Now, the free will I believe we can know we do have.
It’s still the thing we have to have to be morally responsible for our actions, so it’s a question of defining moral responsibility.
To be morally responsible is to be apt target of praise and blame.
I suppose I don’t have what apt is worked out completely but I think I have enough to know we can be.
The main point about being apt targets, is we must be able to be influenced by praise and blame, the prospect of them and the prospect of any reward or penalty that may follow from being held responsible.
If not 1) it wouldn’t work 2) it’s not fair. (this is relative fairness, absolute fairness is out the window because the choice isn’t totally up to us, and ,by the way, the thing we benefit from slinging out the window)
The key is, do we need to be able to do otherwise in the precise same circumstances to satisfy these conditions of being apt targets of praise and blame?
If not determinism is no problem for moral responsibility and so no problem for free will of this variety.
So it’s a question of looking at what able means and it turns out able doesn’t mean in precisely the same circumstances.
When we use the word able, we don’t mean in precisely the same circumstances and we can just check and see. A windmill has arms that are able to turn through 360 degrees.
But, nobody thinks that means it’s able to in the precise same circumstances in which they are not moving.
It’s the same for the type of ability we are interested in regarding this variety of free will.
And we can check and see because this ability needs to allow praise and blame to 1) work and 2) be relatively fair.
Quite sketchy I know but it’s a much tougher job more fully explaining how we can know we have this variety of free will than how we can know we don’t have libertarian free will.
But there is enough there to satisfy me and it’s fun to try and broaden and deepen the theory as time goes on.