Compatibilists usually believe free will is compatible with adequate determinism. They also believe it is compatible with determinism. So they don’t want any more as a rule.
Not quite so.
Compatibilism (or soft determinism) is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. Compatibilists believe freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics.
There is no mention of adequate determinism, only determinism, in the above definition.
Kane insightfully remarks “One may legitimately wonder why worries about determinism persist at all in the twenty-first century, when the physical sciences - once the stronghold of determinist thinking - seem to have turned away from determinism.”
However, if compatibilism concedes that determinism does not exist and that free will is only compatible to adequate determinism, then their belief is more tenable in the modern world.
As you well no it’s the extra control which adequate determinism is supposed to give you which you want.That’s why you don’t want your choices depending upon the past.It’s so that the choices can be entirely up to you.
That your choices is not dependent on the past is innate in you, as a free agent.
Kane describes free will itself, for instance, as “the power of agents to be the ultimate creators ... and sustainers of their own ends and purposes.”
Precisely. However, from the same website I cited above:
Two Cosmological Mysteries:
Kane describes consciousness and the indeterminacy needed for free will as “cosmological problems” that are equally “mysterious.”
How can a physical process of the brain be at the same time a consciously experienced effort of will?
Mind/brain and conscious problem for compatibilists and incompatibilists:
One of these problems is “the mind/body problem,” including at its core the “problem of consciousness”: how can thoughts, perceptions, and other conscious experiences — including efforts of will — be brain processes? But this is a problem whether you are a compatibilist or incompatibilist, libertarian or nonlibertarian.
“The Second Cosmological Problem” of which free will partakes is the problem of genuine indeterminacy-in-nature, which is pretty mysterious as well. How can wave/particles such as electrons have indeterminate trajectories in which their position and momentum cannot both be exact at the same time?
Causal indeterminism or event-causal libertarianism?
Two philosophers who have suggested causal indeterminist views of this kind (without endorsing them), Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele, argue that a view of this kind would give libertarians at least some of the important things they demand about free will.
Unacceptable to Kane:
It is unfortunate that Kane did not accept Dennett’s ideas for “giving libertarians what they want.” He might have reconciled many libertarians and compatibilists. Instead, Kane wants something more - indeterminism in the decision itself - so that our actions are not determined by our prior deliberations and alternative possibilities, however much these are our own creations.
Can this impasse can be resolved?