I think it is Kkwan. You can’t overcome the supposed problem with indeterminism but people tie themselves in knots in the attempt.
It is not, as people do “tie themselves in knots” with determinism and causality as well.
Wrt to indeterminism, from http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/indeterminism.html
Indeterminism is important for the question of free will because strict determinism implies just one possible future. Indeterminism means that the future is unpredictable. Indeterminism allows alternative futures and the question becomes how the one actual present is realized from these potential alternatives.
The departure from strict causality is very slight compared to the miraculous ideas associated with the “causa sui” (self-caused cause) of the ancients.
Bold added by me
So, indeterminism does not imply uncaused or self-caused cause. It implies probabilistic causality and it is germane wrt FW.
Perhaps, perhaps not. It doesn’t make any difference.
It does, because as determinism is only a theoretical ideal, then indeterminism rules in the real world and as such, we must reconcile FW with that.
It was an appropriate analogy because it was about the consequences of indeterminism for causes generally.
From the same article I cited:
An example of an event that is not strictly caused is one that depends on chance, like the flip of a coin. If the outcome is only probable, not certain, then the event can be said to have been caused by the coin flip, but the head or tails result was not predictable. So this causality, which recognizes prior events as causes, is undetermined.
Bold added by me.
So, causality does not imply strict determinism and it is a mistake to assume that it does, probably because of adequate determinism.
As such, how can we have FW? From the conclusion of the same article I cited:
Our Macro Mind needs the Micro Mind for the free action items and thoughts in an Agenda of alternative possibilities to be de-liberated by the will. The random Micro Mind is the “free” in free will and the source of human creativity. The adequately determined Macro Mind is the “will” in free will that de-liberates, choosing actions for which we can be morally responsible.
Bold added by me.
And this is LFW.
More wrt indeterminism, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminism
Definition of indeterminism:
Indeterminism is the concept that events (certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically (cf. causality) by prior events. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance. It is highly relevant to the philosophical problem of free will, particularly in the form of metaphysical libertarianism.
Tychism (Greek: τύχη “chance”) is a thesis proposed by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in the 1890s. It holds that absolute chance, also called spontaneity, is a real factor operative in the universe. It may be considered both the direct opposite of Einstein’s oft quoted dictum that: “God does not play dice with the universe” and an early philosophical anticipation of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
Peirce does not, of course, assert that there is no law in the universe. On the contrary, he maintains that an absolutely chance world would be a contradiction and thus impossible. Complete lack of order is itself a sort of order. The position he advocates is rather that there are in the universe both regularities and irregularities.
Bold added by me.
In his essay Of Clouds and Cuckoos, included in his book Objective Knowledge, Popper contrasted “clouds”, his metaphor for indeterministic systems, with “clocks”, meaning deterministic ones. He sided with indeterminism, writing
“I believe Peirce was right in holding that all clocks are clouds to some considerable degree — even the most precise of clocks. This, I think, is the most important inversion of the mistaken determinist view that all clouds are clocks”
Bold added by me.
So, all clocks are clouds. Vagueness.
Kane is one of the leading contemporary philosophers on free will. Advocating what is termed within philosophical circles “libertarian freedom”, Kane argues that ” the existence of alternative possibilities (or the agent’s power to do otherwise) is a necessary condition for acting freely, and determinism is not compatible with alternative possibilities (it precludes the power to do otherwise)”. It is important to note that the crux of Kane’s position is grounded not in a defense of alternative possibilities (AP) but in the notion of what Kane refers to as ultimate responsibility (UR). Thus, AP is a necessary but insufficient criterion for free will. It is necessary that there be (metaphysically) real alternatives for our actions, but that is not enough; our actions could be random without being in our control. The control is found in “ultimate responsibility”.
What allows for ultimate responsibility of creation in Kane’s picture are what he refers to as “self-forming actions” or SFAs — those moments of indecision during which people experience conflicting wills. These SFAs are the undetermined, regress-stopping voluntary actions or refrainings in the life histories of agents that are required for UR. UR does not require that every act done of our own free will be undetermined and thus that, for every act or choice, we could have done otherwise; it requires only that certain of our choices and actions be undetermined (and thus that we could have done otherwise), namely SFAs. These form our character or nature; they inform our future choices, reasons and motivations in action. If a person has had the opportunity to make a character-forming decision (SFA), he is responsible for the actions that are a result of his character.