Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 01:14 AM

I am challenging Bryan based on the stipulation here that there is a god. It is highly likely that most theists will find a way to make their own system internally self-consistent so this is not a basis to increase Bryn’s a posteriori probability this his god is correct.

How’s that working out for, say, Hindus (who rely on both/and logic in the first place)?

No different to your own arguments for your own self-consistent theistic world view AFAICS.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

It doesn’t follow that the effort to achieve self-consistency achieves self-consistency, and even if it were only 20% likely that a given worldview was inconsistent that would end up increasing the probability that a more consistent position was correct.

Well if you read the anthropological literature you would see that pretty much any theistic worldview is regarded by their holders as self-consistent. And they mostly, to the degree they are exposed to other such world views - uncorrupted by bribery, technology and indoctrination - regard theirs as more self-consistent than the others.  Internal self-consistency is a non-starter to improve your odds over your competitors. I do commend the relative novelty of trying this tack though.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

And that is only that method that can remove other candidates from consideration - they cannot be summarily dismissed as Bryan would like.

Why can’t an incoherent world view be summarily dismissed?  By your own admission, the folks holding such worldviews are likely to dismiss them autonomously in the (supposedly probable) effort to have a more consistent world view.  If people make an effort to improve their worldview’s consistency isn’t that an implicit dismissal of an inconsistent worldview?

By their own admission their world views are fine.  I think all such systems are inconsistent and to the degree I know yours is more inconsistent than many others, so this is a very weak position to come from. In Bayesian reasoning nothing is summarily dismissed it just becomes less and less likely.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

Coherence here has to mean externally consistent to be at all useful as an a posteriori differentiator between different gods. Back to Bryan

Apparently faithlessgod would have no problem at all with a god said to be all good and all evil at the same time and in the same sense.  The real key for him will be external consistency.

It is not for me to pre-judge what god actually is or is not, that would bias such an analysis. I just emphasized external consistency as internal consistency is taken for granted as it fails as a differentiator between theistic world views.  One can make up all sorts of gods - see Pascal Boyer - but that is not the issue here. We are looking at world views actually held by someone and sometime.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

Both are useful.  If one accepts a god that creates a world that is completely incomprehensible to its inhabitants then one has no basis for judging the existence of that god (inability to judge external consistency would be an absolute prediction of the existence of that same god).  The mere assumption that sense-data offers evidence that said god is externally inconsistent with reality fallaciously begs the question.  That question is properly answered by addressing the internal consistency of the system entailed by positing such a god.

I agree both are are useful indeed required, however only external consistency can differentiate your theism from the 9,999 minimum others. The odds of you being right are still 0.0001, too low to consider much longer.

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 12:00 PM

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 01:14 AM

I am challenging Bryan based on the stipulation here that there is a god. It is highly likely that most theists will find a way to make their own system internally self-consistent so this is not a basis to increase Bryn’s a posteriori probability this his god is correct.

How’s that working out for, say, Hindus (who rely on both/and logic in the first place)?

No different to your own arguments for your own self-consistent theistic world view AFAICS.

If you’re saying that I’ve failed then you undercut your own argument (that my method for finding the more likely true religion is unreliable).
If you’re saying that both succeed then you appear to have overlooked Hindu reliance on both/and logic.
If you’re not saying that both either succeed or fail then I don’t know what you’re trying to say.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

It doesn’t follow that the effort to achieve self-consistency achieves self-consistency, and even if it were only 20% likely that a given worldview was inconsistent that would end up increasing the probability that a more consistent position was correct.

Well if you read the anthropological literature you would see that pretty much any theistic worldview is regarded by their holders as self-consistent.

Then on what basis would they try to improve their worldview, as you had earlier suggested they would?

And they mostly, to the degree they are exposed to other such world views - uncorrupted by bribery, technology and indoctrination - regard theirs as more self-consistent than the others.

Again, how would this support your contention that they would improve their world view to improve its self-consistency?  Wouldn’t their view that their view is already more self-consistent than the others remove their motivation for improving it?

Why can’t an incoherent world view be summarily dismissed?  By your own admission, the folks holding such worldviews are likely to dismiss them autonomously in the (supposedly probable) effort to have a more consistent world view.  If people make an effort to improve their worldview’s consistency isn’t that an implicit dismissal of an inconsistent worldview?

By their own admission their world views are fine.

Again, that notion undercuts your suggestion that they would improve the self-consistency of their world view.  You don’t fix what isn’t broken (that is, if you don’t perceive that it is broken).  Your approach to this argument is incoherent.

I think all such systems are inconsistent and to the degree I know yours is more inconsistent than many others, so this is a very weak position to come from. In Bayesian reasoning nothing is summarily dismissed it just becomes less and less likely.

By using Bayesian reasoning you can’t dismiss my reasoning but merely find it less likely.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

Coherence here has to mean externally consistent to be at all useful as an a posteriori differentiator between different gods. Back to Bryan

Apparently faithlessgod would have no problem at all with a god said to be all good and all evil at the same time and in the same sense.  The real key for him will be external consistency.

It is not for me to pre-judge what god actually is or is not, that would bias such an analysis.

If you know that god is proposed to be all good and all evil at the same time and in the same sense, then how would that count as pre-judgment?  Why isn’t it a post judgment based on what is said to be true of a god?

I just emphasized external consistency as internal consistency is taken for granted as it fails as a differentiator between theistic world views.

I think you’re eroding your own epistemic foundation.  You appear to have judged the self-consistency of my system ("I know yours is more inconsistent than many others") yet without thinking either dismissing it or thinking it less likely as a result?  Have you somehow escaped the bias that inevitably affects theists?  Why is external consistency any different, in principle, when it comes to evaluating competing systems?  Won’t we see our systems as consistent on the same basis (our bias)?

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:50 AM

Both are useful.  If one accepts a god that creates a world that is completely incomprehensible to its inhabitants then one has no basis for judging the existence of that god (inability to judge external consistency would be an absolute prediction of the existence of that same god).  The mere assumption that sense-data offers evidence that said god is externally inconsistent with reality fallaciously begs the question.  That question is properly answered by addressing the internal consistency of the system entailed by positing such a god.

I agree both are are useful indeed required, however only external consistency can differentiate your theism from the 9,999 minimum others. The odds of you being right are still 0.0001, too low to consider much longer.

You mean you’re about to dismiss it because of low odds???
If the odds don’t change then what accounts for the not-quite-summarily forthcoming dismissal (unless I’m misreading you)?

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 11:41 AM

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

faithlessgod - 12 May 2008 12:52 AM

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

That is false (another straw man).

My argument throughout places focus on the philosophical naturalist who accepts uncaused states.
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37260/

Well your link -FSM - has to nothing to do with the topic at hand. Your argument is a straw man as I showed.

The link shows that I direct the argument at those who accept() uncaused states, not the one who thinks uncaused states aren’t really uncaused states.  In other words, your suggestion that a straw man is in play is shown false.  If you want to wave your hand in the air and say “Well, that argument doesn’t apply to me!” that’s your prerogative--but it doesn’t make the argument a straw man.

The argument stands as a straw man because you are (a) selectively relying on specific interpretations of QM that do posit uncaused particles and ignoring others that do not - and ignoring my previous post to that effect -

Again, false, for it is up to the individual philosophical naturalist to accept or reject the existence of uncaused particles--and I’ve been rather clear about that throughout.  It has nothing to do with my selective reliance on anything.

and (b) imposing an absurd constraint on philosophical naturalism - that everything must have a cause with no possible exception, PN does not have such a requirement, any supporter on PN does not need to speculate on what happened before the Big Bang before example.

On the contrary, I’ve posted definitions of philosophical naturalism that posit that all phenomena have a cause and others that imply it.  Moreover, I’ve invited alternative definitions of philosophical naturalism (intended to test their utility in even meeting the requirements of a world view).  We’ll shortly see whether you took advantage of your latest opportunity to provide a definition in response to my request.

An additional point is that even if there were truly uncaused particles then your argument fails as a god of the gap argument and breaks Occam’s razor.

I’m just talking about falsifying naturalism.  Neither “god of the gaps” nor Occam’s razor is relevant in the present context.

Then again none of this can point to your god over any other god, indeed there may be no god involved at all and so this still does not get your god off a near zero probability of 0.0001 at best.

That’s OK.  We can work on that later when it becomes the topic.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

Bryan - 10 May 2008 08:23 PM

http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/37368/

Another completely irrelevant link.

It accomplishes the same purpose as the first one.  It documents the narrow and appropriate scope of my argument (and shows that your straw man accusation is inappropriate).

It accomplishes absolutely nothing. This was the FSM post. So now you have widened it to irrelevant points over the FSM as well as the Buddha? And you call this rational?

I had assumed that you were talking about the links embedded in the post to which you replied (the charitable course, I would say).  Was that not the case?  Were you referring to links other than those embedded in the post to which you replied?

Bryan - 12 May 2008 08:29 AM

How would you define “philosophical naturalism” if quantum particles formed causelessly and randomly?

Exactly the same as I do now.

And that is ...?

Bryan - 12 May 2008 12:54 PM

Again, false, for it is up to the individual philosophical naturalist to accept or reject the existence of uncaused particles--and I’ve been rather clear about that throughout.  It has nothing to do with my selective reliance on anything.

There is not much point pursing this. I have no problem with my naturalism over this issue since you are making an argument that depends selectively on certain QM interpretations and it is not up to you to insist upon them, anyone who subscribes to PN as you paint them would just choose other interpretations. End of story

Indeed it is often due to one’s metaphysics why one interpretation is chosen over another.

Bryan - 12 May 2008 12:54 PM

An additional point is that even if there were truly uncaused particles then your argument fails as a god of the gap argument and breaks Occam’s razor.

I’m just talking about falsifying naturalism.  Neither “god of the gaps” nor Occam’s razor is relevant in the present context.

Excellent. Well this thread is called Ask a Christian and you are the Christian here. I am only interested in any argument you can make to increase the likelihood of your god from 0.0001. Since you are not claiming to use this to increase your odds, then your odds still remain at 0.0001 and I have no further interest in this sub-thread.

Bryan

When you suggested internal self-consistency as your differential evidence to show the superiority and thereby increase the a posteriori odds of your god being correct, I indicated that is insufficient as a form of differential evidence and external consistency could do the trick. You are quite entitled to reject my suggestion, as I think you are and as the challenge is for you to provide suitable evidence. However this was not meant specifically as a suggestion but also as an indicator of the problem with your internal self-consistency argument.

That is I am saying that your method relying on the self-consistency of your own worldview can also, and has been, used by other theists and so internal self-consistency fails as a means to provide a posteriori evidence to increase the odds of your god over its alternates. I am sure you are more than capable of finding flaws in self-consistency in other theistic world views. The internet is also full of other theism’s criticisms of your theism (or at least something like it).  In order make this external criticism of other systems internal self-consistency work, without being biased or selective or subjective, one needs someone to be objective like certain anthropologists such as Pascal Boyer - who covers this point extensively in the first chapter of his book Religion Explained - who is not biased towards or against a particular theistic worldview. But this ends up saying that all such world views are inconsistent and again that fails to differentiate theistic world views and you are unlikely, based on subjective reasons, to accept this.

Just because you think an incoherent worldview can be dismissed does not mean that it should. After all in that case I think, from what I have read that your worldview is incoherent (and we don’t need to go into details here) so should I not summarily dismiss yours before we even start? And many other theistic world views would say the same about yours too. So shall we dismiss it based on a a majority view (each worldview here has only one vote regardless of how many supporters it has - that avoids demographic bias)? Is that fair? Why listen to you only or listen all together? The Bayesian method here is designed to avoid these types of issues of bias. So I am specifically not doing that here and trying to offer you a fair chance to make your case. Or do you not want me to do that?

So as as far as I can see the odds of you being right remain at 0.0001 at best.

You mean you’re about to dismiss it because of low odds???
If the odds don’t change then what accounts for the not-quite-summarily forthcoming dismissal (unless I’m misreading you)?

Well if you fail to increase the odds of your god, the opportunity cost of spending time dealing with a worldview that at best has odds of being correct of 0.0001 is limited. Either increase it or I will conclude that this is not worth considering further. How much time would you spend on any other religion if you thought the odds of it being correct were only 0.0001?

faithlessgod - 13 May 2008 02:44 AM

Bryan

When you suggested internal self-consistency as your differential evidence to show the superiority and thereby increase the a posteriori odds of your god being correct, I indicated that is insufficient as a form of differential evidence and external consistency could do the trick.

You failed to offer sufficient evidence that internal consistency was insufficient as a form of differential evidence--and in the first place your original question was how I would suggest shifting the odds to make one religion more likely than another.  My reply does not tie me to one criterion for differentiation.  In fact I alluded to an external consistency test in an earlier post (one that you acknowledged) but now here you are appearing to suggest that all my eggs are in one basket.  My eggs are not all in one basket, are they?

You are quite entitled to reject my suggestion, as I think you are and as the challenge is for you to provide suitable evidence. However this was not meant specifically as a suggestion but also as an indicator of the problem with your internal self-consistency argument.

I think your complaint has been effectively addressed.

You appear to take it as an article of faith that if internal consistency is claimed and if evaluations include bias then that is the end of using self-consistency as a valuable criterion.  I don’t think that it is properly assumed that reason, properly applied, does not trump that complaint.

That is I am saying that your method relying on the self-consistency of your own worldview can also, and has been, used by other theists and so internal self-consistency fails as a means to provide a posteriori evidence to increase the odds of your god over its alternates.

Non sequitur.  It is improper to assume that mere claims to self-consistency establish self-consistency.  Each system should be amenable to evaluation in terms of reason regardless of the potential for bias.  If bias is as pervasive and destructive as faithlessgod appears to suggest then we should wonder whether to accept anything he says owing to the fact that his bias is likely to corrupt his reasoning.

I am sure you are more than capable of finding flaws in self-consistency in other theistic world views. The internet is also full of other theism’s criticisms of your theism (or at least something like it).  In order make this external criticism of other systems internal self-consistency work, without being biased or selective or subjective, one needs someone to be objective like certain anthropologists such as Pascal Boyer - who covers this point extensively in the first chapter of his book Religion Explained - who is not biased towards or against a particular theistic worldview. But this ends up saying that all such world views are inconsistent and again that fails to differentiate theistic world views and you are unlikely, based on subjective reasons, to accept this.

Doesn’t that reduce the issue to an ad hominem attack?  Instead of admitting that the framework I propose is reasonable but might not lead where I wish it to lead, you proceed directly (on what evidence?) to suppose that I would be incapable of fairly weighing evidences in the first place.  And how do we know that Mr. Boyer is free of bias?  Because of a bias against all religion?

Here’s an atheist’s critique of Boyer:
http://www.cosmoetica.com/B99-DES54.htm

Does the atheist’s critique fail because the atheist is biased whereas Boyer is not?

Just because you think an incoherent worldview can be dismissed does not mean that it should. After all in that case I think, from what I have read that your worldview is incoherent (and we don’t need to go into details here) so should I not summarily dismiss yours before we even start?

I thought it charitable to think that your suggestion of judging religions a priori took into account the nature of the religion (otherwise I’d have no reason for differentiating between Wicca and Scientology or even between Hinduism and atheism).  Was I wrong to make that assumption?  If so, please explain what you mean regarding a priori judgment of religions.

Beyond that, your criticism appears equivocal, and here’s what I mean by that.
1) I suggest that internal contradiction should result in a given worldview being excluded from consideration
2) You suggest that just because I think an internal contradiction exists that it does not necessarily follow that the religion should be so excluded.
3) In effect, you have re-interpreted my suggestion (1) and turned it into (4):
4) “I suggest that if I think an internal contradiction exists then a given wouldview should be excluded from consideration”

5) I did not assume that evaluation was inevitably done correctly.  I simply provided a framework in which a proper evaluation might take place.  That framework of course assumes that the evaluations are done properly as the basic premise of the system working.  Yet you reject that premise to suggest that the system itself is flawed.

I daresay there is no system for which a similar type of flaw does not exist, for not following a system is one of the basic ways in which systems fail.

And many other theistic world views would say the same about yours too. So shall we dismiss it based on a a majority view (each worldview here has only one vote regardless of how many supporters it has - that avoids demographic bias)? Is that fair? Why listen to you only or listen all together?

I’m positing that there is correct and ~correct, contradiction and ~contradiction.  I’m not suggesting listening either to me or to a majority.  I am suggesting reasoning accurately.

The Bayesian method here is designed to avoid these types of issues of bias. So I am specifically not doing that here and trying to offer you a fair chance to make your case. Or do you not want me to do that?

No, I don’t want you to change the topic from the method I use to eliminate many different religions from consideration to an exhaustive discussion of how and why each one is eliminated in my own experience to arrive at the conclusion I hold for the present.  The latter is the sort of question that I am reasonable to skip based on the various demands on my time.  The former is a reasonable question, and I think I have provided a suitable answer that you have not treated suitably.

So as as far as I can see the odds of you being right remain at 0.0001 at best.

Like I said before, that’s fine.  I don’t need to make you alter your assessment.  You asked how I would alter the odds and I have told you.  Your objection assumes that the system is not/would not be followed properly.

You mean you’re about to dismiss it because of low odds???
If the odds don’t change then what accounts for the not-quite-summarily forthcoming dismissal (unless I’m misreading you)?

Well if you fail to increase the odds of your god, the opportunity cost of spending time dealing with a worldview that at best has odds of being correct of 0.0001 is limited. Either increase it or I will conclude that this is not worth considering further. How much time would you spend on any other religion if you thought the odds of it being correct were only 0.0001?

You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

Did we just go in a figure eight circle or what?  You appear to utilize the same process you’re criticizing me for applying.  okfyts.

Bryan

Your are missing the point here. Let us accept your claim that using self-consistency is a means of differentiable evidence over theisms. The problem is as simple you do not get to decide how other theism’s self-consistency works, they do. Each decides their own means of self-consistency and I know from past experience that they will be confident as you are, that they can show their self-consistency is better than yours.  Now without any external criteria there is no way to differentiate these self-consistent systems. On such a basis they can all be made unfalsifiable, and this is a very common move. (Indeed I have met enough “Bryans” that advocate the superiority and self-consistency of their own religion and I am sure others have here to).

To resolve this we could ask what is the justification for applying your self-consistent criteria over anyone else’s without begging the question? The only way that I can see and your are ambivalent on this, is external criteria. Then again on what basis do you get to decide which external criteria are to be used as opposed to other theists?

A specific point to your theism is that since your Christianity is derived from and enhanced over Judaism, you need to start from a self-consistent Judaism and take it further. But then probabilistically yours is less likely to correct than such a Judaism by the normal rules of logic and so your odds go down not up compared to at least one version of a Jewish theism.

Well if you fail to increase the odds of your god, the opportunity cost of spending time dealing with a worldview that at best has odds of being correct of 0.0001 is limited. Either increase it or I will conclude that this is not worth considering further. How much time would you spend on any other religion if you thought the odds of it being correct were only 0.0001?

You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

No, either you increase the odds or you don’t. How that is done is up to you.

faithlessgod - 14 May 2008 12:35 AM

Bryan

Your are missing the point here. Let us accept your claim that using self-consistency is a means of differentiable evidence over theisms. The problem is as simple you do not get to decide how other theism’s self-consistency works, they do. Each decides their own means of self-consistency and I know from past experience that they will be confident as you are, that they can show their self-consistency is better than yours.

I have addressed this point.

It doesn’t matter how any religious adherent assesses his own system’s self-consistency.  I am not proposing a subjective system, but an objective one, based on non-fallacious reasoning concerning the self-consistency of systems.

You are not addressing my reply.

Now without any external criteria there is no way to differentiate these self-consistent systems.

Again, as I pointed out earlier, mere belief that one’s system is self-consistent does not serve to establish that system as self-consistent.

On such a basis they can all be made unfalsifiable, and this is a very common move. (Indeed I have met enough “Bryans” that advocate the superiority and self-consistency of their own religion and I am sure others have here to).

We need only look at naturalism redefined to see that technique in action.
Even so, it’s irrelevant.  Even unfalsifiable systems remain amenable to rational analysis and that would not need to take place in any case until internal consistency was rationally evaluated.

To resolve this we could ask what is the justification for applying your self-consistent criteria over anyone else’s without begging the question?

I don’t see how criteria for self-consistency can vary.  You’ll have to explain that one.
A system either is or is not self-consistent.  The criterion for self-consistency is self-consistency.

Perhaps what you’re trying to say is that I would have to reason accurately in order for my evaluation of self-consistency to turn out correctly (unless it turned out correctly by happenstance).  No question about that.  I’ve already pointed out that it is implicit in the system I suggest.

The only way that I can see and your are ambivalent on this, is external criteria. Then again on what basis do you get to decide which external criteria are to be used as opposed to other theists?

Behold my ambivalence:
“Both (external and internal) are useful.”
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewreply/38259/

There’s no point in contesting external consistency, since we both agree that it is useful.  You deny the usefulness of internal consistency.  That makes it the appropriate point of contention.

A specific point to your theism is that since your Christianity is derived from and enhanced over Judaism, you need to start from a self-consistent Judaism and take it further. But then probabilistically yours is less likely to correct than such a Judaism by the normal rules of logic and so your odds go down not up compared to at least one version of a Jewish theism.

Good point, albeit not particularly relevant to the issue on which we disagree--unless perhaps I were to suggest that you had derived this factor based on self-consistency rather than external consistency.  If you did the former then you’re implicitly conceding the usefulness of internal consistency to assist in calculating the probability that a religion is correct.

Well if you fail to increase the odds of your god, the opportunity cost of spending time dealing with a worldview that at best has odds of being correct of 0.0001 is limited. Either increase it or I will conclude that this is not worth considering further. How much time would you spend on any other religion if you thought the odds of it being correct were only 0.0001?

You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

No, either you increase the odds or you don’t. How that is done is up to you.

Well, since it’s up to me ...
You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

I have another question.  I’ve been missing from awhile, but I’m back to ask this.

This is a question for a Christian person: where does morality come from?  Is morality defined by what God says is right (your God), or by how God acts?  Either way, does this mean that God can change his mind about what is right or wrong?  Does God make a decision about what is right or wrong, then, or is he somehow by definition right/wrong?  If that is the case, why does God contradict his own Ten Commandments with mass genocide against people?  I think I’ve asked too many questions.  I hope you’ll start with the first ones and we can have an interesting discussion on this topic.

Please try not to answer this question with “God is great and mysterious,” (basically, ‘I don’t know’).  I’d appreciate an attempt at a thoughtful response.

saraaaahhhhhh - 14 May 2008 01:13 PM

I have another question.  I’ve been missing from awhile, but I’m back to ask this.

This is a question for a Christian person: where does morality come from?  Is morality defined by what God says is right (your God), or by how God acts?  Either way, does this mean that God can change his mind about what is right or wrong?  Does God make a decision about what is right or wrong, then, or is he somehow by definition right/wrong?  If that is the case, why does God contradict his own Ten Commandments with mass genocide against people?  I think I’ve asked too many questions.  I hope you’ll start with the first ones and we can have an interesting discussion on this topic.

Please try not to answer this question with “God is great and mysterious,” (basically, ‘I don’t know’).  I’d appreciate an attempt at a thoughtful response.

Ah the Euthyphro dilemma.  For monotheists its goes something like this: Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it is commanded by God?

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

It doesn’t matter how any religious adherent assesses his own system’s self-consistency.  I am not proposing a subjective system, but an objective one, based on non-fallacious reasoning concerning the self-consistency of systems.

So what you are saying is that your internal self-consistency test, applicable to your and other theists’ systems, is based on the external criteria of Bayesian reasoning, that is terms of validity and strength and not soundness (which would an external consistency requirement)?

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

I don’t see how criteria for self-consistency can vary.  You’ll have to explain that one.
A system either is or is not self-consistent.  The criterion for self-consistency is self-consistency.

That is using Bayesian reasoning?

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

Perhaps what you’re trying to say is that I would have to reason accurately in order for my evaluation of self-consistency to turn out correctly (unless it turned out correctly by happenstance).  No question about that.  I’ve already pointed out that it is implicit in the system I suggest.

Which means that semantic games and rhetorical tricks are disallowed?

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

There’s no point in contesting external consistency, since we both agree that it is useful.  You deny the usefulness of internal consistency.  That makes it the appropriate point of contention.

I have never denied the usefulness of internal consistency only discussed the problems of dealing with it without external criteria. You are now suggesting external criteria which is the point I was making.

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

A specific point to your theism is that since your Christianity is derived from and enhanced over Judaism, you need to start from a self-consistent Judaism and take it further. But then probabilistically yours is less likely to correct than such a Judaism by the normal rules of logic and so your odds go down not up compared to at least one version of a Jewish theism.

Good point, albeit not particularly relevant to the issue on which we disagree--unless perhaps I were to suggest that you had derived this factor based on self-consistency rather than external consistency.  If you did the former then you’re implicitly conceding the usefulness of internal consistency to assist in calculating the probability that a religion is correct.

[edit]No I am granting that if this is a suitable differentiable criteria, then you need to answer this challenge else a suitable version of Jewish theism beats yours by default by increasing its a priori odds over yours [/edit]

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

Well, since it’s up to me ...
You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

No you are still missing the point (and repeating yourself). To the extent that we can, which is clearly limited here, this is a differentiable criteria theoretically applicable across all candidates in parallel which alters their a posteriori odds.

faithlessgod - 15 May 2008 12:50 AM

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

It doesn’t matter how any religious adherent assesses his own system’s self-consistency.  I am not proposing a subjective system, but an objective one, based on non-fallacious reasoning concerning the self-consistency of systems.

So what you are saying is that your internal self-consistency test, applicable to your and other theists’ systems, is based on the external criteria of Bayesian reasoning, that is terms of validity and strength and not soundness (which would an external consistency requirement)?

Your statement is too grammatically dicey to warrant an answer without explanation.

Bayesian reasoning is not a criterion at all.  It is a method, and might be used to evaluate various criteria.  Based on what you wrote, I do not feel comfortable hazarding a guess as to what you’re trying to say.

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

I don’t see how criteria for self-consistency can vary.  You’ll have to explain that one.
A system either is or is not self-consistent.  The criterion for self-consistency is self-consistency.

That is using Bayesian reasoning?

Yes, it can be viewed that way based on the recognition that either/or logic is not necessarily correct.  And I did mention that early on.

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

Perhaps what you’re trying to say is that I would have to reason accurately in order for my evaluation of self-consistency to turn out correctly (unless it turned out correctly by happenstance).  No question about that.  I’ve already pointed out that it is implicit in the system I suggest.

Which means that semantic games and rhetorical tricks are disallowed?

okfyts.

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

There’s no point in contesting external consistency, since we both agree that it is useful.  You deny the usefulness of internal consistency.  That makes it the appropriate point of contention.

I have never denied the usefulness of internal consistency only discussed the problems of dealing with it without external criteria. You are now suggesting external criteria which is the point I was making.

Based on your (apparent) claim that Bayesian reasoning is an external criterion?
That could easily pass for a rhetorical trick, IMHO.

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

A specific point to your theism is that since your Christianity is derived from and enhanced over Judaism, you need to start from a self-consistent Judaism and take it further. But then probabilistically yours is less likely to correct than such a Judaism by the normal rules of logic and so your odds go down not up compared to at least one version of a Jewish theism.

Good point, albeit not particularly relevant to the issue on which we disagree--unless perhaps I were to suggest that you had derived this factor based on self-consistency rather than external consistency.  If you did the former then you’re implicitly conceding the usefulness of internal consistency to assist in calculating the probability that a religion is correct.

[edit]No I am granting that if this is a suitable differentiable criteria, then you need to answer this challenge else a suitable version of Jewish theism beats yours by default by increasing its a priori odds over yours [/edit]

Well I’d just be wasting my time in addressing it if you don’t accept it as a suitable criterion for differentiation, wouldn’t I?
So of what use is the challenge at this point other than as a diversionary tactic?

Bryan - 14 May 2008 08:13 AM

Well, since it’s up to me ...
You mean like if I thought it contained an internal contradiction?

No you are still missing the point (and repeating yourself). To the extent that we can, which is clearly limited here, this is a differentiable criteria theoretically applicable across all candidates in parallel which alters their a posteriori odds.

How is that supposed to follow?  Are you back to judging self-consistency according to subjective impressions?

saraaaahhhhhh - 14 May 2008 01:13 PM

I have another question.  I’ve been missing from awhile, but I’m back to ask this.

This is a question for a Christian person: where does morality come from?

I’ve addressed this issue before, though it may have occurred in a different thread.

I suggest that morality is part of the foundation of reality, in that it exists as a feature of the eternal nature of God.

If true, that would mean two things: 
1) God does not decide what is moral and what is not (not by force of will, anyway)
2) God is not subject to a higher power than himself as regards morality

Is morality defined by what God says is right (your God), or by how God acts?

Neither, so far as I can tell.  Even if God did not act or speak, morality would be the same as established in his eternal nature.

Either way, does this mean that God can change his mind about what is right or wrong?

Neither way, but I think I can still affirm that God cannot change his mind about what is right or wrong, any more than he can decide not to be God.

Does God make a decision about what is right or wrong, then, or is he somehow by definition right/wrong?  If that is the case, why does God contradict his own Ten Commandments with mass genocide against people?

Mass genocide against people does not contradict the Ten Commandments, so far as I can tell.  I’d certainly be willing to entertain an argument to that effect, however.

Carbon based - 14 May 2008 10:00 PM

saraaaahhhhhh - 14 May 2008 01:13 PM

I have another question.  I’ve been missing from awhile, but I’m back to ask this.

This is a question for a Christian person: where does morality come from?  Is morality defined by what God says is right (your God), or by how God acts?  Either way, does this mean that God can change his mind about what is right or wrong?  Does God make a decision about what is right or wrong, then, or is he somehow by definition right/wrong?  If that is the case, why does God contradict his own Ten Commandments with mass genocide against people?  I think I’ve asked too many questions.  I hope you’ll start with the first ones and we can have an interesting discussion on this topic.

Please try not to answer this question with “God is great and mysterious,” (basically, ‘I don’t know’).  I’d appreciate an attempt at a thoughtful response.

Ah the Euthyphro dilemma.  For monotheists its goes something like this: Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it is commanded by God?

I was kind of getting at that, but less the why is something moral and more how whatever person answers personally understands morality.  Do they feel they make decisions about morality? 
But I like the Euthryphro dilemma, as well.  It makes clear that if morality is inherently moral, then why do we need any god to tell us the answer?  Clearly the Judeo-Christian god is immoral by this definition because he commands contradicting actions (to kill others, and not to kill others).  On the other side, if morality is what is commanded by a god, then morality is arbitrary can be defined at the whim of a god.  It becomes logically inconsistent and impossible for this god to contradict himself and command opposing things.  So, either god is immoral, or logically impossible, and these are the two options.

Any thoughts?