fotobits - 11 May 2008 08:32 PM

Bryan - 11 May 2008 03:14 PM

Jackson - 11 May 2008 09:27 AM

What exactly do you find convincing about Christianity?

The relative superiority of its world view and evidences.

Relative superiority over what?

Other world views such as polytheism, New Age, materialism-philosophical naturalism, and nihilism.

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

That is false (another straw man).

My argument throughout places focus on the philosophical naturalist who accepts uncaused states.
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37260/

Well your link -FSM - has to nothing to do with the topic at hand. Your argument is a straw man as I showed.

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37368/

Another completely irrelevant link.

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

Simply put, quantum mechanics is not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with the methodological principles, indeed QM is one of the best examples of naturalism - it is incredibly unlikely we could have found it without naturalism - producing more accurate predictions than just about anything else.

It doesn’t matter how in sync with methodological principles it is if the phenomenon ends up contradicting the world view of philosophical naturalism.  And philosophical naturalism is not the same thing as methodological naturalism (there’s a hint of equivocal language in faithlessgod’s response:  “not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with methodological principles").

Well I am both. However I am a deflationist when it comes to metaphysics so my “philosophical naturalism” is the minimal a posteriori extension beyond what we know empirically.  My position is quite immune to such criticism as you have posed.

Regardless if you posit this challenge to a professional physicist (a career I nearly pursued but did not, still quite a few of my friends did) who also holds to philosophical naturalism they will come with an answer something like mine. Indeed I have had numerous arguments over causality - for different reasons to here - with them over the years and I have merely pointed out some thoughts in my previous post as to what I learned from those conversations.

I repeat QM/QED is one of the best exemplars of the success of methodological naturalism and is entirely consistent with metaphysical naturalism.

Jackson - 10 May 2008 05:11 AM

Bryan - 09 May 2008 10:19 AM

....  Gods associated with the more coherent world views are more likely correct [i.e., exist] than those that are not......  Those [gods] that represent an incoherent world view I suggest should be excluded from serious consideration.

By “coherence” you mean self-consistent?  Isn’t it more consistent to conclude that all 10,000 religions are superstitious nonsense than to conclude the ratio is 1:9999?  Should we ignore the parts of the Old Testament which are inconsistent with Jesus’ message?

I am challenging Bryan based on the stipulation here that there is a god. It is highly likely that most theists will find a way to make their own system internally self-consistent so this is not a basis to increase Bryn’s a posteriori probability this his god is correct. And that is only that method that can remove other candidates from consideration - they cannot be summarily dismissed as Bryan would like.

Coherence here has to mean externally consistent to be at all useful as an a posteriori differentiator between different gods. Back to Bryan

Superiority of the Christian world view? Which of its competing world views are we talking about?

The one that says to love your neighbor, or the one that says that only Christians can go to heaven?

Let’s assume that one looks completely past the moral and ethical content of Christian theology for evidence of its consistency or inconsistency. Then we have:

A theology premised on the existence of hell, which God creates to punish the wicked forever with no hope of salvation;
A god who waits thousands of years before sending his only begotten Son (?) to offer salvation to all humanity; and
Each person’s salvation is conditioned on believing in the divinity of this Son and his death and his resurrection; but
God neglects to tell most of the world about him for centuries after he supposedly came here to save everyone.

Come on.

You are arguing at a level that is five times removed from any known reality. It’s a less effective argument, on less solid ground and it’s less persuasive. Not to mention that you’re trying to have a discussion with a troll.

Keep it simple. Keep your eyes on the ball.

.

.

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 12:52 AM

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

That is false (another straw man).

My argument throughout places focus on the philosophical naturalist who accepts uncaused states.
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37260/

Well your link -FSM - has to nothing to do with the topic at hand. Your argument is a straw man as I showed.

The link shows that I direct the argument at those who accept() uncaused states, not the one who thinks uncaused states aren’t really uncaused states.  In other words, your suggestion that a straw man is in play is shown false.  If you want to wave your hand in the air and say “Well, that argument doesn’t apply to me!” that’s your prerogative--but it doesn’t make the argument a straw man.

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37368/

Another completely irrelevant link.

It accomplishes the same purpose as the first one.  It documents the narrow and appropriate scope of my argument (and shows that your straw man accusation is inappropriate).

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

Simply put, quantum mechanics is not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with the methodological principles, indeed QM is one of the best examples of naturalism - it is incredibly unlikely we could have found it without naturalism - producing more accurate predictions than just about anything else.

It doesn’t matter how in sync with methodological principles it is if the phenomenon ends up contradicting the world view of philosophical naturalism.  And philosophical naturalism is not the same thing as methodological naturalism (there’s a hint of equivocal language in faithlessgod’s response:  “not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with methodological principles").

Well I am both. However I am a deflationist when it comes to metaphysics so my “philosophical naturalism” is the minimal a posteriori extension beyond what we know empirically.  My position is quite immune to such criticism as you have posed.

Naturally. 

Is it fair to paraphrase your above-stated position such that your “philosophical naturalism” is not asserted as a truth about reality but a framework that follows empirical observations?
How would you define “philosophical naturalism” if quantum particles formed causelessly and randomly?

Regardless if you posit this challenge to a professional physicist (a career I nearly pursued but did not, still quite a few of my friends did) who also holds to philosophical naturalism they will come with an answer something like mine. Indeed I have had numerous arguments over causality - for different reasons to here - with them over the years and I have merely pointed out some thoughts in my previous post as to what I learned from those conversations.

I repeat QM/QED is one of the best exemplars of the success of methodological naturalism and is entirely consistent with metaphysical naturalism.

You can repeat it all you like, but there is a contradiction if philosophical naturalism posits a natural cause for all phenomena while met(hodological) naturalism posits causeless phenomena.  Unless there is some reconciliation of “natural cause” and “causeless.”

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

How would you define “philosophical naturalism” if quantum particles formed causelessly and randomly?

Isn’t because they are observed as random why they are recognized as “uncaused”?

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 01:14 AM

I am challenging Bryan based on the stipulation here that there is a god. It is highly likely that most theists will find a way to make their own system internally self-consistent so this is not a basis to increase Bryn’s a posteriori probability this his god is correct.

How’s that working out for, say, Hindus (who rely on both/and logic in the first place)?
It doesn’t follow that the effort to achieve self-consistency achieves self-consistency, and even if it were only 20% likely that a given worldview was inconsistent that would end up increasing the probability that a more consistent position was correct.

And that is only that method that can remove other candidates from consideration - they cannot be summarily dismissed as Bryan would like.

Why can’t an incoherent world view be summarily dismissed?  By your own admission, the folks holding such worldviews are likely to dismiss them autonomously in the (supposedly probable) effort to have a more consistent world view.  If people make an effort to improve their worldview’s consistency isn’t that an implicit dismissal of an inconsistent worldview?

Coherence here has to mean externally consistent to be at all useful as an a posteriori differentiator between different gods. Back to Bryan

Apparently faithlessgod would have no problem at all with a god said to be all good and all evil at the same time and in the same sense.  The real key for him will be external consistency.

Both are useful.  If one accepts a god that creates a world that is completely incomprehensible to its inhabitants then one has no basis for judging the existence of that god (inability to judge external consistency would be an absolute prediction of the existence of that same god).  The mere assumption that sense-data offers evidence that said god is externally inconsistent with reality fallaciously begs the question.  That question is properly answered by addressing the internal consistency of the system entailed by positing such a god.

PLaClair - 12 May 2008 04:55 AM

Superiority of the Christian world view? Which of its competing world views are we talking about?

The one that says to love your neighbor, or the one that says that only Christians can go to heaven?

Are those two different world views or the same one?

Let’s assume that one looks completely past the moral and ethical content of Christian theology for evidence of its consistency or inconsistency. Then we have:

A theology premised on the existence of hell, which God creates to punish the wicked forever with no hope of salvation;
A god who waits thousands of years before sending his only begotten Son (?) to offer salvation to all humanity; and
Each person’s salvation is conditioned on believing in the divinity of this Son and his death and his resurrection; but
God neglects to tell most of the world about him for centuries after he supposedly came here to save everyone.

Come on.

PLaClair’s objection works very well as an appeal to outrage or an appeal to ridicule (both logical fallacies, for what it’s worth).
As Doug discovered, however, it isn’t easy to press the case using logic and reason instead (of) fallacies.  Doug hoped to make his case via reductio ad absurdum but (so far as I can tell) he continues to wait for a statement from me that makes a suitable counterexample to power his reductio.

You are arguing at a level that is five times removed from any known reality. It’s a less effective argument, on less solid ground and it’s less persuasive. Not to mention that you’re trying to have a discussion with a troll.

okfyts.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:59 AM

As Doug discovered, however, it isn’t easy to press the case using logic and reason instead (of) fallacies.  Doug hoped to make his case via reductio ad absurdum but (so far as I can tell) he continues to wait for a statement from me that makes a suitable counterexample to power his reductio.

I actually discovered quite the opposite. The case from logic and reason is all too easy to press, and the only way to rebut it is by using disingenuous rhetorical games. And to be clear, I am not waiting for anything in particular from you at this point. I see what’s going on, as Brennen and PLaClair have described all-too-accurately.

dougsmith - 12 May 2008 10:16 AM

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:59 AM

As Doug discovered, however, it isn’t easy to press the case using logic and reason instead (of) fallacies.  Doug hoped to make his case via reductio ad absurdum but (so far as I can tell) he continues to wait for a statement from me that makes a suitable counterexample to power his reductio.

I actually discovered quite the opposite. The case from logic and reason is all too easy to press, and the only way to rebut it is by using disingenuous rhetorical games.

okfyts.

When you never obtain the statement you’re hoping for there’s nothing to rebut.  And while you waited in vain for the key to your hoped-for reductio you avoided questions about as well as anyone could.
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37093/

And to be clear, I am not waiting for anything in particular from you at this point.

Meh.  Figure of speech.  Point being you didn’t get what you hoped for.

I see what’s going on, as Brennen and PLaClair have described all-too-accurately.

okfyts.

What is “okfyts”?

I’m guessing, ok if you think so. One of the more intelligent remarks, BTW.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 12:52 AM

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

That is false (another straw man).

My argument throughout places focus on the philosophical naturalist who accepts uncaused states.
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37260/

Well your link -FSM - has to nothing to do with the topic at hand. Your argument is a straw man as I showed.

The link shows that I direct the argument at those who accept() uncaused states, not the one who thinks uncaused states aren’t really uncaused states.  In other words, your suggestion that a straw man is in play is shown false.  If you want to wave your hand in the air and say “Well, that argument doesn’t apply to me!” that’s your prerogative--but it doesn’t make the argument a straw man.

My mistake the link is to a post on the Buddha not the FSM.  This has nothing to do with the topic at hand.

The argument stands as a straw man because you are (a) selectively relying on specific interpretations of QM that do posit uncaused particles and ignoring others that do not - and ignoring my previous post to that effect - and (b) imposing an absurd constraint on philosophical naturalism - that everything must have a cause with no possible exception, PN does not have such a requirement, any supporter on PN does not need to speculate on what happened before the Big Bang before example.

An additional point is that even if there were truly uncaused particles then your argument fails as a god of the gap argument and breaks Occam’s razor.  Then again none of this can point to your god over any other god, indeed there may be no god involved at all and so this still does not get your god off a near zero probability of 0.0001 at best.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37368/

Another completely irrelevant link.

It accomplishes the same purpose as the first one.  It documents the narrow and appropriate scope of my argument (and shows that your straw man accusation is inappropriate).

It accomplishes absolutely nothing. This was the FSM post. So now you have widened it to irrelevant points over the FSM as well as the Buddha? And you call this rational?

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

Is it fair to paraphrase your above-stated position such that your “philosophical naturalism” is not asserted as a truth about reality but a framework that follows empirical observations?

No

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

How would you define “philosophical naturalism” if quantum particles formed causelessly and randomly?

Exactly the same as I do now.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

Regardless if you posit this challenge to a professional physicist (a career I nearly pursued but did not, still quite a few of my friends did) who also holds to philosophical naturalism they will come with an answer something like mine. Indeed I have had numerous arguments over causality - for different reasons to here - with them over the years and I have merely pointed out some thoughts in my previous post as to what I learned from those conversations.

I repeat QM/QED is one of the best exemplars of the success of methodological naturalism and is entirely consistent with metaphysical naturalism.

You can repeat it all you like, but there is a contradiction if philosophical naturalism posits a natural cause for all phenomena while metaphysical naturalism posits causeless phenomena.  Unless there is some reconciliation of “natural cause” and “causeless.”

Referential opacity.