You don’t know that.
Modern science knows that determinism is only “an abstract theoretical ideal”.
One physically possible future we can get to from the actual past.
Is that compatibilism?
It does no good to responsibility either. It makes no relevant difference, which is why it doesn’t get us Libertarian free will.
It does get us LFW, but you don’t or won’t accept, that it could.
It doesn’t make any relevant difference, specifically it doesn’t solve the problem of luck which is the motivation for it in the first place.
The problem of luck is a non-problem, posed as an intractable problem.
The above does nothing to solve the problem of causal luck, since anything that just happens uncaused is out of your control. And if causes are probabilistic you still have the problem that effects can be traced back to prior causes beyond your control.
So which ever way you look at it, to have done otherwise circumstances out of your control would have had to be appropriately different. And if circumstances out of your control had been appropriately different you would have done otherwise.
So if circumstances out of your control had been appropriately different you would be a murderer.
And if circumstances out of a murderer’s control had been appropriately different the murderer would not have committed murder.
Luck swallows everything. The motivation for belief in libertarian free will is to avoid this conclusion. And once you are clear on that it is equally clear that the two stage model fails.
“That luck swallows everything” is a misnomer for the inherent unpredictability of extremely complex self adaptive dynamic systems and as such, is simplistic, misconceived and misleading.
There are many concepts of cause.
In logic, necessary and sufficient or contributory causes:
If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the presence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.
A cause may be classified as a “contributory cause,” if the presumed cause precedes the effect, and altering the cause alters the effect. It does not require that all those subjects which possess the contributory cause experience the effect. It does not require that all those subjects which are free of the contributory cause be free of the effect. In other words, a contributory cause may be neither necessary nor sufficient but it must be contributory.
1. Counterfactual theories:
Research in the psychology of reasoning shows that people make different sorts of inferences from different sorts of causes.
2. Probabilistic causation:
Interpreting causation as a deterministic relation means that if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B.
This is sometimes interpreted to reflect imperfect knowledge of a deterministic system but other times interpreted to mean that the causal system under study is inherently probabilistic, such as quantum mechanics.
3. Derivation theories:
Rather, a causal relation is not a relation between values of variables, but a function of one variable (the cause) on to another (the effect).
4. Manipulation theories:
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability. Under these theories, x causes y only in the case that one can change x in order to change y.
Criticisms of circularity:
First, theorists complain that these accounts are circular. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that manipulation is more basic than causal interaction.
If causality is identified with our manipulation, then this intuition is lost. In this sense, it makes humans overly central to interactions in the world.
5. Process theories:
These theorists claim that the important concept for understanding causality is not causal relationships or causal interactions, but rather identifying causal processes. The former notions can then be defined in terms of causal processes.
6. Systematic causation:
Systemic causation, because it is less obvious, is more important to understand. A systemic cause may be one of a number of multiple causes. It may require some special conditions. It may be indirect, working through a network of more direct causes. It may be probabilistic, occurring with a significantly high probability. It may require a feedback mechanism. In general, causation in ecosystems, biological systems, economic systems, and social systems tends not to be direct, but is no less causal. And because it is not direct causation, it requires all the greater attention if it is to be understood and its negative effects controlled. Above all, it requires a name: systemic causation.
Causal processes and systemic causation are relevant in complex dynamic self adaptive biological systems, such as the human mind/brain (together with the importance of top down causation).
So, what concept of causality does “causal luck” refer to and why should it be that fundamental at all, in reality?
Causal Moral Luck:
Thomas Nagel has been criticized [who?] for including causal moral luck as a separate category, since it appears largely redundant. It does not cover any cases that are not already included in constitutive and circumstantial luck, and seems to exist only for the purpose of bringing up the problem of free will.
Some philosophers, such as Susan Wolf, have tried to come up with “happy mediums” that strike a balance between rejecting moral luck outright and accepting it wholesale. Wolf introduced the notions of rationalist and irrationalist positions as part of such a reconciliation.