To externally evaluate J, we need to compare its existence with it’s non-existence (as we really do for any desire, which leads to the outcomes above).
a) If J if fulfilled, then desire T is thwarted and C is fulfilled (directly C’, indirectly the others) by J. So J involves a combination of T being thwarted and C being fulfilled.
b) If J does not exist (or is thwarted itself) then the consequence on desires is that T is fulfilled and C is thwarted.
So you are asking why should we “prefer” 4a over 4b?
5. OK here goes. (Whether can be generalized to other scenarios is open, we will see.)
The only active desires here are T and J, C is passive - in the sense it is the desire not be hurt and a child is powerless to prevent the thwarting of this desire C.
Now both T and J are tentatively morally bad involving thwarting of other desires. Still the choice is over T and J only here (since C is passive in this scenario). Choosing 4a is to choose J, choosing 4b is to choose T. Objectively we want to choose the morally better option, that is the one that allows more fulfillment and less thwarting.
Since the absence of T is better than T and J brings about the absence of T, J is better than T.
Over to you
[ Edited: 28 February 2008 01:25 AM by faithlessgod ]
Well, I suspect I’d have followed that a lot more easily and quickly in words than “algebra,” but that is just a reflection of my own prejudices. I get what you’re saying, I think, but I’ll restate it as I respond just to be sure.
1. Not being tortured (C) is a passive desire in that it cannot be accomplished by the action of the desirer. It encompasses C’ (desire to avoid suffering) and other passive desires as well. This is what I am accustomed to thinking of as the childrens “interests.” I suppose one could tweak the scenario to make C active (the children could thwart T by some action), so I’m not sure if it being passive is integral to the general point you’re making, but I’ll go along with it as is for now.
2. T is the desire to torture children. It is an active desire because its fulfillment is accomplished by an act of the desirer. T thwarts C by definition. T is what I would call the “interests” of the torturers.
3. J is the desire to prevent T. Also an active desire, though as you said we are leaving aside the details of how/by whom it is enacted. J thwarts T and allows C. J I would call the interests not only of the judge but, arguably, of “society” as a whole, though that’s bleeding over the edges of the limited scenario a bit. It is at leats the interests of the judge and, I would think, the children since it is a necessary condition of C.
4. The thwarting of a desire is generically bad internally, meaning bad for the desirer. The fulfillment of a desire is generically internally good, meaning good for the desirer. These kinds of good and bad are essentially subjective.
5. A desire which thwarts other desires is in principle morally bad, at least tentatively. So in this model that can apply equally to J and T. A desire which permits the fulfillment of another individual’s desire is morally good, at least tentatively. In this scenario, this applies only to J, but in principle it could apply equally to some other desire which aided the fulfillment of T. At this point there is not yet any real distinction between what we conventionally regard as morally good and bad, merely a statement that a set of relations between the world and a desirer that allows the fulfillment of that individual’s desire is morally good and a state that thwarts the desire is morally bad. I would still argue that the distinction here is still essentially subjective since it relies only on the idea that fulfillment of desire is good and thwarting desire is bad, and desire is inherently subjective.
6. Now come sthe “objective” part, but I’m still seeing some arbitrainess or subjectivity here. You claim to judge between J and T based on which allows “more fulfilling and less thwarting.” I’m still having trouble with how this differes from utilitarianism in the sense that it is a calculation of a net X (in this case desire fulfillment rather than “good” or “happiness” as in the classical utilitarian model) which defines morally best or better option, and I think such calculations are often ultimately impossible in real world situations. But anyway, in this limited scenario, why does J fulfill more and thwart less than T? It still seems that you are giving C greater weight than T, and I’m not sure why (in a strict intellectual sense, since I think we almost all would in reality, for probably biological reasons, consider C more valuable than T). Is it simply that J fulfills J and C and thwarts T, whereas T thwarts C and fulfills only T? And doesn’t C, in some sense, require that T be thwarted, even if it passive and so requires some external desire to allow this to happen?
[ Edited: 28 February 2008 10:18 PM by mckenzievmd ]
1. Not being tortured (C) is a passive desire in that it cannot be accomplished by the action of the desirer. It encompasses C’ (desire to avoid suffering) and other passive desires as well. This is what I am accustomed to thinking of as the childrens “interests.” I suppose one could tweak the scenario to make C active (the children could thwart T by some action), so I’m not sure if it being passive is integral to the general point you’re making, but I’ll go along with it as is for now.
I agree I was tryng out an idea over passive that may or may not be correct. As for desires versus interests I am quite ambivalent over that, all I require is that this relates to actual brain states, that is all. Call it what you will, interest-fulfillment if you like.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
2. T is the desire to torture children. It is an active desire because its fulfillment is accomplished by an act of the desirer. T thwarts C by definition. T is what I would call the “interests” of the torturers.
Fine although in this case interests sounds less emotionally engaging than I what I think a torturer desires
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
3. J is the desire to prevent T. Also an active desire, though as you said we are leaving aside the details of how/by whom it is enacted. J thwarts T and allows C. J I would call the interests not only of the judge but, arguably, of “society” as a whole, though that’s bleeding over the edges of the limited scenario a bit. It is at leats the interests of the judge and, I would think, the children since it is a necessary condition of C.
Not sure where you are going with this interests angle that is of any benefit here but if it aids your understanding then fine.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
4. The thwarting of a desire is generically bad internally, meaning bad for the desirer. The fulfillment of a desire is generically internally good, meaning good for the desirer. These kinds of good and bad are essentially subjective.
And so what? Someone has a desire that they want to be fulfilled. They have subjectively decided on one desires over another. Still we can objectively examine the structure of such desires and even the contents and that is all that is needed here. For example “I like sorbet more than ice cream” is a subjective preference but it is also objectively true. If I do get to eat a sorbet this desire is fulfilled, if I am only offered ice cream it is thwarted. And these are all objective facts of the matter.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
5. A desire which thwarts other desires is in principle morally bad, at least tentatively. So in this model that can apply equally to J and T. A desire which permits the fulfillment of another individual’s desire is morally good, at least tentatively. In this scenario, this applies only to J, but in principle it could apply equally to some other desire which aided the fulfillment of T. At this point there is not yet any real distinction between what we conventionally regard as morally good and bad, merely a statement that a set of relations between the world and a desirer that allows the fulfillment of that individual’s desire is morally good and a state that thwarts the desire is morally bad. I would still argue that the distinction here is still essentially subjective since it relies only on the idea that fulfillment of desire is good and thwarting desire is bad, and desire is inherently subjective.
Two similar points, this is a framework and an objective one that we can and are discussing. The fact that desire is inherently subjective as you put it has no great consequences that I can see. The structure and framework still remain the same.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
6. Now come sthe “objective” part, but I’m still seeing some arbitrainess or subjectivity here. You claim to judge between J and T based on which allows “more fulfilling and less thwarting.” I’m still having trouble with how this differes from utilitarianism in the sense that it is a calculation of a net X (in this case desire fulfillment rather than “good” or “happiness” as in the classical utilitarian model) which defines morally best or better option, and I think such calculations are often ultimately impossible in real world situations.
Whether these calculations are possible or not, is not an argument against this approach. It is a scientific field like any other with various challenges, that is all. Anyway I already said this is a “criterion of goodness” not a “decision strategy” so your point holds no water. You are trying to make an unreasonable demand on this model, certainly at this stage and these are no grounds to dismiss in in preference to relativism. I am being methodological here and and am quite prepared to change (say to methodological moral relativism) given convincing arguments, yet have seen none yet.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
But anyway, in this limited scenario, why does J fulfill more and thwart less than T?
Now the meat! Please note that I am trying various approaches here fro the simplest upwards, I am not attempting a moving target, just testing out ideas as we go beyond a descriptive to a normative model.
mckenzievmd - 28 February 2008 10:14 PM
It still seems that you are giving C greater weight than T, and I’m not sure why (in a strict intellectual sense, since I think we almost all would in reality, for probably biological reasons, consider C more valuable than T). Is it simply that J fulfills J and C and thwarts T, whereas T thwarts C and fulfills only T? And doesn’t C, in some sense, require that T be thwarted, even if it passive and so requires some external desire to allow this to happen?
No I specifically am not giving extra weight to C. In addition I am removing any demographic distortion or bias by using prototyping representatives to stand for each indeterminately enumerated class - that is the size of each class does not count here as it can distort results, as opposed to that in standard utilitarian theories.
Lets expand this, dunno if it will work, (but I habe other ideas if not )
1.States of the World Wj: J is fulfilled, T is thwarted, C is fulfilled
2.States of the World Wt: J is thwarted, T is fulfilled, C is thwarted
It is important to remember scenario3, Wc as I have labeled it. We can certainly objectively order these three scenarios is terms of external evaluation of desire fulfillment in descending order as Wj>Wt. This is an objective analysis of various outcomes. That is all I am trying to do here.
Let us try and generalize this logically, applying how these interact in reality to eliminate the naturally impossible ones. ("t" stands for thwart and “f” for fulfilled)
4. States of the World Wf: J is f, T is f, C is (f or t) - naturally impossible so eliminated
5. States of the World Wc1:J is t, T is t, C is t - naturally possible - an earth quake for example
6. States of the World Wc2:J is t, T is t, C is f - naturally possible - an earth quake for example and the children are saved.
This seems to exhaust the possibilities. Now the ranking is Wj>(Wt=Wc2)>Wc1 and this objective analysis still stands. Either way Wj offer more desire fulfillment. I would interested in counter examples obviously.
I think I missed something, since there is no “scenario 3, Wc” above.
Anway, all I see you doing is an adding up of the total number of desire states fulfilled and thwarted and then world state with the greatest net number of fulfilled states as better in some sense. I think this is a flimsy basis for moral decision making that only works in incredibly limited artificial scenarios such as this, so I can’t think it is robust enough to move into more realistic scenarios. The liklihood that such calculations are not even possible in most real life situations is most certainly an argument against the approach, and I don’t see how you can claim it isn’t. You may only be at the stage of defining good and bad, but it is implicit in doing so that such definitions have some relevance for decision making or they are pointless, so I don’t think my demands are in any way unfair. Perhaps premature, and I stand ready to see you demonstrate that in fact your “moral calculus” is feasible in the real world without introducing relative or subjective values, but I am skeptical.
As for the use of “interests,” I prefer it somewhat to “desires” because I think it is broader. A brain dead person may have no desires, but they have interests that I think one can argue have moral relevance. Of course, as a reletavist I hold that moral states such as good/bad, right/wrong only exist relative to desires and beliefs anyway. If we ignore such desires and beliefs, then a childbeing , a pack of wild dogs eating a zebra alive, or the sun going supernova and wiping out humankind are all simply events or actions, with no question of morality even being relevant. Now as I’ve stated before, that doesn’t bother me since I think our feelings and intuitions, moderated and extended by our reason and ultimately based in our biology, are perfectly sound bases for a very good, functional ethical system, though not a perfect one certainly. I don’t see a need for an “objective” scientific basis for ethics any more than a basis in divine will, Platonic ideals, or anything else outside of what people feel, want and believe. So I am interested in your attempt to base moral distinctions and judgements on desires, since I think they are key. But I’m not finding your claim to scientific or mathematical objectivity convincing. Even in such a simple scenario it amounts to a simple summing up of fulfilled and thwarted desires, which doesn’t seem to have any claim to strong advantages over relativism, classical utilitarianism, the categorical imparative, or many other foundations for ethical systems.
I’d be interested in what Doug or others more familiar with formal philosophy have to say about the model, though. And as I said, I’m willing to wait and see where you go with the model and if it seems capable of handiling in a truly objective way realistic moral decision making, which I still say is the onlynpoint of such a model and the discussion around it.
I think I missed something, since there is no “scenario 3, Wc” above.
No you have not, must have got my numbering wrong that is all.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
Anway, all I see you doing is an adding up of the total number of desire states fulfilled and thwarted and then world state with the greatest net number of fulfilled states as better in some sense.
No that is not what I am saying. I have been only descriptive. The question of a prescription,say, that the world is better off with more good-desires-fulfillment is another step which we have not even started to discuss.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
I think this is a flimsy basis for moral decision making that only works in incredibly limited artificial scenarios such as this, so I can’t think it is robust enough to move into more realistic scenarios.
The point of this framework is tbe enable discussion of real not artificial scenarios. Just because you cannot think it is robust enough does not mean it is not.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
The liklihood that such calculations are not even possible in most real life situations is most certainly an argument against the approach, and I don’t see how you can claim it isn’t.
Then you do not understand how science progresses in a field. Just because you are pessimistic here is still not an argument for relativism.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
You may only be at the stage of defining good and bad, but it is implicit in doing so that such definitions have some relevance for decision making or they are pointless, so I don’t think my demands are in any way unfair.
Yes but do you understand the difference between a “criterion of goodness” and a “decision making procedure”. So far you have not indicated that you do. And until you do your argument has no strength (that is you need to refute this difference to start to make your case).
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
Perhaps premature, and I stand ready to see you demonstrate that in fact your “moral calculus” is feasible in the real world without introducing relative or subjective values, but I am skeptical.
This is, of course, fine. Skepticism of this kind is welcome and indeed needed. I would not call it a moral calculus though. Still whatever you call it it is still the case that objectively some desires are being fulfilled or thwarted, whether these can be explicitly calculated (before or maybe only after), approximated to or otherwise.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
As for the use of “interests,” I prefer it somewhat to “desires” because I think it is broader. A brain dead person may have no desires, but they have interests that I think one can argue have moral relevance.
You can use the same argument for desires, this is mere terminology (desires for the fulfillment of a will or deathbed wishes etc.).
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
Of course, as a reletavist I hold that moral states such as good/bad, right/wrong only exist relative to desires and beliefs anyway. If we ignore such desires and beliefs, then a childbeing , a pack of wild dogs eating a zebra alive, or the sun going supernova and wiping out humankind are all simply events or actions, with no question of morality even being relevant. Now as I’ve stated before, that doesn’t bother me since I think our feelings and intuitions, moderated and extended by our reason and ultimately based in our biology, are perfectly sound bases for a very good, functional ethical system, though not a perfect one certainly.
Well your demand for a perfect one will always go unanswered. We dont have a pefect understanding of anythiing really, why should one expect this of morality? Plus how can relativism be have a “perfectly sound bases for a very good, functional ethical system” when it can make no pronouncements of any force over other cultures whose morals differ - maybe there child torture is ok, and we must tolerate it, for who are we to say otherwise. That is the basis of an ethical system????
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
I don’t see a need for an “objective” scientific basis for ethics any more than a basis in divine will, Platonic ideals, or anything else outside of what people feel, want and believe.
As far as I can see there is either an objective basis for it or none at all. A subjective basis as you argue for is a fiction. Maybe it is a fiction but you deny this too. Regardless there is an objective basis for “what people feel, want and believe” in science and so on, so the burden on you is to say how this does not apply to morals (however they work) too.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
So I am interested in your attempt to base moral distinctions and judgements on desires, since I think they are key.
Good
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
But I’m not finding your claim to scientific or mathematical objectivity convincing. Even in such a simple scenario it amounts to a simple summing up of fulfilled and thwarted desires, which doesn’t seem to have any claim to strong advantages over relativism, classical utilitarianism, the categorical imparative, or many other foundations for ethical systems.
I have not yet presented an ethical system. I have given an objective framework that could be used to evaluate ethical systems and possibly evolve into one itself. This has yet to be explored here.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
I’d be interested in what Doug or others more familiar with formal philosophy have to say about the model, though.
So would I but I am dubious of the many philosophical conundrums in morality as I have stated in other threads.
mckenzievmd - 29 February 2008 02:40 PM
And as I said, I’m willing to wait and see where you go with the model and if it seems capable of handiling in a truly objective way realistic moral decision making, which I still say is the onlynpoint of such a model and the discussion around it.
That is to be developed and again I am more focused on a criterion of goodness rather than actual decision making at this stage ( that is I want to move from a descriptive to a normative model before we approach applied ethics). To demand otherwise in a model being developed and discussed here is running too far ahead I think.
Finally I note that I have given you a tentative answer in my previous post to which I have had no feedback. So can you not answer this or is my analysis acceptable for your original question over thwarting a desire thwarting desire (which was a good question, of course)?
Well your demand for a perfect one will always go unanswered. We dont have a pefect understanding of anythiing really, why should one expect this of morality? Plus how can relativism be have a “perfectly sound bases for a very good, functional ethical system” when it can make no pronouncements of any force over other cultures whose morals differ - maybe there child torture is ok, and we must tolerate it, for who are we to say otherwise. That is the basis of an ethical system????
You misunderstood me. I do not expect a perfect system since none is possible. I think a system such as I describe is essentially what we have despite our protestations that our ethics come form god or pure logic or some other “objective” source, and I think one based on intuition modified by reaoson is good enough. As I have pointed out ad nauseum, the culture in which child torture is a moral good is a strawman argument. Our biology sets limits for moral principles that make such a culture vanishingly unlikley. Certainly we can point to particular places and times in which lots of people did bad things but 1) this is still the exception and pretty uncommon and 2) this is in the context of absolutist or realist moral systems so it’s hardly an argument against relativsim. Anyway, my point is that I think ultimately an “objective” foundation for ethics is an illusion, but I’m fine following along as you develop what you’re proposing to see where it goes.
As for the issue of the feasability or the kind of calculations you suggest, the burden of proof is on you my friend to show that your system can handle real life. I’ll wait and see.
I understand you’re trying to separate defining goodness and making moral decisions. However, I’m just pointing out what I see as a weakness in your definition that might carry over into the decision-making stage. Your criteria rests on the thwarting of desires or the fulfillment of desires, theoretically with complete neutrality as to the nature of those desires. I see that as unlikely to lead to a robust decision-making system, but as I say, it’s your model so the burden of proof is yours. I don’t see any “tentative answer” except the comparison of conditions to determine which fulfills the greatest net number of desires and thwarts the fewest. Yet you deny that that is what you are suggesting is how to decide which desire is morally better. SO maybe restate what you are saying becuase I can’t respond to it since I clearly am not getting it.
You misunderstood me. I do not expect a perfect system since none is possible. I think a system such as I describe is essentially what we have despite our protestations that our ethics come form god or pure logic or some other “objective” source, and I think one based on intuition modified by reaoson is good enough.
I am not saying otherwise the difference is that you appear to be refusing to accept that one can investigate objectively how “intuition modified by reason” works and have given me no good reason why this is different to anything else.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
As I have pointed out ad nauseum, the culture in which child torture is a moral good is a strawman argument.
Sorry you have misunderstood me but I thought this was obvious. I never thought that any modern culture endorse child torture, I was just presenting a logical structure which you have taken much further than intended for such a stage. Given this, you can replace the variable “child torture” with another value such as “child labour”, “suppression of women, “"suppression of minorities” or whatever you want that is suitably relevant.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
Our biology sets limits for moral principles that make such a culture vanishingly unlikley.
Of course, that is why we had had human sacrifice cultures, genocide repeatedly in the past etc. etc. Our biology has not prevented at one time or another what we regard today as the most horrendous acts. Merely relying on biology to prevent this is a misleading thought of its own.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
Certainly we can point to particular places and times in which lots of people did bad things but 1) this is still the exception and pretty uncommon and 2) this is in the context of absolutist or realist moral systems so it’s hardly an argument against relativsim.
This was not meant as an argument against relativism, this was an argument for an objective analysis of human interactive behavior. Now 1st order relativism is trivially true but beside the point and the grander claim of 2nd order relativism - that no culture can judge another etc.- is what I am challenging as I see no grounds to assert such a claim.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
Anyway, my point is that I think ultimately an “objective” foundation for ethics is an illusion, but I’m fine following along as you develop what you’re proposing to see where it goes.
Thanks, well then can we get back to this now?
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
As for the issue of the feasability or the kind of calculations you suggest, the burden of proof is on you my friend to show that your system can handle real life. I’ll wait and see.
I repeat I am not claiming that these can be done in real-time - that needs to be investigated but this does not alter the fact that these relations exist and we can objectively understand them. Your argument is simply a rhetorical ploy to avoid this core point. You are making the same rhetorical move as creationists do when they try to dismiss natural evolution by saying it does not explain the origin of life (biogenesis).
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
I understand you’re trying to separate defining goodness and making moral decisions. Your criteria rests on the thwarting of desires or the fulfillment of desires, theoretically with complete neutrality as to the nature of those desires.
Good.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
I don’t see any “tentative answer” except the comparison of conditions to determine which fulfills the greatest net number of desires and thwarts the fewest.
That is all I am attempting at this stage.
mckenzievmd - 01 March 2008 11:09 AM
Yet you deny that that is what you are suggesting is how to decide which desire is morally better. SO maybe restate what you are saying becuase I can’t respond to it since I clearly am not getting it.
The question is, to turn this into an ethical system, is whether maximizing good desires/interest and/or minimizing bad desires/interests is a basis for an ethical system and/or a means for evaluating other ethical systems. Then, if so, how to implement it is yet a further question. However until people understand the framework and you appear more to than the others AFAICT, then I am still building a framework and I am far more confident such types of framework than these latter two as yet unexplored implications.
OK lets revise where we have got to in this thread.
First I have my doubts about developing this framework as a moral system in its own right. Given this I realize that I have introduced “moral speak” unreasonably and misleadingly early in this framework, including in the thread title, so lets take a step back, remove this bias by dropping this. And what are we left with then?
Humans are biological organisms with a certain type of complex brains such that some of their actions - words and behaviours - are a consequence of attempting to fulfill requirements specified by certain brain states. One could call these motivational brain states, desires, preferences, interests or something else. Whether these are states of mind or states of brain is moot, I am assuming the latter here. Still whatever your theory of mind, there are objective requirements specified by these brain states, this specification being the conditions of fulfillment. Due to the actions and inactions of the specifier of these requirements, they are either fulfilled, uncompleted, aborted or thwarted. These results are also objective. One can examine the many ways that requirements can be faulty - requirements impossible to fulfill (singly or together), requirements that are not “worth” it, actions that mistakenly thwart the requirments and so on. again this analysis can be quite objective. The fact that there may be quite a few empirical challenges applying this in differing circumstances is not a substantive argument against such a framework. Finally there can be a clash between requirements from different humans where, say, one requirement needs the thwarting of another’s requirement for its own fulfillment.
It is with respect to these type of clashes that the questions of ethics apply. One can generate different, let us call it conflict resolution strategies or theories - meta-ethics (are all clashes “bad”,only certain ones or are some non-clashes “bad” etc.) - and different tactics or operations - normative ethics - and finally evaluate the results the success or failure of theory versus practice - a sort of descriptive ethics if you will.
That is what I am proposing here. If someone has something better please suggest it and if someone can criticize such an approach in general or this version in particular please do.
I’m not saying one cannot study ethics objectively, only that one cannot set normative ethical standards that have a purely objective basis.
I disagree that our biology has never prevented what we consider horrendous behavior. I think it certainly permits such behavior, however my point is that the tired argument that relativism necessarily means that societies can arbitrarily choose “evil” values to relabel and glorify as “good” is untrue. Consequently, one pillar of the argument in favor of finding an objective basis for morality, that otherwise our ethics can be whatever we want, is faulty. You may or may not actually believe this yourself, but I just raised it in the context of explaining why I do not think making ethics purely objective is possible or necessary.
I have no objection to the general trend of your argument in your latest post. I do question whether we can identify brain states objectively or analyze their criteria for fulfillment in as precise a way as you suggest, and I still disagree that such a challenge is immaterial or not “substantive.” For your theoretical framework to move forward and have any meaning, you have to meet this challenge. If the kind of brain states you are interested in turn out not to really exist as you conceive them, or if they are not objectivley identifiable reliably, then the model fails. But the general idea itself is fine as far as it goes.
What do you do about conflicts that do not involve the brain states of allparticipants? I.e. do ethics not apply to people or beings without brain states of which they are themselves reflectively aware? What about the brain dead, retarded children, dead bodies, other animals with simple or effectively no brains? I’m not being judgemental, just asking whether these are automatically excluded from your ethical system by virtue of not having what we usually call desires, preferences, etc.
How about partial fulfillment of these states? Is that possible, and if so how does it fit?
I’m not saying one cannot study ethics objectively, only that one cannot set normative ethical standards that have a purely objective basis.
Well I am not so certain that “one cannot set normative ethical standards that have a purely objective basis”. Indeed I am focused on examining those who claim they can. It appears that you are dogmatically implying it is impossible. Why dogmatic? Well I might have missed this but I have yet to see your argument that this is so, if I have missed this then please enlighten me. Still of the objective accounts none fulfills what i am looking for but the best are easily preferable to ...
mckenzievmd - 04 March 2008 10:38 AM
I disagree that our biology has never prevented what we consider horrendous behavior. I think it certainly permits such behavior, however my point is that the tired argument that relativism necessarily means that societies can arbitrarily choose “evil” values to relabel and glorify as “good” is untrue. Consequently, one pillar of the argument in favor of finding an objective basis for morality, that otherwise our ethics can be whatever we want, is faulty. You may or may not actually believe this yourself, but I just raised it in the context of explaining why I do not think making ethics purely objective is possible or necessary.
It is not a question of necessity but possibility. How can you deny that the Nazis, Stalin, the Taliban, the dark ages catholic church, Dafur, Mao’s cultural revolution and many others are not examples of “evil” values, as you put it? Its their values and who are we to say that they are wrong? Really? Common don’t be absurd. QED.
mckenzievmd - 04 March 2008 10:38 AM
I have no objection to the general trend of your argument in your latest post. I do question whether we can identify brain states objectively or analyze their criteria for fulfillment in as precise a way as you suggest, and I still disagree that such a challenge is immaterial or not “substantive.” For your theoretical framework to move forward and have any meaning, you have to meet this challenge. If the kind of brain states you are interested in turn out not to really exist as you conceive them, or if they are not objectivley identifiable reliably, then the model fails. But the general idea itself is fine as far as it goes.
I have no issue with reasonable skepticism. This is the best way to achieve a robust theory. I am creating a fallible model. For example,if you think there are no brain states that generate requirements on the world, that is no desires, interests, preferences of the mind, or any eliminative or reductive brain equivalents exist (regardless of whether we can actually measure them directly or not) then please demonstrate this but I fail to see how you can then make any argument in favour of your relativism unless you are a dualist!
mckenzievmd - 04 March 2008 10:38 AM
What do you do about conflicts that do not involve the brain states of allparticipants? I.e. do ethics not apply to people or beings without brain states of which they are themselves reflectively aware? What about the brain dead, retarded children, dead bodies, other animals with simple or effectively no brains? I’m not being judgemental, just asking whether these are automatically excluded from your ethical system by virtue of not having what we usually call desires, preferences, etc.
No these are not automatically excluded and these are good questions. However let us focus on the core issues first which does involve the clashes between people’s requirements and see how this relates to the current crop of moral theories. Certainly there is nothing in the idea of requirements to exclude relations with any of your examples I just quoted. Without relevant brain states of any participant there is nothing to talk about but this does not imply that all the relevant states of the world must include and only include brains states of all the participants. The whole point of this relational framework (as I have just redefined it in the previous post) is to avoid any specific moral theory, such a traditionally subjective point of view (whilst allowing it can be considered within such a framework), it also involves states of the world that might include any of your examples.
mckenzievmd - 04 March 2008 10:38 AM
How about partial fulfillment of these states? Is that possible, and if so how does it fit?
Well I was sketching out a skeleton at this stage, but partial fulfillment would mean that some but not all of the conditions of fulfillment were met. For such scenarios, quite simply one could break down these multiple conditions and examine them separately.
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