.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

faithlessgod - 07 May 2008 11:35 PM

No it is to discourage having those desires in the first place

Does that distinction come with a difference?
How does one extinguish a desire without either fulfilling or somehow thwarting it?

Yes it does make a difference. It is between not having the desire and having the desire and wanting to fulfill it. It is not so much extinguishing but I would saying dissolving but lets not get into semantics A desire is extinguished through social forces generating emotional reactions such as guilt, shame and embarrassment which are a few of the contributory factors so that next time it is less likely to be the more and stronger desire to act upon and eventually it could be become extinct.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

What then justifies the action of the many in thwarting the desire of the one to thwart the desires of many (if not the desire-thwarting of the many outweighing the desire-thwarting of the few)?

First this is one step too far. Desire thwarting responses to desire thwarting desires are the result of a failure of social conditioning and hence morality and where the legal system steps in. If the one has desire thwarting desires and social forces fail to prevent this, then, even though it is a prima facia wrong to imprison that person it is justified to prevent further desires thwarting given the alternative of not imprisoning that person, for example, which leads to more desire thwarting.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

Have you explained how this works on the social level (and if so could you reveal the post #?)?

Yes repeatedly in these posts.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM

How he equivocating over relative?  If one guy is programmed by his genes to think murder good while another is programmed by his genes to think murder wrong then why is this not moral relativism in the customary sense?

A double no. Moral relativism is usually relative to cultural values with the fallacious inference of normative relativism. If values were relative to genes then this would be independent of culture and normative relativism would not hold. How are people are “programmed” to murder or not murder - how do genes incorporate what is defined culturally as illegal killing?

“No” doesn’t work particularly well as an answer to how and why questions.

Your “illegal killing” objection is a straw man--murder is not typically defined as “illegal killing.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder

Your “programmed to murder” comment also seems to be a straw man.  My statement and that of baffledking both referred to a predisposition of valuation, not a causal account of behavior.

That’s a great deal of misdirection for a four sentence paragraph.  I don’t think you’d care for it if you were on the receiving end.

Really? I answered your specific question over relativism and equivocation see that you commented no further on that, I take you see that point

The illegal killing is not a straw man, if what qualifies as murder varies from culture to culture legal systems, then how could it be genetically based?
Anyway that is I admit not the main issue here. If someone is “programmed” to murder then they will fall foul (hopefully sooner rather than later) of the legal and/or psychiatric system as clearly social conditioning will fail on them.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

Are you able to specify the non-genetic “proximate biological basis,” or at least suggest a specific alternative to the genetic origin of valuation?

I do not deny that there is a genetic origin to valuation but that value does not reside in the genes themselves. We have various desires such as to eat, drink, for sex, avoiding predators, avoiding pain, seeking pleasure and these are all biological and all benefit in one way or another surviving and successful reproduction and have an evolutionary origin. It is the genetic fallacy to assert because desires have some dependency on genes that value is genetic.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

And what is the basis for the desires if not genetic?  We’re back to your “proximate biological basis"--what is it?

Desires are the proximate basis!

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM

Person A painfully whips person B

The scenario above may be morally good or apparently morally bad depending simply on the subjective desires of A and B.  Baffledking is perfectly reasonable in asking his question, for your model appears to preserve subjective morality and present it in supposedly objective terms.

Stating these are “subjective” here is redundant.

Agreed, but to emphasize the point.  The fact that one has desires objectively makes them no less subjective.

You have this the wrong way around. Without desire there are no values (desires are value imposing functions if you will). This is an objective or third person analysis looking an the material effects of these desires.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

It is a third person objective analysis.

It is a third person objective analysis of subjectivity.

If you like yes, bu the danger is to play semantics. Still it is still objective and that is the focus here.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

You still have not answered as to where where these other values are for it be be culturally relative. There is no subjective morality here just desires fulfilling or thwarting as occurs. There are no additional moral facts.

If it is redundant to say “subjective desires” then how do you coherently deny the subjectivity of basing your system on desires?
There need not be any additional moral fact if the moral fact you’ve located is a function of (subjective) desires.  That is subjective morality by definition.

To deny that morality is partly about subjective desires, is to deny morality. That is the part of the ontological topic under investigation. However you can call it what you like this analysis is an epistemically objective analysis and that is what counts.

Bryan - 08 May 2008 12:25 AM

Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM

I’d like to know whether faithlessgod thinks his system results in true moral statements like “X is wrong” instead of merely “J thinks X is wrong.”

Yes it does in the usual sense of a moral fact. What obligations and prohibitions anyone would have in a specific situation - with no exceptions. And you can generalize this, but you do not get absolutes of course.

Thank you for addressing that issue.  The next key issue is your “proximate biological basis.”

Done above

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jholt - 08 May 2008 04:07 PM

Please pardon this interruption. I’ve honestly grown interested in what is talked about on this thread. I do want to make sure my score card is correct—faithlessgod, you argue against moral relativism, right? While watching the Ron Geire CFI video again today, I was reminded that he argues for moral relativism, but says it’s not a simple form, that it is naturalistic in the way it recognizes cultures are natural and morals are derived from the culture.

Yes I am arguing against moral relativism specifically normative relativism - that one cannot judge other culture’s morals.
Brennen and baffeldking both argue for moral relativism, Bryan argues for another form of relativism, some sort of Divine Command, obviously he agrees with me being against normative relativism but for different reasons

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Wow. The speed with which this thread is moving seems to be accelerating rapidly!  I must apologize for being relatively (no pun intended) slow to reply recently; I am currently in the middle of editing a film which seems to be taking up every spec of free time. But anyways, thanks Bryan, faithless and jholt for keeping the dialogue going and saving me a warm seat when I got back. I am by no means anything but an absolute beginner when it comes to moral philosophy so my arguments are based purely on my own grasp of the traditional definitions of moral relativism and objectivism and my common sense responses to both of them.  From the paltry amount of information I’ve read on either view, I am somewhat puzzled that most authors seem to reject moral relativism without actually refuting its foundational claims, mainly, that morality is subjective phenomenon and that as such, there are no moral facts, or absolutes about right behaviour and wrong behaviour or right values and wrong values.  Contrarily, objectivism traditionally holds that there are moral facts and that regardless of the desires of the agent, some actions are always right and some actions are always wrong.

To recap, Faithlessgod is not arguing for traditional objectivism nor am I arguing for traditional relativism.  I am convinced our values and our beliefs about right and wrong stem ultimately from our genes and I concede their objectivity only insofar as they are “hardwired” into us and cannot be ignored, negated or refuted in their essential form.  For example, it seems clear to me that all creatures with a central nervous system have the following “values” preprogrammed into them by their genes: pain is bad, pleasure is good, procreation is good, self(genetic)-perpetuation is good, death is bad. From these (what I have been calling) “meta-values/meta-morals” we derive all other moral beliefs including beliefs about killing, stealing, co-operating, communicating etc....Morality is relative insofar as it is directly derived from the genetic makeup of the creature in question; what is right and wrong will depend solely on the genes (or perhaps to be safer..."activated" genes) of the agent.  But taking an entirely evolutionary biological approach is akin to explaining away morality all together, which has lead to the criticism that moral relativism is really moral nihilism, that is, denying that morals even exist at all.  Epistemically, I have to problem with this, though I do think that “moral speak” as faithless called it, is useful when discussing behaviour in a social context.

I’ll jump right back in…

A desire is extinguished through social forces generating emotional reactions such as guilt, shame and embarrassment which are a few of the contributory factors so that next time it is less likely to be the more and stronger desire to act upon and eventually it could be become extinct.

But are not the social forces used to “extinguish” the desire really just a slow-drip process of thwarting the desire anyways?  Also, it seems that this Pavlovian conditioning process is morally questionable in the first place?  How do we know the social forces at work are “good”?  What if the society in question is Hitler’s Germany or the present-day Myanmar?  In other words, it seems that “extinguishing” desires are really the same thing as thwarting the desires.

Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM

Could you explain why, I cannot see this. I have just presented a third person objective analysis which is extendable beyond this example of course. Where does it become first person and subjective? Where is the relativity - where are the other “existing” values these are supposedly relative to?

Person A painfully whips person B

The scenario above may be morally good or apparently morally bad depending simply on the subjective desires of A and B.  Baffledking is perfectly reasonable in asking his question, for your model appears to preserve subjective morality and present it in supposedly objective terms.

Stating these are “subjective” here is redundant. It is a third person objective analysis. You still have not answered as to where these other values are for it be culturally relative. There is no subjective morality here just desires fulfilling or thwarting as occurs. There are no additional moral facts.

So, if a sadist whips a non-masochist it is morally wrong. Yes?
If he whips a masochist it is morally right? Yes?

If the above statements are both true then I still fail to see how you can say that morality is anything but relative.

Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM

I’d like to know whether faithlessgod thinks his system results in true moral statements like “X is wrong” instead of merely “J thinks X is wrong.”

Yes it does in the usual sense of a moral fact. What obligations and prohibitions anyone would have in a specific situation - with no exceptions. And you can generalize this, but you do not get absolutes of course.

But this precisely what moral relativism holds (or should be able to hold).  Right and wrong only exist in specific situations.  You see, “X is wrong when A” is not an objectivist’s statement, it is a relativist’s statement.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

From the paltry amount of information I’ve read on either view, I am somewhat puzzled that most authors seem to reject moral relativism without actually refuting its foundational claims, mainly, that morality is subjective phenomenon and that as such, there are no moral facts, or absolutes about right behaviour and wrong behaviour or right values and wrong values.

If morality is subjective it does not necessarily imply it is morally relative (that is cultural relativism)
For there to be no moral facts than morality must only subjective.
I still see in what you write equivocation over relative. It would be useful to state what type of relativism you are referring to in these and the following statements. I will add the most likely qualifiers to clarify this or at least for you to see what I am seeing.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

Contrarily, objectivism traditionally holds that there are moral facts and that regardless of the desires of the agent, some actions are always right and some actions are always wrong.

I think you mean moral objectivism

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

To recap, Faithlessgod is not arguing for traditional objectivism nor am I arguing for traditional relativism.

Aha, so you are not arguing for moral relativism as in values relative to a culture‘s values and not arguing for normative relativism hat one cannot judge another culture’s morals?

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

I am convinced our values and our beliefs about right and wrong stem ultimately from our genes and I concede their objectivity only insofar as they are “hardwired” into us and cannot be ignored, negated or refuted in their essential form.  For example, it seems clear to me that all creatures with a central nervous system have the following “values” preprogrammed into them by their genes: pain is bad, pleasure is good, procreation is good, self(genetic)-perpetuation is good, death is bad. From these (what I have been calling) “meta-values/meta-morals” we derive all other moral beliefs including beliefs about killing, stealing, co-operating, communicating etc....Morality is relative insofar as it is directly derived from the genetic makeup of the creature in question; what is right and wrong will depend solely on the genes (or perhaps to be safer..."activated" genes) of the agent.  But taking an entirely evolutionary biological approach is akin to explaining away morality all together, which has lead to the criticism that moral relativism is really moral nihilism, that is, denying that morals even exist at all.  Epistemically, I have to problem with this, though I do think that “moral speak” as faithless called it, is useful when discussing behaviour in a social context.

If morals are relative to gene based values this is certainly not moral relativism and it is confusing to call it that IMHO. Further this would explicitly reject normative relativism, do you agree? This is gene-based morality which is not normally called relativism. If so we have been talking across each other? Using the term relative in this way you used in the above paragraph does not imply subjectivity. Indeed all of scientific knowledge can be applied this way and this is just objective relativism.

My critique of gene-based morality has two main points 1) as I said before the Euthyphro dilemma - if you take the second horn then you need an independent theory of morality to evaluate these gene based values. Taking the first horn there is inconsistent evidence we have evolved to be moral given the history of mankind’s violence o each other etc. 2) Genes are certainly necessary but insufficient for morality. They are distal causes and not the only ones.

I argue that the proximate causes are the biological and evolutionarily selected desires. Both fixed desire-as-ends - the aversion to predators, the aversion to pain, the desire for happiness, the desire for xex , the aversion o hunger and thirst and so on and also malleable desires hat are affected to intra-generational factors too quick for genes to operate over, still these evolutionarily selected because they provided differentially reproductive successful phenotypes.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

A desire is extinguished through social forces generating emotional reactions such as guilt, shame and embarrassment which are a few of the contributory factors so that next time it is less likely to be the more and stronger desire to act upon and eventually it could be become extinct.

But are not the social forces used to “extinguish” the desire really just a slow-drip process of thwarting the desire anyways?

Only desires that are acted upon can be fulfilled or thwarted. If the social forces change one’s motivational set so that these are not the more and stronger of desires then they are not acted upon and so not thwartable.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

Also, it seems that this Pavlovian conditioning process is morally questionable in the first place?  How do we know the social forces at work are “good”?  What if the society in question is Hitler’s Germany or the present-day Myanmar?

This is a good point. It is indeed this Pavolvian conditioning which has distorted and biased this natural process as in the countries you a gave and wrt to religious morality and so on. The social forces at work are “good” only to the extent this are being used to encourage desire fulfilling desires and discourage desire thwarting desires.  Indeed acts, consequences, duties, rules, laws and social “forces” are all evaluated according to their effects on desire fulfillment.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

In other words, it seems that “extinguishing” desires are really the same thing as thwarting the desires.

Recall that I preferred dissolved to extinguish but this has been answered in the previous paragraph.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

So, if a sadist whips a non-masochist it is morally wrong. Yes?
If he whips a masochist it is morally right? Yes?

If the above statements are both true then I still fail to see how you can say that morality is anything but relative.

This is equivocation over relative. One could call this objectively relative and it is quite standard in scientific and empirical reasoning and does not lead to moral relativism. For example when one applies an equation and obtains values for the independent variables such that the value of the dependent variable changes, call it relative if you will but then you have emptied this term of any real usefulness and this does not imply anything like subjectivity nor moral relativism.  The classic point is Einstein’s theories of relativity which do refute the absolue postulaes of Newtonian Mechanics and are still quite objective.

baffledking - 09 May 2008 12:52 PM

But this precisely what moral relativism holds (or should be able to hold).  Right and wrong only exist in specific situations.  You see, “X is wrong when A” is not an objectivist’s statement, it is a relativist’s statement.

More equivocation. Moral relativism says something like that Act A is right relative to culture B and wrong relative to culture C.  To say that anything dependent on conditions in anyway is moral relativism is plain false. On what a basis can anyone apply any model to reality without avoiding specifying conditions?  It is is a non sequitur to say this makes it subjective or morally relative.

AFAICS you seem to be switching between gene-based and relative (culture) morality. Please could you make up your mind which you are defending? I do not see how you can hold both positions since arguments for moral relativism refute gene-based morality and vice versa so this is incoherent, if you don’t mind me saying so.

I would generally agree with baffledking’s approach, with a few caveats. I do think evolution underlies our moral sense and approach to moral reasoning in an ultimate caual relationship. I think the proximate relations between evolutionary adaptations and actual individual moral decision-making are quite complex and not yet well-elucidated. Desires and aversions are certainly fundamntal proximate causes. I do think some of the more complex moral principles humans hold are the result of cultural factors. The basic mechanisms for reasoning in general and moral reasoning in particular are estalshed by evolution, but I think there is a great deal of latitude available, and I would probably place more emphasis than baffleding on culture as a proximate cause. Arbitrary principles that may or may not have made some sort of practical sense can become established and then propagate for long periods of time in a culture well past any apparent practical or evolutionary utility. In this sense, I do think moral values can be arbitrary, at least within the limits set by evolutionary hardwired principles. I don’t think a society could develop that thinks eating all newborn infants is morally good, because this falls outside of the limits set by evolution and is only aailable as a moral choice to sociopaths. Still, many principles people fight and die for are ultimately arbitrary and pointless, which I think points to an important role for culture that we must keep in mind when analyzing moral systems or principles.

I also agree that it is possible to make decisions and judgements despite this, so I’m no extreme postmodernist in this regard, as I’ve already explained.

If morality is subjective it does not necessarily imply it is morally relative (that is cultural relativism)
For there to be no moral facts than morality must only subjective.
I still see in what you write equivocation over relative. It would be useful to state what type of relativism you are referring to in these and the following statements. I will add the most likely qualifiers to clarify this or at least for you to see what I am seeing.

I believe morals do not exist outside the mind and are entirely subjective phenomena derived from biologically determined values/desires (what you call “desires-as-ends") which are in turn, determined by the creature’s genetic makeup and experiential influences, or phenotype if you will.  Those behaviours we say are morally “right” are supposed to maximize our chances of achieving our “desires-as-ends” while those behaviours we designate as being morally “wrong” minimize those chances.  Of course, we may be mistaken about which behaviours are “right” and which are “wrong” and this is why society develops laws to uphold the moral beliefs of those agents who hold societal authority.  When I say that morals are “relative” I mean that they have no inherent truth value and are only logically meaningful in the mind of the agent or once the “desires-as-ends” have been defined.  I am attempting to salvage and improve the argument put forth by traditional relativism by being more precise about what I mean when I say “right” and “wrong.” If this is equivocating then I apologize. Perhaps you might suggest a better way of defining relative, or another word I might use in place of “relative.” Given my definitions of the terms “relative”, “right”, “wrong” and your term “desires-as-ends” I do not see how this view is incoherent. 

Aha, so you are not arguing for moral relativism as in values relative to a culture‘s values and not arguing for normative relativism that one cannot judge another culture’s morals?

From what we know about evolutionary biology and sociology, “culture” is an inadequate and misleading term to use when talking about the origin of values and beliefs.  Instead of “cultural” relativism, I’ll substitute the term “genetic” relativism or “naturalistic” relativism or even “phenotypical” relativism if we want to be really precise.  But moral relativism’s rejection of the moral objectivist’s belief in absolute moral statements is a rejection that I wish to maintain.  We may judge and criticize other people, societies, cultures and even ourselves but only without invoking a “higher” morality since such a term is meaningless.  For criticism to have any meaning, it must be made with reference to the efficacy of the behaviour-in-question’s ability to achieve one’s stated “desire”.  For example, if Culture A has the “desire” to foster a populace that will maintain a competitive advantage in the world market, and decides that the best way to achieve this is to require all workers to work a 12hr day, I might see this as a bad decision and criticize Culture A for its lack of foresight.  I might suggest that a “better” way to achieve their stated goal would be to reward hard-work and innovation with higher pay and public recognition or some such thing.  Such a criticism is devoid of any moral reference and criticism in any case can be made from the very same place, devoid of any reference to morality or a cosmic kind of absolute “right and wrong”.  I might criticize Culture B for its practice of slavery but instead of invoking morality I can simply show them that slavery is not a good means of achieving their stated end/desire.  At times, when the rationality of a behaviour is in question, we may be forced to appeal to our emotional response to the behaviour-in-question, for example, torture or animal experimentation make me feel bad and therefore, regardless of their possible rational implications, I choose not to partake in such behaviour or endorse it.  This emotional appeal is a big part of what makes us human, in my opinion and a big part of what makes psychopaths distinctly “inhuman.”

My critique of gene-based morality has two main points 1) as I said before the Euthyphro dilemma - if you take the second horn then you need an independent theory of morality to evaluate these gene based values. Taking the first horn there is inconsistent evidence we have evolved to be moral given the history of mankind’s violence o each other etc. 2) Genes are certainly necessary but insufficient for morality. They are distal causes and not the only ones.

I agree there is more to be researched and contemplated with regards to “gene-based morality” but I disagree about your conclusion regarding the first horn of the Euthypro dilemma. All human behaviour (and animal behaviour) is adapted to best ensure the survival of the organism in the given environment.  There are no morals anywhere in the equation. Morality is really a malapropism for “genetically-derived-behavioural instructions”, to say it clumsily.

Only desires that are acted upon can be fulfilled or thwarted. If the social forces change one’s motivational set so that these are not the more and stronger of desires then they are not acted upon and so not thwartable.

So, a child born into poverty whose dream to become successful and wealthy slowly disappears as he grows up and realizes the improbability of this dream has not had his desire thwarted by society but merely “dissolved”?  Doesn’t this still cause him to suffer internally?  Isn’t this close to what happens to Winston in 1984 when he is finally “conditioned” to love Big Brother?

This is equivocation over relative. One could call this objectively relative and it is quite standard in scientific and empirical reasoning and does not lead to moral relativism. For example when one applies an equation and obtains values for the independent variables such that the value of the dependent variable changes, call it relative if you will but then you have emptied this term of any real usefulness and this does not imply anything like subjectivity nor moral relativism.  The classic point is Einstein’s theories of relativity which do refute the absolute postulates of Newtonian Mechanics and are still quite objective.

But whether we like it or not, Einstein’s theories still render Newtonian laws relative to the bodies being studied. But moral relativism is not relative epistemically; that is, the theory itself is not relative, the morality it discusses is what is relative.

The social forces at work are “good” only to the extent this are being used to encourage desire fulfilling desires and discourage desire thwarting desires.  Indeed acts, consequences, duties, rules, laws and social “forces” are all evaluated according to their effects on desire fulfillment.

But isn’t one’s desire-fulfilling another’s desire-thwarting? One man’s pain another man’s pleasure?

I would generally agree with baffledking’s approach, with a few caveats[:]

I do think some of the more complex moral principles humans hold are the result of cultural factors. The basic mechanisms for reasoning in general and moral reasoning in particular are established by evolution, but I think there is a great deal of latitude available, and I would probably place more emphasis than baffledking on culture as a proximate cause. Arbitrary principles that may or may not have made some sort of practical sense can become established and then propagate for long periods of time in a culture well past any apparent practical or evolutionary utility. In this sense, I do think moral values can be arbitrary, at least within the limits set by evolutionary hardwired principles. I don’t think a society could develop that thinks eating all newborn infants is morally good, because this falls outside of the limits set by evolution and is only available as a moral choice to sociopaths. Still, many principles people fight and die for are ultimately arbitrary and pointless, which I think points to an important role for culture that we must keep in mind when analyzing moral systems or principles.

I also agree that it is possible to make decisions and judgements despite this, so I’m no extreme postmodernist in this regard, as I’ve already explained.

These are some very good points mckenzievmd and a thank you for bringing them out at this point in the discussion.  It will be important, when evaluating the origins of certain moral beliefs and behaviours in any given culture to keep in mind that many customs and beliefs will be obsolete, “left-overs” from past generations, the moral and cultural equivalent to “junk DNA” I suppose and not directly reflective of any present-day adaptive qualities.  I believe Daniel Dennet sees religion as one such cultural “left-over” that is no longer adaptive (though it once was) and holds that is now detrimental to our survival or at least neutral to it.  Though like DNA, the hard part will be figuring out which part of our human nature is the junk and which is the good stuff, even more so since a change in the environment can render a previously maladaptive trait into something that is beneficial and even essential for survival in the new environment.

Once moral jargon has been substituted with biological, psychological and sociological terminology we can actually make judgements and criticisms that will hopefully help ourselves be better understood.

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

I would generally agree with baffledking’s approach, with a few caveats. I do think evolution underlies our moral sense and approach to moral reasoning in an ultimate caual relationship.

Well we have no real disagreement here in principle. Nothing I am saying goes against an evolutionary basis to our capacity to be moral. I am differing by saying that it is, whilst necessary, not sufficient, and that the proximate biological basis of desire mechanisms - motivational brain states - are sufficient. I am dubious of “moral sense” as of intuitionism, both can be mistaken and be unreliably affected/distorted by social factors.

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

I think the proximate relations between evolutionary adaptations and actual individual moral decision-making are quite complex and not yet well-elucidated. Desires and aversions are certainly fundamntal proximate causes.

Good, well unless you can propose some better proximate mechanisms, desires are the best I have seen to date. The challenge here is to elucidate them better which is what I am attempting to do. This is the basis to explicate and analyse these complexities and all I argue is that this the best currently available basis to do this. This will not magically solve all problems and that would not be an empirical expectation and am I not making any such claim. I am saying this is the best provisional basis to date and lets use it and see how far it gets.

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

I do think some of the more complex moral principles humans hold are the result of cultural factors. The basic mechanisms for reasoning in general and moral reasoning in particular are estalshed by evolution, but I think there is a great deal of latitude available, and I would probably place more emphasis than baffleding on culture as a proximate cause. Arbitrary principles that may or may not have made some sort of practical sense can become established and then propagate for long periods of time in a culture well past any apparent practical or evolutionary utility. In this sense, I do think moral values can be arbitrary, at least within the limits set by evolutionary hardwired principles.

Here we disagree. Whilst these cultural factors are indeed significant causes of what is regarded as moral or not within a culture, they are included as one of the factors that contribute to agent’s actions. They are included when the agent acts on the more and stronger of the desires that they do have. However this does not prevent these cultural factors being empirically analyzed in terms of desire fulfillment. And still I have no seen an argument for normative relativism, do you still support this and if so what is your argument for it?

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

I don’t think a society could develop that thinks eating all newborn infants is morally good, because this falls outside of the limits set by evolution and is only aailable as a moral choice to sociopaths.

I though part of the definition of sociopaths is that that they are incapable of moral reasoning. That is sociopaths are amoral - but not necessarily immoral - due to the way their brain works.

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

Still, many principles people fight and die for are ultimately arbitrary and pointless, which I think points to an important role for culture that we must keep in mind when analyzing moral systems or principles.

People act o fulfill the more and stronger of their desires, given their beliefs. Your point is an example over faulty beliefs which are quite open to rational as well as empirical examination.

mckenzievmd - 10 May 2008 11:53 AM

I also agree that it is possible to make decisions and judgements despite this, so I’m no extreme postmodernist in this regard, as I’ve already explained.

Good otherwise there is no useful basis within which to have a conversation. Pomo is self-refuting.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

I believe morals do not exist outside the mind and are entirely subjective phenomena derived from biologically determined values/desires (what you call “desires-as-ends") which are in turn, determined by the creature’s genetic makeup and experiential influences, or phenotype if you will.

This is where we disagree. I think it makes no sense to say the only exist in the mind since these lead to material actions that affect interactions with others. How can morality be disconnected from the behaviour that results? This looks incoherent to me. Please explain how this is possible?

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

Those behaviours we say are morally “right” are supposed to maximize our chances of achieving our “desires-as-ends” while those behaviours we designate as being morally “wrong” minimize those chances.

Now you immediately switch and so contradict yourself to looking at “moral" behaviours. However here, in addition, I also disagree that what you have stated here is moral at all, rather it is pre-moral (not even proto-moral).

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

Of course, we may be mistaken about which behaviours are “right” and which are “wrong” and this is why society develops laws to uphold the moral beliefs of those agents who hold societal authority.

And society itself can be mistaken - how can you deny that given your reasoning here?

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

When I say that morals are “relative” I mean that they have no inherent truth value and are only logically meaningful in the mind of the agent or once the “desires-as-ends” have been defined.

Desires have no inherent truth value. I am an advocate of neo-Humean motivational non-cognitivism. So we cannot reason to ends but we can still reason about ends. That is no amount of beliefs can change our desires alone but we can reason over ends by looking at them as means within a larger picture - that is an individual’s ends can be evaluated as a means over its affect on other’s ends.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

I am attempting to salvage and improve the argument put forth by traditional relativism by being more precise about what I mean when I say “right” and “wrong.”

Well right and wrong refer to acts. In DF right and wrong are derivative of good and bad desires. An act is right if is or could be the result of a good desire, ditto for wrong. I still am unclear what you mean by right and wrong or do you just mean it is dependent on that culture’s value?

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

If this is equivocating then I apologize.

This equivocation over relative seems to be more baffledking’s forte than yours. I do not think you have done it much - as far as I can recall.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

Perhaps you might suggest a better way of defining relative, or another word I might use in place of “relative.” Given my definitions of the terms “relative”, “right”, “wrong” and your term “desires-as-ends” I do not see how this view is incoherent. 

Well my suggestion would be argued for the basis of one’s moral approach. For example one could have a rights-based morality or contract-based morality although no-one here is arguing for them. In this sense both you and baffledking appeared to be arguing for culture-based morality, although baffeldking and you to some degree are leaning more towards gene-based morality now. I am arguing for desire fulfillment-based morality. We all reject absolutism, we all acknowledge subjective and relative aspects to this process where we differ is that this does not prevent, in my view, an epistemically objective analysis of all biological and cultural factors and this is what I am arguing for, which is against normative relativism.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

From what we know about evolutionary biology and sociology, “culture” is an inadequate and misleading term to use when talking about the origin of values and beliefs.  Instead of “cultural” relativism, I’ll substitute the term “genetic” relativism or “naturalistic” relativism or even “phenotypical” relativism if we want to be really precise.  But moral relativism’s rejection of the moral objectivist’s belief in absolute moral statements is a rejection that I wish to maintain.

And here again I am not sure what you mean by “absolute moral statements” . I think I have made clear what a moral fact is and that is not absolute but provisional even if most of the time the support for it is overwhelming. And what is your argument for this position because, as far as I can see a phenotype based morality weakens any argument, if one exists, for normative relativism, which is what I think you are trying to defend.  Are you holding that position on a purely emotive basis or can you give an argument for this? What you say below does not seem to be an argument. I have come to the view that the default position is everything is morally permissible - that is unless circumstance shows otherwise - and this is quite different to normative relativism as a default which needs to be argued for.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

We may judge and criticize other people, societies, cultures and even ourselves but only without invoking a “higher” morality since such a term is meaningless.

I have always thought this too.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

For criticism to have any meaning, it must be made with reference to the efficacy of the behaviour-in-question’s ability to achieve one’s stated “desire”.

And this is exactly what DF offers as an empirical analysis whher the desire is stated or not and whether the agent has the desire or not.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

For example, if Culture A has the “desire” to foster a populace that will maintain a competitive advantage in the world market, and decides that the best way to achieve this is to require all workers to work a 12hr day, I might see this as a bad decision and criticize Culture A for its lack of foresight.  I might suggest that a “better” way to achieve their stated goal would be to reward hard-work and innovation with higher pay and public recognition or some such thing.  Such a criticism is devoid of any moral reference and criticism in any case can be made from the very same place, devoid of any reference to morality or a cosmic kind of absolute “right and wrong”.

Yes this is economics not morality.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

I might criticize Culture B for its practice of slavery but instead of invoking morality I can simply show them that slavery is not a good means of achieving their stated end/desire.

Yes well such an economic argument might fail… Slavery involves desire thwarting of the slaves and the encouragement of direct desire thwarting desires of the slave owners and other beneficiaries. Generally a slave based economy today would be morally wrong although this is no an absolute statement as there are economic arguments such as that sweat shop labor - as a temporary phase - can lead to later benefits locally to all. But every question is context dependent of course.

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

At times, when the rationality of a behaviour is in question, we may be forced to appeal to our emotional response to the behaviour-in-question, for example, torture or animal experimentation make me feel bad and therefore, regardless of their possible rational implications, I choose not to partake in such behaviour or endorse it.  This emotional appeal is a big part of what makes us human, in my opinion and a big part of what makes psychopaths distinctly “inhuman.”

Yes but this is unreliable and culture dependent. What do you think of the (in)famous Vietnamese cook book “50 ways to wok your dog”?

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

I agree there is more to be researched and contemplated with regards to “gene-based morality” but I disagree about your conclusion regarding the first horn of the Euthypro dilemma. All human behaviour (and animal behaviour) is adapted to best ensure the survival of the organism in the given environment.  There are no morals anywhere in the equation. Morality is really a malapropism for “genetically-derived-behavioural instructions”, to say it clumsily.

You appear to be both agreeing and disagreeing with me! You seem to agree that morals is nothing to do with genes alone but then you go on to make a moral nihilistic claim and at the same time contradicting yourself by denying normative relativism -since one can now make, albeit non-moral (because in this sense morals don’t exist) judgments of other cultures. In fact whether you think there is such a thing as gene-based morality or that genes are all there is to it but there is no such thing as morality as in your “genetically-derived-behavioural instructions” both these positions deny normative relativism! When are you going to make arguments for normative relativism you seem to be doing the opposite?

baffledking - 10 May 2008 12:24 PM

So, a child born into poverty whose dream to become successful and wealthy slowly disappears as he grows up and realizes the improbability of this dream has not had his desire thwarted by society but merely “dissolved”?  Doesn’t this still cause him to suffer internally?  Isn’t this close to what happens to Winston in 1984 when he is finally “conditioned” to love Big Brother?

Actually this is another of my arguments against Preference Utilitarianism which seeks to maximize preferences satisfied yet there is a socio-economic differential over preferences held as you point out here (my main other one is over demographics). Everyone is capable of having practically as well as theoretically unfulfillable desires. One needs to be realistic about the situation one is in, but that is really a prudential concern. Now you are talking about distributive justice which is I would argue a second tier moral issue with political and economic implications. For now I am focused on first tier moral issues - individual actions and inactions in specific situations and it is these that are to do with moral facts.

Please stop making so many good (and bad ) points. I want to keep these posts short but now have to spill this into a second reply

Reply to baffledking part 2.

[quote author="baffledking"]

This is equivocation over relative. One could call this objectively relative and it is quite standard in scientific and empirical reasoning and does not lead to moral relativism. For example when one applies an equation and obtains values for the independent variables such that the value of the dependent variable changes, call it relative if you will but then you have emptied this term of any real usefulness and this does not imply anything like subjectivity nor moral relativism.  The classic point is Einstein’s theories of relativity which do refute the abso