On the Regularity Theory, an existential proposition’s “being physically impossible” connotes something far more benign: simply that proposition’s being omnitemporally false. If (ex hypothesi) there never is (past, present, or future) a river of Coca Cola, then it is a universal truth (physical law) that no rivers are (constituted of) Coca Cola. Accordingly, in the sense in which “physical impossibility” is understood in the Regularity Theory, it is physically impossible for there to be a river of Coca Cola. Physical impossibility in this latter theory is simply omnitemporal falsity: it is not the confronting of an insurmountable metaphysical obstacle. Rather than being a fatal flaw in the theory, the physical impossibility of all omnitemporally false existential propositions rightly ought to be seen to be nothing more than an innocuous logical triviality.
Seems to me that Swartz is wrong; whatever action he took it would be called “event D4729” and could never be called “event D5322” at that precise moment.
D4729 is “an” event at a specific spacetime coordinate, not a “specific” event, thus is always timelessly true..
His point is, although it is timelessly true it would be timelessly false if he had done otherwise.
The sentence, yes. But there is no law of nature changed. There is a true description of a law of nature found.
And if The action had been different a different law of nature would have been found instead.
From the link, these three statements caught my eye,
Propositions do not ‘become’ true. A person may become the treasurer of a company; her becoming so is an event which is datable. The truth of a proposition is not a datable event or occurrence; propositions bear their truth omnitemporally. “John F. Kennedy is (/was /will be) assassinated on November 22, 1963” is true, has always been true, and will always be true. It did not ‘become’ true on November 22, 1963. The proposition’s having been true for all time prior to November 22, 1963 was not the cause of Kennedy’s death. (So-called ‘logical determinism’ is a crass confusion.) The cause of Kennedy’s death was an occurrence (event) in Dallas, Texas, on the fateful day; it was not a proposition or its truth
and
On a Tarskian theory of truth, the proposition expressed by the sentence “The charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs” is true if and only if the charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs.[note 15] However, according to the ‘standard’ account of the nature of physical laws, electrons bear the charge they do because they are governed by the ‘law’ “The charge on each electron is –1.6 × 10–19 coulombs”. The Moon and the Earth dance (to first approximation) in elliptical orbits around a common focus because they are governed by the Einsteinian laws of Space-time (General Relativity). Cats learning to escape from puzzle boxes do so in accord with (what Thorndike called) ‘the law of effect’: “If a response in the presence of a stimulus leads to satisfying effects, the association between the stimulus and the response is strengthened”.[note 16] And, acting in accord with the laws of sociobiology, a person is more likely to come to the aid of a grandchild than of a cousin. In other words, on the standard account, there are certain, special, propositions, viz. physical laws, which do not take their truth from the way the world is, but instead ‘dictate’ to Nature, forcing it, governing it, regulating it, to ‘behave’ in certain ways and not in others.
I am still digesting these posits in context of (logical) determinism.
In the 1993 federal election in Canada, the Natural Law Party fielded a candidate in every riding (constituency). Their 44-page advertising brochure includes these explanations: “The most fundamental level of Natural Law is the Unified Field of Natural Law, the Constitution of the Universe. Both modern science and ancient Vedic Science locate the source of Nature’s perfect order in a single self-interacting Unified Field of pure intelligence. This field sequentially creates, from within itself, all the diverse Laws of Nature governing life at every level of the manifest universe” and “The technology to enliven the Unified Field of Natural Law is the group practice of Maharishi’s Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi program, including Yogic Flying” (p. 5). [Resume]
This is beginning to sound like David Bohm’s posit of “Insight Intelligence”.
It is useless to react Stephen. You do not show that you have understood my posting. Your bringing in indeterminism at this point is ridiculous. You seem to think that Swartz is just a silly philosopher with silly ideas. But that is just because you interpret him wrong.
Leave Swartz, and react on my other points:
- That you use another definition of the concept of ‘physical possibility’ then Doug and I do: none of them is right or wrong, but it must be clear in what meaning one uses the concept.
- about what material implications mean in the formal logical way and in everyday life.
- That you use another definition of the concept of ‘physical possibility’ then Doug and I do: none of them is right or wrong, but it must be clear in what meaning one uses the concept.
Physical possibility means doesn’t contradict the laws of nature. Obviously if a law of nature were different then that would be a contradiction of the laws of nature as they are.
The definition Doug works with is the same as I work with and the way he does it is move to the nearest possible world with the same laws of nature. This world has different initial conditions which is why he stresses that determinism means everything is determined with the exception of the initial conditions (assuming a beginning).
It is useless to react Stephen. You do not show that you have understood my posting. Your bringing in indeterminism at this point is ridiculous. You seem to think that Swartz is just a silly philosopher with silly ideas. But that is just because you interpret him wrong.
There is nothing ridiculous about bringing indeterminism into it.
I have just cooked a chicken. Assuming determinism if that chicken had come out raw in those exact conditions indeterminism would be true.
Determinism is the thesis that everything is sufficiently caused and so all examples are the same (except the initial conditions) .
Also what is silly about the idea of introducing possible worlds in which indeterminism is true as Swartz does? All that’s required is that determinism is a contingent truth (assuming determinism).
David Lewis took a similar stance saying if he had done otherwise there would have been a “divergent miracle” shortly before the action. (assuming determinism)
It’s easy to be an atheist (or at least a deist) since we have Epicurus and Plato’s Euthyphro. (I think philosophy here did a great job answering the question of God’s existence.) I just wish somebody came up with something as clever to show me that compatibilism (or moral realism) is true.
The thing is George, compatibilists are free will atheists, using free will to mean what you mean by it.
I don’t think there is a clever argument that shows you that compatibilism is true because it’s not that kind of thing. It’s like wanting a clever argument to show you sport exists, for instance. What we can do is look at what we call sports, contrast these with similar things that we don’t call sports and try to understand what we mean by it. Same goes for free choices a.k.a free will.
I have a book called “Logical Chess” I’ve not got it to hand but in it the author uses the term free will refering to a particular move. Black has a knight pinned by a bishop and moves a pawn to attack the bishop because he’s concerned about the pin and is trying to get out of it. What happens is this move weakens the defence of his king and he goes on to lose because of it.
What is meant by free will in this case is the pawn move was not forced, put another way he didn’t have to do it. And what that means is the pin wasn’t so devastating that he had to attempt to attack the bishop to avoid certain defeat, the game was fairly even until he moved the pawn.
One thing to note is that the truth of determinism or not as the case may be has absolutely nothing to do with it, which is why this is an example of compatibilist free will.
I think that the compatibilist would say that even in the chess game, in which a player has one and only one move, to avoid checkmate, that move would be an act of free will, (if the player took the one available move) because the player wanted to make that move rather than concede.
I think that the compatibilist would say that even in the chess game, in which a player has one and only one move, to avoid checkmate, that move would be an act of free will, (if the player took the one available move) because the player wanted to make that move rather than concede.
In your example the player has other possible moves, it’s just they don’t avoid check mate.
A little later in the game in the book, this is the situation black finds himself in and the author naturally calls this move a forced move, the author writes “forced because…” and then points out the mating combination that would follow otherwise.
