what were the other “many”? Before I express what I suspect I want to give you the opportunity to share these “many” other warnings that went unheeded.
Cuz I dont know of “many” warnings that went unheeded, certainly not from someone who was not a “faceless bureaucrat” like Ambassador Grew. So share those with me, pretty please.
Come on, truthaddict. Read some WWII history.
Just for starters, HERE is what wiki has to say about the attack on Pearl Harbor:
U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, none specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor, nor has any doing so been identified since. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, and it was preferred that Japan make the first hostile act as they were apparently preparing to do. It was felt that war would most probably start with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, or the Russian Far East. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only war with Japan was expected in the immediate short term and all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status would have required), or killed (in their obsolescent and obsolete aircraft) by more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (not ready to fly at a moment’s warning), and so on.
This stuff is very well known.
For an example of other intelligence in November of 1941 suggesting an attack on the Philippines or Borneo, check HERE. Do you know that governments receive bogus intelligence about possible attacks literally all the time? The report you noted was from January of 1941. By December it had likely been long ago circular-filed, as not credible.
For an example of a telegram by Ambassador Grew on November 17, 1941, that is, less than a month before Pearl Harbor, and almost a full year after the cable you quoted, check HERE. Clearly the Ambassador did not believe he had any special insight into Japanese military preparations by November.
HERE is the confidential army assessment of the Japanese military situation on Nov. 2, 1941, by General Sherman Miles, for the Assistant Chief of Staff. In particular:
1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily over-extended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure is crumbling.
2 For obvious reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the United State in a large scale war with Japan. While Japan is reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action. She has the following alternatives:
a. Attack Siberia to neutralize the threat on her flank and rear.
b. Occupy Thailand as a base from which to launch an offensive against Burma or Malaya.
c. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Netherlands East Indies.
d. Launch a direct attack on Singapore.
e. Make a determined effort to bring the war in China to a close by cutting China’s last supply route, the Burma Road.
f. Bide her time while disposing her forces from north to such in such a way that she will be able to seize the opportunity for successful aggression in whatever direction it presents itself.
3. A Japanese attack on Siberia is unlikely as long as Russian resistance in Europe continues, and as long as the Siberian forces are not materially reduced in strength. Action under b above might, and under c or d above would certainly bring Japan into armed conflict with ABD powers-a situation which Japan, at present, wishes to avoid.
4. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would probably not involve Japan with any Third Power. Although an extremely difficult operation for the Japanese, requiring elaborate preparation on their part, a successful drive into Yunnan and across the Burma Road, even if it did not cause China’s early capitulation would nevertheless, be a terrific blow at her chances of holding out. It would not however, have the effect of immediately releasing any considerable Japanese force for use elsewhere, since long-drawn out mopping up operations would probably be necessary.
6. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain in southern Yunnan, and the almost complete lack of communications, the Chinese, if determined, could put up a very strong resistance even with the means now at their disposal. Such a defense would further deplete Japan’s meager resources and immobilize her remaining reserves. (For a description of the terrain see Tab A.)
6. Japan’s most probable line of action, therefore, will be to continue her efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure while completing her plans and arranging her forces for an advance in the direction which will be most fruitful of quick results.
No mention of Pearl Harbor.
HERE is an intelligence report from Nov. 21, 1941 finding the Japanese expeditionary force near, Palau, Dutch East Indies. HERE is an intelligence report from Nov. 22, 1941 indicating that the Japanese 4th fleet may move to Palau. HERE is one indicating that their aim was Portuguese Timor.
Etc., etc. I don’t have time to look through all this stuff, but there’s tons of it.