I have no idea what to make of it when you say that “without determinism free will would be impossible.” As opposed to what? Indeterminism? How does that prove anything?
It does not proof anything, i.e. it is just part of the definition of compatibilist free will.
But Doug and I have both argued why it is correct: in the first place a rigid connection between wishes and beliefs at one side, and our actions at the other side, is simply needed that actions are my actions, and not some indeterminate randomness; in the second place my observations and feelings etc must have causal influence on my wishes and beliefs. See e.g. here and here.
“Indeterminate action” is a contradiction in terms. This necessarily gets into what counts as an action: “actions” are volitional bodily movements. “Actions” are opposed to involuntary twitches, jerks, etc. If my arm hurts and so I move it to the left to relieve pressure on a nerve, that is an action. If the wind blows my arm over, or a muscle spasm causes it to move, that is not an action.
Now, libertarians about free will accept all that as well. The only question is how the volition works. The libertarian says it is “indeterminate”: that is, the volition is an uncaused cause. So the will “spontaneously” chooses to move my arm.
The problem with this picture is this: how is my will supposed to know to move my arm to the left, if it’s doing so completely uncaused by anything? Then my will has to be uncaused in particular by the nerve impulses that cause pain in that arm. Given that picture, it is equiprobable that my will move my arm in any direction at all, or indeed in no direction, since the will has no causal access to information from my nerve endings.
This sort of “action” looks to me indistinguishable from a twitch, jerk, or muscle spasm. And such things by definition aren’t actions at all. The only sorts of causal streams that result in actions come from the causal nexus in which my perceptual organs, desire mechanisms, etc., exist.
Until you show me what an indeterminate action looks like, I don’t care how a determined action explains free will.
Sigh… I do not say that every determined action is a free action. Nor did I say that determinism explains free will. It is a necessary attribute of free will.
I only say that a free action is determined, just as all other natural processes (with the notorious exception of quantum mechanics of course.) An undetermined action is no action at all, it is a bodily jerk. A free action is determined by somebody’s wishes and beliefs, opposed to being determined by the wishes and beliefs of somebody else.
You both have said that the opposite of “determined” is “indeterminate,” so “free actions” and “involuntary movements” have nothing to do with this since everything is determined, be it free actions or involuntary movements. What I am not sure is how the fact that everything is determined adds anything to explaining compatibilism. I mean, you might as well say that in order for us to be able to act according to our wishes and beliefs we need gravity and oxygen.
What I am not sure is how the fact that everything is determined adds anything to explaining compatibilism.
I’ll repeat it again:
Determinism does not explain compatibilist free will. It is a necessary attribute of free will.
An action is free if it is caused by my wishes and beliefs. Without determinism free will would be impossible. But a robot that is complex enough could very well have free will, and maybe it (sorry, he) works also in an orbit around earth, where there is no gravity and no oxygen. The only trivial condition in this respect is that the wishes and beliefs must be implemented somehow in determinate matter.
What GdB says. Determinism is necessary for freely willed actions. Determinism is not sufficient, obviously, because there are all kinds of things that are determined yet unfree. In the same way, determinism is necessary for there to be biological species. Clearly it isn’t sufficient, since there are all kinds of things that are determined yet not biological species.
You both have said that the opposite of “determined” is “indeterminate,” so “free actions” and “involuntary movements” have nothing to do with this since everything is determined, be it free actions or involuntary movements. What I am not sure is how the fact that everything is determined adds anything to explaining compatibilism. I mean, you might as well say that in order for us to be able to act according to our wishes and beliefs we need gravity and oxygen.
No, because actions don’t just occur in accordance with our beliefs and wishes by coincidence. Some causal link is needed, which I think is what Doug and GdB mean.
The compatibilist definition of free will is useful in distinguishing coerced actions and free actions. On the physical level, these cannot be distinguished, all actions are determined. It is only in the opposition between free and coerced actions that the concept of free will makes any sense.
Right, so it is just a matter of semantics for you. Like I said 100x you just want to use the term free-will to couch issues of morality.
You have been misleading everyone along into a game of semantics. Everybody knows that non-coerced actions are generally the result of “free-will”. This is all you have been stringing us along with for 100s of pages.
We went over the man with the gun to his head scenario months and months ago! Why didn’t you wrap it up then?
We get it!! People use the term free-will to describe actions they do without being blackmailed or threatened etc…
Really? Really? GdB.
Don’t say that’s what you’ve been trying to say all along either. You’ve deliberately misled many folks here.
Countless times people are having discussions here to get a feel for the basics of determinism and causality. Libertarian free-will(discussed as free-will) vs. determinism and you chime in with your obfuscating references to “determined free-will” and compatibilism and other confusing sidetracks into desserts, morals,
consequences, guns to heads, etc etc…...
It’s a joke. What a stubborn agitator you are.
You could have just said years ago that people use the term free-will to describe non-coerced actions. But of course why would you say that?
It would have taken one post and you wouldn’t be able to carry on for 100s of pages.
Also everyone would have replied(as I’m sure already happened)....“Yes yes, we get that! Free-will is a term used to describe actions that aren’t coerced.”
Like in a wedding ceremony..“Do you take this person of your own free-will…”
I suppose you’re going to keep banging away at this right?
Sorry, VYAZMA, I was always clear about this. I have always defined free will as ‘being able to do what you want’. It was you, and others, that always argue against me as if I defend libertarian free will. You always thought I was talking nonsense because you always replaced my concept of free will, in which I was always very explicit, with libertarian free will. The 100ds of pages are caused by just not getting that compatibilist free will is not the same as libertarian free will.
And you may call it just semantics, but the semantics becomes important when neurologists and many others say that we should reform our judicial system because neurology ‘discovers’¹ that we are determined. If we see that the correct definition of free will is the compatibilist one, then we see also that this discovery does not touch our judicial system at all.
And if you think that those neurologists are right, then you see that based on our semantical difference we come to very different practical conclusions.
¹Of course that is not a discovery. It is a presumption. Without this presumption science would be impossible. So neurology discovers how we are determined, not that we are determined.
Sorry, VYAZMA, I was always clear about this. I have always defined free will as ‘being able to do what you want’. It was you, and others, that always argue against me as if I defend libertarian free will. You always thought I was talking nonsense because you always replaced my concept of free will, in which I was always very explicit, with libertarian free will. The 100ds of pages are caused by just not getting that compatibilist free will is not the same as libertarian free will.
And you may call it just semantics, but the semantics becomes important when neurologists and many others say that we should reform our judicial system because neurology ‘discovers’¹ that we are determined. If we see that the correct definition of free will is the compatibilist one, then we see also that this discovery does not touch our judicial system at all.
And if you think that those neurologists are right, then you see that based on our semantical difference we come to very different practical conclusions.
¹Of course that is not a discovery. It is a presumption. Without this presumption science would be impossible. So neurology discovers how we are determined, not that we are determined.
We have all defined “free-will” as being able to do what you want.
I didn’t replace your idea of free-will. I have always been arguing under the assumption that there is only one kind of free will. Libertarian free-will.
Outside of that there is a multitude of semantical references. Of which people can ably use license with.
I do call it just semantics. It’s irrelevant. The system is already well set up to consider “compatibilism” in it’s legal jurisprudence.
We’ve been over this before.
There are many cases in which determinism is considered in legal venues. Many!
Of course the system itself is subject to the same “compatibilism”. It’s a 2 way street. The arm of the law is an extension of the collective for better or worse.
And the collective is just as causally determined as the criminal. Or the hero. Or the lawyer. Or the judge. Or the victim. Or the criminal.
