To get away from the discussion of evolutionary theory and back to the van Hecke interview for a moment.
I would classify her as a “soft epistemologist.” I’ve heard her sorts of arguments before: science and rationality can’t offer the meaning of a poem, or there are forms of knowledge outside the scientific purview, or gaps in evidence (in, say, archaeology) limit the scope of our conclusions and require us to keep an open mind to alternatives, etc.
DJ did a good job of pointing out some of the pitfalls of her approach, some of the looming abysses that await the unwary.
Just to take the poem example. The meaning of a poem cannot be “known”—it can only interpreted subjectively. To claim that poems have a truth value that can be “known” (as the earth circling the sun can be known) is to claim that everyone can have their own truth. That is not the case. Everyone can have have their aesthetic and subjective appreciation of a poem, or a painting, or a piece of music. People can discuss and compare their reactions and interpretations, but there is no single “truth” in a poem that everyone can “know.” The key point is to distinguish “knowledge” (which is universally demonstrable) and “aesthetic appreciation” (which is inherently subjective)
In no way, however, is the value of rationalism and science as an enterprise limited by such observations. Arguments like van Hecke’s are often presented as doing just that, as even van Hecke suggests so by labelling them “blind spots.” It’s not a blind spot that science can’t present a universal, single meaning for a poem or a painting, since the appreciation of aesthetics is an intensely subjective experience. But appreciation is not “truth.” That’s a vital distinction to appreciate.
As to the limits of evidence, every scientist and rationalist knows this and this is why all conclusions are provisonal pending further inquiry. And supposed “other ways of knowing,” when assessed, invariably turn out to be personal, experiential, and subjective and, as such, have no business claiming to be “knowledge.” Subjective experience is not knowledge, it’s just experience.
Finally, how—o take van Hecke’s own example—should archaeologists be aware of blind spots as they reason from limited bodies of data? Should they be open to “alternative” theories of civilizing spacemen, or civilizing Atlanteans, or lost super-civilizations to explain the data? Hardly. Archaeological hypotheses, like all hypotheses, are formulated on the best available evidence using the best available interpretive tools and they are always subject to revision in the face of new evidence. So what? How does the scarcity of data create “blind spots” in reasoning here?
If an archaeologist (or any scientist) insists on maintaining models no longer supported by the evidence, they have left the realm of genuine inquiry and have begun defending unsupported dogma. That’s not a blind spot, it’s an outright travesty and such a person will be quickly passed by as other researchers follow the best available evidence to a revised conclusion that better accords with the data.
I liked the interview and found van Hecke articulate and engaging, but I thought she skirted very close to some awful nonsense.