Only if indeterminism can give us freedom Kkwan. And it’s well known that it can’t.
Apparently, it is only a well known contention (that indeterminism can’t give us freedom) of compatibilists and their supporters, but the contention is rejected as false, misconceived and misleading by metaphysical libertarians and their supporters.
Let’s explore and investigate the ramifications of indeterminism.
Indeterminism is the concept that events (certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically (cf. causality) by prior events. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance. It is highly relevant to the philosophical problem of free will, particularly in the form of metaphysical libertarianism.
Bold added by me
1. The concept, highlighted in bold, is anathema and fatal to compatibilism as it implies that causal determinism and logical determinism, are not necessarily true, if there are such events as mentioned in the concept.
2. Indeterminism does not imply it is just all pure chance as in mere randomness, although it is related to chance as “something that happens unpredictably without discernible human intention or observable cause” - Merriam-Webster Online. In other words, chance does play a role in the evolution of biological systems and the universe and as such, it should not be dismissed outright as incoherent. Nature does not do that.
OTOH, compatibilists conveniently interpret chance as synonymous to mere randomness and as such, jump to the conclusion with undue haste that there is no freedom per se, which is prejudice and unjustified value judgment.
As there are anticausal or acausal systems (mentioned in my post 317) besides causal systems, there are grounds to support 1 and 2.
How about indeterminism and science? From the same wiki above:
In science, Indeterminism has been promoted by the French biologist Jacques Monod’s essay “Chance and necessity”. It is also asserted by Werner Heisenberg, Sir Arthur Eddington, Max Born and Murray Gell-Mann. The physicist-chemist Ilya Prigogine argued for indeterminism in complex systems.
Causation without determinism:
A number of philosophers have argued that lack of determinism does not entail absence of causation.
Necessary, but insufficient causation:
If x is a necessary cause of y; then the presence of y necessarily implies that x preceded it. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.
Thus, the presence of x does not necessarily mean y will occur i.e. it is not as deterministic as compatibilism assume it to be so.
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.
That the presence of y does not imply the presence of x is again not uniquely deterministic as z may alternately cause y.
Indeterminism in classical and relativistic physics:
John Earman has argued that most physical theories are indeterministic. For instance, Newtonian physics admits solutions where particles accelerate continuously, heading out towards infinity. By the time reversibility of the laws in question, particles could also head inwards, unprompted by any pre-existing state. He calls such hypothetical particles “space invaders”.
John D. Norton has suggested another indeterministic scenario, where a particle is initially situated on the exact apex of an inverted dome.
Branching space-time is a theory uniting indeterminism and the special theory of relativity. The idea was originated by Nuel Belnap. The equations of general relativity admit of both indeterministic and deterministic solutions.
Reductionist (bottom-up) causation versus (top-down) causation:
There is also the issue of the reductionist (bottom-up) causation versus (top-down) causation in complex biological systems (specifically human consciousness and the mind/brain) whereby deterministic (bottom-up) causation finds it inexplicable and/or non existent, which is ridiculous as from human experience, higher level decisions of human consciousness and the mind/brain have causal powers.
There are serious challenges to compatibilist free will from process philosophy:
In opposition to the classical model of change as accidental (as by Aristotle) or illusory, process philosophy regards change as the cornerstone of reality—the cornerstone of the Being thought as Becoming. Modern philosophers who appeal to process rather than substance include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Charles Peirce, Alfred North Whitehead, Robert M. Pirsig, Charles Hartshorne, Arran Gare and Nicholas Rescher. In physics Ilya Prigogine distinguishes between the “physics of being” and the “physics of becoming”. Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion, philosophy, and science.
Whitehead’s philosophy of reality:
An occasion of experience consists of a process of prehending other occasions of experience, reacting to them. This is the process in process philosophy.
Such process is never deterministic. Consequently, free will is essential and inherent to the universe.
The causal outcomes obey the usual well-respected rule that the causes precede the effects in time. Some pairs of processes cannot be connected by cause-and-effect relations, and they are said to be spatially separated. This is in perfect agreement with the viewpoint of the Einstein theory of special relativity and with the Minkowski geometry of spacetime.
Bold added by me.
Whither, compatibilist free will?