162 of 168
162
The greatest proof of free will…
Posted: 16 September 2012 03:46 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2416 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20

GdB,

Just came across this.

http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/physical-law/regularity_theory.htm

On the Regularity Theory, an existential proposition’s “being physically impossible” connotes something far more benign: simply that proposition’s being omnitemporally false. If (ex hypothesi) there never is (past, present, or future) a river of Coca Cola, then it is a universal truth (physical law) that no rivers are (constituted of) Coca Cola. Accordingly, in the sense in which “physical impossibility” is understood in the Regularity Theory, it is physically impossible for there to be a river of Coca Cola. Physical impossibility in this latter theory is simply omnitemporal falsity: it is not the confronting of an insurmountable metaphysical obstacle. Rather than being a fatal flaw in the theory, the physical impossibility of all omnitemporally false existential propositions rightly ought to be seen to be nothing more than an innocuous logical triviality.

Bold by me.

Stephen

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 04:11 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2417 ]
Sr. Member
Avatar
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  4574
Joined  2007-08-31
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 01:39 AM

The way he ‘creates’ possible worlds and the way Lewis does it, is assuming determinism, if I had made a different choice indeterminism would be true.

So the possible world Swartz creates is of type 1)

I am sure he doesn’t. His ‘possible worlds’ are of category 2:

They cannot be because he must be introducing indeterminism in the possible world he creates.

No idea what you are saying here.

StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 03:46 AM

Bold by me.

Yes. And what follows?

Would you mind to give concise and readable arguments?

 Signature 

GdB

“The light is on, but there is nobody at home”

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 04:22 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2418 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
GdB - 16 September 2012 04:11 AM
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 01:39 AM

The way he ‘creates’ possible worlds and the way Lewis does it, is assuming determinism, if I had made a different choice indeterminism would be true.

So the possible world Swartz creates is of type 1)

I am sure he doesn’t. His ‘possible worlds’ are of category 2:

They cannot be because he must be introducing indeterminism in the possible world he creates.

No idea what you are saying here.

If I had made a different choice either the initial conditions of the universe would have been different or indeterminism would be true.

Swartz opts for the latter like Lewis.

 

StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 03:46 AM

Bold by me.

Yes. And what follows?

It’s not what follows it’s what he says. Even a world with a river of cola is physically impossible in his book.

Interesting enough to point out, I would have thought.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 04:32 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2419 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
GdB - 27 August 2012 12:22 AM
StephenLawrence - 27 August 2012 12:05 AM
Write4U - 26 August 2012 03:10 PM

Seems to me that Swartz is wrong; whatever action he took it would be called “event D4729” and could never be called “event D5322” at that precise moment.
D4729 is “an” event at a specific spacetime coordinate, not a “specific” event, thus is always timelessly true..

His point is, although it is timelessly true it would be timelessly false if he had done otherwise.

The sentence, yes. But there is no law of nature changed. There is a true description of a law of nature found.

And if The action had been different a different law of nature would have been found instead.

Stephen

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 05:08 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2420 ]
Sr. Member
Avatar
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  4574
Joined  2007-08-31
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 04:22 AM

If I had made a different choice either the initial conditions of the universe would have been different or indeterminism would be true.

Or we would have found another law of nature.

StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 04:32 AM

And if The action had been different a different law of nature would have been found instead.

Yep. And?

I suggest you reread my posting carefully, and see what I am saying there.

 Signature 

GdB

“The light is on, but there is nobody at home”

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 05:18 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2421 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
GdB - 16 September 2012 05:08 AM
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 04:22 AM

If I had made a different choice either the initial conditions of the universe would have been different or indeterminism would be true.

Or we would have found another law of nature.

As a matter of fact there is no third option.

This indisputably follows from there being one physical possibility given the initial conditions and given determinism.

StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 04:32 AM

And if The action had been different a different law of nature would have been found instead.

Yep. And?

The and is that is physically impossible by definition.

Swartz ‘creates’ a physically impossible world.

Stephen

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 05:33 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2422 ]
Sr. Member
Avatar
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6164
Joined  2009-02-26

From the link, these three statements caught my eye,

Propositions do not ‘become’ true. A person may become the treasurer of a company; her becoming so is an event which is datable. The truth of a proposition is not a datable event or occurrence; propositions bear their truth omnitemporally. “John F. Kennedy is (/was /will be) assassinated on November 22, 1963” is true, has always been true, and will always be true. It did not ‘become’ true on November 22, 1963. The proposition’s having been true for all time prior to November 22, 1963 was not the cause of Kennedy’s death. (So-called ‘logical determinism’ is a crass confusion.) The cause of Kennedy’s death was an occurrence (event) in Dallas, Texas, on the fateful day; it was not a proposition or its truth

and

On a Tarskian theory of truth, the proposition expressed by the sentence “The charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs” is true if and only if the charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs.[note 15] However, according to the ‘standard’ account of the nature of physical laws, electrons bear the charge they do because they are governed by the ‘law’ “The charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs”. The Moon and the Earth dance (to first approximation) in elliptical orbits around a common focus because they are governed by the Einsteinian laws of Space-time (General Relativity). Cats learning to escape from puzzle boxes do so in accord with (what Thorndike called) ‘the law of effect’: “If a response in the presence of a stimulus leads to satisfying effects, the association between the stimulus and the response is strengthened”.[note 16] And, acting in accord with the laws of sociobiology, a person is more likely to come to the aid of a grandchild than of a cousin. In other words, on the standard account, there are certain, special, propositions, viz. physical laws, which do not take their truth from the way the world is, but instead ‘dictate’ to Nature, forcing it, governing it, regulating it, to ‘behave’ in certain ways and not in others.

I am still digesting these posits in context of (logical) determinism.

In the 1993 federal election in Canada, the Natural Law Party fielded a candidate in every riding (constituency). Their 44-page advertising brochure includes these explanations: “The most fundamental level of Natural Law is the Unified Field of Natural Law, the Constitution of the Universe. Both modern science and ancient Vedic Science locate the source of Nature’s perfect order in a single self-interacting Unified Field of pure intelligence. This field sequentially creates, from within itself, all the diverse Laws of Nature governing life at every level of the manifest universe” and “The technology to enliven the Unified Field of Natural Law is the group practice of Maharishi’s Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi program, including Yogic Flying” (p. 5). [Resume]

This is beginning to sound like David Bohm’s posit of “Insight Intelligence”.

[ Edited: 16 September 2012 05:48 AM by Write4U ]
 Signature 

Art is the creation of that which evokes an emotional response, leading to thoughts of the noblest kind.
W4U

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 08:59 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2423 ]
Sr. Member
Avatar
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  4574
Joined  2007-08-31

It is useless to react Stephen. You do not show that you have understood my posting. Your bringing in indeterminism at this point is ridiculous. You seem to think that Swartz is just a silly philosopher with silly ideas. But that is just because you interpret him wrong.

Leave Swartz, and react on my other points:
- That you use another definition of the concept of ‘physical possibility’ then Doug and I do: none of them is right or wrong, but it must be clear in what meaning one uses the concept.
- about what material implications mean in the formal logical way and in everyday life.

 Signature 

GdB

“The light is on, but there is nobody at home”

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 09:28 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2424 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  3330
Joined  2011-11-04
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 01:12 AM
TimB - 27 August 2012 12:30 AM

I am wondering whether statements, about something being timelessly true or false, make sesne.

Well, does the following make sense?

It is true that on the 15th of September 2012 I had vegetable stew with rice for dinner.

Tomorrow that will still be true and the day after that will still be true and so on.

Stephen

But that all is within the course of time.  There is no such thing as time"less” which would mean without time or time not existing.

 Signature 

As a fabrication of our own consciousness, our assignations of meaning are no less “real”, but since humans and the fabrications of our consciousness are routinely fraught with error, it makes sense, to me, to, sometimes, question such fabrications.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 09:55 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2425 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
TimB - 16 September 2012 09:28 AM
StephenLawrence - 16 September 2012 01:12 AM
TimB - 27 August 2012 12:30 AM

I am wondering whether statements, about something being timelessly true or false, make sesne.

Well, does the following make sense?

It is true that on the 15th of September 2012 I had vegetable stew with rice for dinner.

Tomorrow that will still be true and the day after that will still be true and so on.

Stephen

But that all is within the course of time.  There is no such thing as time"less” which would mean without time or time not existing.

I’m taking timelessly true to mean the truth doesn’t and can’t change with time. So if it is true today it was also true yesterday and true tomorrow.

Stephen

Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 10:09 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2426 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
GdB - 16 September 2012 08:59 AM

- That you use another definition of the concept of ‘physical possibility’ then Doug and I do: none of them is right or wrong, but it must be clear in what meaning one uses the concept.

Physical possibility means doesn’t contradict the laws of nature. Obviously if a law of nature were different then that would be a contradiction of the laws of nature as they are.

The definition Doug works with is the same as I work with and the way he does it is move to the nearest possible world with the same laws of nature. This world has different initial conditions which is why he stresses that determinism means everything is determined with the exception of the initial conditions (assuming a beginning).

Swartz and Lewis do it differently.

Stephen

[ Edited: 16 September 2012 10:43 AM by StephenLawrence ]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 16 September 2012 10:16 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2427 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
GdB - 16 September 2012 08:59 AM

It is useless to react Stephen. You do not show that you have understood my posting. Your bringing in indeterminism at this point is ridiculous. You seem to think that Swartz is just a silly philosopher with silly ideas. But that is just because you interpret him wrong.

There is nothing ridiculous about bringing indeterminism into it.

I have just cooked a chicken. Assuming determinism if that chicken had come out raw in those exact conditions indeterminism would be true.

Determinism is the thesis that everything is sufficiently caused and so all examples are the same (except the initial conditions) .

Also what is silly about the idea of introducing possible worlds in which indeterminism is true as Swartz does? All that’s required is that determinism is a contingent truth (assuming determinism).

David Lewis took a similar stance saying if he had done otherwise there would have been a “divergent miracle” shortly before the action. (assuming determinism)

Stephen

[ Edited: 16 September 2012 10:44 AM by StephenLawrence ]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 30 September 2012 12:48 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2428 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20

I’ve moved the following quote in order to reply.

George - 27 September 2012 11:24 AM

It’s easy to be an atheist (or at least a deist) since we have Epicurus and Plato’s Euthyphro. (I think philosophy here did a great job answering the question of God’s existence.) I just wish somebody came up with something as clever to show me that compatibilism (or moral realism) is true.

The thing is George, compatibilists are free will atheists, using free will to mean what you mean by it.

I don’t think there is a clever argument that shows you that compatibilism is true because it’s not that kind of thing. It’s like wanting a clever argument to show you sport exists, for instance. What we can do is look at what we call sports, contrast these with similar things that we don’t call sports and try to understand what we mean by it. Same goes for free choices a.k.a free will.

I have a book called “Logical Chess” I’ve not got it to hand but in it the author uses the term free will refering to a particular move. Black has a knight pinned by a bishop and moves a pawn to attack the bishop because he’s concerned about the pin and is trying to get out of it. What happens is this move weakens the defence of his king and he goes on to lose because of it.

What is meant by free will in this case is the pawn move was not forced, put another way he didn’t have to do it. And what that means is the pin wasn’t so devastating that he had to attempt to attack the bishop to avoid certain defeat, the game was fairly even until he moved the pawn.

One thing to note is that the truth of determinism or not as the case may be has absolutely nothing to do with it, which is why this is an example of compatibilist free will.

Stephen

[ Edited: 30 September 2012 01:09 AM by StephenLawrence ]
Profile
 
 
Posted: 30 September 2012 01:08 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2429 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  3330
Joined  2011-11-04

I think that the compatibilist would say that even in the chess game, in which a player has one and only one move, to avoid checkmate, that move would be an act of free will, (if the player took the one available move) because the player wanted to make that move rather than concede.

 Signature 

As a fabrication of our own consciousness, our assignations of meaning are no less “real”, but since humans and the fabrications of our consciousness are routinely fraught with error, it makes sense, to me, to, sometimes, question such fabrications.

Profile
 
 
Posted: 30 September 2012 01:34 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2430 ]
Sr. Member
RankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRankRank
Total Posts:  6195
Joined  2006-12-20
TimB - 30 September 2012 01:08 AM

I think that the compatibilist would say that even in the chess game, in which a player has one and only one move, to avoid checkmate, that move would be an act of free will, (if the player took the one available move) because the player wanted to make that move rather than concede.

In your example the player has other possible moves, it’s just they don’t avoid check mate.

A little later in the game in the book, this is the situation black finds himself in and the author naturally calls this move a forced move, the author writes “forced because…” and then points out the mating combination that would follow otherwise.

Stephen

Profile
 
 
   
162 of 168
162