He his arguing against property nominalism, and for a notion of universals. That is, he is arguing that properties are more than their particular instantiations; that there is some universal form present in all things with the same property.

This is a controversial point of view in philosophy, but no more controversial than any other point of view ...  :wink: ... it is one that I myself share.

But it is perfectly compatible with a naturalist program. Indeed, many of the most famous people who argue for universals are themselves fervent naturalists. I am thinking in particular of the philosophers David Armstrong and David Lewis, among others.

So what he’s arguing may be true, but it is entirely irrelevant to theism.

You assume that the human mind is able to furnish the unity that must bind together the diversity of factual experience.

Of course, this is exactly what the mind does. Individual bits of sensory information are processed and integrated with each other and with pre-existing knowledge into coherent patterns. This requires no “law outside the mind,” it’s what the mind (i.e. brain) is for. So I don’t see how he in any way challenges naturalism here.

I found it totally incoherent.  The “object and the subject of knowledge” can’t “come into contact” with each other?  And how does he get the idea that naturalism assumes metaphysics “out of the question”?  Is this some special meaning of metaphysics I’m not aware of?  It’s no use asking him, he just states the same thing again in different words!

Yes, Advocatus!