Ok, so if, as you say “Nietzschean philosophy openly wants the world, including man, to be the will to power and nothing besides.”, then this justifies doing absolutely anything.
Exactly, it justifies absolutely anything—and not just in the neutral sense, as in “nothing is unjust”, but in the positive sense: everything is just. (Though if we are to keep the laughers on our side, we should say: “It is just to consider things just, and unjust to consider things unjust.” For there is also such a thing as being too just…)
What I would choose is to limit the power of those who would do things that are destructive of humanity.
I agree insofar as “humanity” refers to the human in its highest reach. But the preservation thereof is precisely the effect of Nietzsche’s teaching: the overcoming of our human-alltoohumanism by a human-superhumanism. As I wrote recently:
Actually, it is for the sake of a certain part of human nature that other parts of human nature are being conquered. In fact, it was also that part, and not the whole of human nature, for whose sake the conquest of non-human nature was promoted in the first place. It is what Nietzsche would call the human, all too human part or the herd animal part. In other words, the ‘humanist’ part.
Now a humanism worthy of the name could of course not be concerned solely with a part of human nature, but would have to be concerned with the whole of human nature, including its beast of prey part. Any ‘humanism’ that seeks to conquer part of human nature for the sake of another part is by that token already transhumanism. A humanism worthy of the name must be a superhumanism, in the Nietzschean sense: concerning itself with the full human being, including its terrifying and questionable aspects.
It is precisely our “humanism” which is most destructive of humanity—destructive of its natural high points. But to actively combat that movement would itself be an initiative to conquer human nature: for the herd animal part is as essential a part of human nature as the beast of prey part is; and its only natural for the former to wish to abolish the latter.
So we’re back in the same “dream” with the snake eating it’s tail as in your logo. So it seems to me that it is an ultimately useless conclusion, except for suggesting that these are the parameters of our universe. Yeah, okay, there are parameters. Just like there is no such thing as libertarian free will. Regardless, the dream goes on.
And we Nietzscheans want the dream to go on. Nietzsche’s teaching is the teaching of the eternal recurrence of the world as will to power. This is an ideal. The opposite ideal is to wake up from it—from the nightmare—, to a world of universal peace and equality. And modern technology just might make that happen…
“Sometimes I ask students if any real restraints, limits set by something like nature or gods, exist to curb scientific experimentation. Can science, for example, make men immortal or transform them into eagles? Most students deny that anything is intrinsically impossible. They acknowledge that some things probably will not happen tomorrow and even in a century, but, in principle, nothing prevents anything imaginable from happening at any time. Like good liberal democrats, these same students usually cling to a groundless faith that science’s uncurbed experimentation ought to be used for liberal democratic goals—to promote freedom rather than slavery, peace rather than war. As if that made any difference in the nihilist world revealed by science!” (Neumann, ibid.)
“S]cience is not a cooperative enterprise in which scientists work for each other and with each other, building on previous scientific findings. Science neither progresses nor regresses. I”
A confusion of the scientific method with what the method actually accomplishes. Lots of other confusion here too, but far too boring to address it.
I think that distinction is precisely the one Neumann makes here. Thus he says, in the same essay:
“Heidegger’s ‘Age of the World-View’ rightly notes that ‘world view’ understood scientifically ‘does not mean a view of the world, but the world understood as a view (or picture). Existence as a whole is now understood in such a way that it only exists in the first place insofar as it is produced by man who perceives or produces it (durch den vorstellend-herstellenden Menschen) ... Wherever existence is not interpreted in this way, the world cannot become a view or picture; there cannot be a world view.’ Heidegger rightly insists that a previously unscientific world-view does not change into a scientific one, but this very thing, ‘that the world itself becomes a view’ is the essence of science. In this regard, Nietzsche claims that, for science there are no facts, only interpretations or methods—methods of experience, points of view. There is nothing inherently rigorous or mathematical in scientific method which, rightly understood as it rarely is, means nothing more than nihilist experience, any way (or method) of experiencing—whether it be that of a tiger, an infant or an Einstein. Science is the realization that reality is nothing but mere experience, methods of perceiving or thinking. This ‘definition’ of science, like all theories or thoughts, is no more than another empty experience or method.” (Neumann, ibid.)
Did you know that Heidegger gave a lecture course in which he attempted to have himself and his audience “seized” by the “fundamental mood” of boredom (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics)? This was, according to him, necessary to con-ceive fundamentally of metaphysics.
Science can never get beyond phenomena; there is no more accurate view of phenomena, just other phenomena. As soon as you hold that what you see when you look at a looking glass is a more accurate view of what you see when you take it away, you’re no longer thinking scientifically, in terms of phenomena; you’re thinking in terms of noumena—metaphysically.