Geez, I hate to ever post on these determinism vs free will threads, but here goes. The problem you posed, Gnostikosis, is meaningless. Just because our behavior is determined doesn’t mean that we necessarily have any conscious idea of the factors caused it. Lack of that knowledge doesn’t mitigate for free will. Suppose, for example, that I decide to lie to you if a coin flipped comes up heads and to tell the truth if it comes up tails. That would certainly seem random, however, we know that the forces on the coin, while unable to be recognized, are clearly deterministic, that is, the coin doesn’t have free will.
Occam
I think this will all turn out to be much less a waste of time than you think Occam.
What it shows is people very much are libertarians intuitively.
You then want to shrug your shoulders but I think that will turn out to be a mistake, like it would be to shrug your shoulders at other beliefs that you would classify as woo.
Especially as this is so wrapped up with how we think and feel about ourselves and each other and is so much more universal than other woo.
Reason, like habit or intuition, is a means by which thinking comes from one idea to a related idea. But more specifically, it is the way rational beings propose and consider explanations concerning cause and effect, true and false, and what is good or bad. In contrast to reason as an abstract noun, a reason is a consideration which explains or justifies some event, phenomenon or behaviour.
Precisely because determinism is causal, reason to explain why and how causation and causal chains are unique in the universe over cosmic time for causal determinism to hold, is crucial.
However, compelling reason (which is necessary and sufficient) to justify why and how causation and causal chains are unique, is problematic. This does not satisfy the principle of sufficient reason.
The principle of sufficient reason states that anything that happens does so for a reason: no state of affairs can obtain, and no statement can be true unless there is sufficient reason why it should not be otherwise.
Thus, causal determinism remains an ancient unproven doctrine/belief with many fundamental issues, like the clockwork universe of Deism.
OTOH, because nature is creative, complex and evolutionary, there is more reason to consider the universe as non-deterministic, naturalistic, possibly infinite and eternal.
I think this will all turn out to be much less a waste of time than you think Occam.
What it shows is people very much are libertarians intuitively.
You then want to shrug your shoulders but I think that will turn out to be a mistake, like it would be to shrug your shoulders at other beliefs that you would classify as woo.
Especially as this is so wrapped up with how we think and feel about ourselves and each other and is so much more universal than other woo.
And that is precisely why I try never to post on these determinism/Free Will threads, because you COMPLETELY misunderstood my point, Stephen.
What we are looking for is what we mean when we talk about what we could have done.
However I’m talking about you can do or I can do, not what either of us could have done.
It’s the case that it turns out that is compatible with determinism.
It has nothing to do with the truth or otherwise of determinism.
What we mean by could have done otherwise in the context of choice making is there was nothing that would have prevented us if we’d chosen to.
Now all you need to do is empirically test this and see.
Stephen
Neither compatibilism nor freewill is the question here. I’m sorry if I somehow made it seem that way. Non-determinism has something to do with the truth of determinism wouldn’t you say? I am looking at the arguments from a non-determinist POV.
The compatibilist accepts the determinist model for human behavior isn’t this true? So I’d assume the compatibilist must by necessity defend determinism.
Geez, I hate to ever post on these determinism vs free will threads, but here goes. The problem you posed, Gnostikosis, is meaningless. Just because our behavior is determined doesn’t mean that we necessarily have any conscious idea of the factors caused it. Lack of that knowledge doesn’t mitigate for free will. Suppose, for example, that I decide to lie to you if a coin flipped comes up heads and to tell the truth if it comes up tails. That would certainly seem random, however, we know that the forces on the coin, while unable to be recognized, are clearly deterministic, that is, the coin doesn’t have free will.
Occam
I’m not making an argument for freewill. I am making an argument against determinism with regard to human behavior. Specifically the conclusion reached from the deterministic model that the future is a predetermined unalterable one that has only one possible outcome dictated since or before the beginning of time.
If any element of randomness exists either in human behavior or the physics of the universe then the inference of a predetermine future is a false one.
The question is whether a person can make a random choice from a range of choices offered when no desire, obligation, personal interest or consequence is involved.
Yes, normally this is not the case. However it only takes a single instance of this to falsify the concept of an unalterable future.
I think this will all turn out to be much less a waste of time than you think Occam.
What it shows is people very much are libertarians intuitively.
You then want to shrug your shoulders but I think that will turn out to be a mistake, like it would be to shrug your shoulders at other beliefs that you would classify as woo.
Especially as this is so wrapped up with how we think and feel about ourselves and each other and is so much more universal than other woo.
And that is precisely why I try never to post on these determinism/Free Will threads, because you COMPLETELY misunderstood my point, Stephen.
But of course I understood your particular point about not being aware of all the causes of our choices.
The compatibilist accepts the determinist model for human behavior isn’t this true? So I’d assume the compatibilist must by necessity defend determinism.
No, this isn’t true.
The compatibilist has no need to defend determinism.
The compatibilist only has to defend the meaning of could have done otherwise that is compatible with determinism.
The surprising - at the time - solution is that the idea of the deterministic universe is probably wrong.
This conclusion came out of the physicist Heisenberg’s work with quantum mechanics. In 1927 he published what has become known as the “uncertainty paper,” in which he described his work with trying to determine the position and the momentum of a particle simultanously, and concluded:
“The more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this instant, and vice versa.”
Contrary to what many argued, this was not due to any fault from the observer. Simplified, we can say that this imprecision is due to an actual fuzziness in the fabric universe itself, at the quantum level.
It actually follows from quantum mechanics, solidly confirmed by experiments, that on the quantum level, the universe is not at all deterministic. Events happen according to a statistical distribution that comes out of quantum equations. Given an elementary particle, if it can go zing or zong, it is actually inheritably impossible to determine with certainty which it will do either, only the statistical probabilities.
While Einstein, and even some contemporary physicists, argue that there must be an actual underlying deterministic system to quantum mechanics, this system has never been found, and little evidence available now suggests it ever will.
If I drop an apple, it must (determinism) fall towards the center of gravity. However, if I throw the apple away from me, it will still fall toward the center of gravity, but this process will take longer than when the apple was dropped from a stationary position.
Thus we have two competing deterministic paths. The law of gravity (universal determinism) and my free will (personal determinism) to redirect the path which the apple will follow, resulting in a difference in the time it will take for the apple to fall to the ground.
It was my choice (free will) to alter the natural deterministic path of the falling apple.
Is this line of reasoning pertinent to the discussion?
Are you being serious, Write4U? What if the apple gets stolen by a bird while it’s falling toward the ground? What is that all about? An avian determinism?
What if the apple gets stolen by a bird while it’s falling toward the ground? What is that all about? An avian determinism?
