I am only focused on moral facts here too. The desire fulfillment theory of value is that value is the relation between desires and states of affairs and they all exist and this is 100% objective.
I follow this. But if values are relations between desires (intended outcomes) and states of affairs (outside circumstances) then shouldn’t they be subjective? That is, varying depending on the agent?
“Moral” includes all affected desires, whoever has them. So the moral empirical evaluation is with the same formula empirically applied where the desire itself is being is evaluated - according to the material effects of its fulfillment (or not) against the material effects on all other desires’ fulfillment or thwarting. Again this is 100% objective. There are no other facts of the matter.
So, you are saying that an action is evaluated for its consequences, that is, its ability to either fulfill or thwart one’s desired outcome? If it fulfills the desire, then it is morally right, if it thwarts it, it is morally wrong? Could you perhaps give another example of what you mean by this so I don’t get you wrong.
One can introduce “moral speak” here and so say that (generic) good/bad is such as to fulfill/thwart the desires of the kind in question. When it is a practical good this refers just to the state of affairs that is the target of the desire. When it is moral good/bad the states of affairs are all the desires that are affected by the desire under focus. However there are no additional facts of the matter that occur as a result of using such “moral speak”.
It seems to me that out positions are not so different after all in most regards; though our choice of words is different.
I’m saying that morality can be reduced to biology and that as such, it is relative to those biological structures it is derived from. I will read Hauser. Though I will say that the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t alarm me as much as it might seem it should. It sounds like a meaningless “chicken or the egg” type dilemma that has no real significant answer. That is, its a question of perspective whether or not genetic dispositions stem from morals or morals from genetic dispositions. Similarly, do we eat to live or live to eat? Either perspective is defensible.
I am only focused on moral facts here too. The desire fulfillment theory of value is that value is the relation between desires and states of affairs and they all exist and this is 100% objective.
I follow this. But if values are relations between desires (intended outcomes) and states of affairs (outside circumstances) then shouldn’t they be subjective? That is, varying depending on the agent?
This does not follow, just because they vary does not entail they are subjective. Plenty of models describe varying processes, there is nothing different here unless you can show why this is different. This, here at this stage, is a description of what value is, not what it should be. Secondly states of affairs - fulfillment/thwarting - are objective not an inner psychological state - of satisfaction/frustration - that is subjective.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
“Moral” includes all affected desires, whoever has them. So the moral empirical evaluation is with the same formula empirically applied where the desire itself is being is evaluated - according to the material effects of its fulfillment (or not) against the material effects on all other desires’ fulfillment or thwarting. Again this is 100% objective. There are no other facts of the matter.
So, you are saying that an action is evaluated for its consequences, that is, its ability to either fulfill or thwart one’s desired outcome? If it fulfills the desire, then it is morally right, if it thwarts it, it is morally wrong? Could you perhaps give another example of what you mean by this so I don’t get you wrong.
No, not quite. you need to differentiate between generic and moral value.
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another, the states of affairs that is the object of the desire is good for the sadist, but not morally good. There is not yet enough information until you know the desires of the recipient.
If the state of affairs involves a masochist, then the masochist’s desire is also fulfilled, it is good for the masochist, still this is not moral good. Looked at objectively there is not desire thwarting, so this is morally permissible.
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another - who is not a masochist and so their desire not to have pain is thwarted - then for this other person this is a prima facie bad - but is it morally bad for the sadist to do this?
The answer here is to look at objectively at all the desires that are affected by the sadist’s desire, now since this brings about some desire thwarting, then it is morally bad.
The sadist’s desire is not universally prescriptive, only conditionally so - with a consenting masochist. The latter being morally permissible.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
One can introduce “moral speak” here and so say that (generic) good/bad is such as to fulfill/thwart the desires of the kind in question. When it is a practical good this refers just to the state of affairs that is the target of the desire. When it is moral good/bad the states of affairs are all the desires that are affected by the desire under focus. However there are no additional facts of the matter that occur as a result of using such “moral speak”.
It seems to me that out positions are not so different after all in most regards; though our choice of words is different.
If that was the case you would not be a moral relativist unless you haev a radically different conception of this to the norm
The words do not matter but it is what they refer to that count. You can use whatever words you like, if refer to the equivalent (or better - I am always looking for better objective models) what I mean by “desires”, “relations” and “states of affairs”.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
I’m saying that morality can be reduced to biology and that as such, it is relative to those biological structures it is derived from. I will read Hauser. Though I will say that the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t alarm me as much as it might seem it should. It sounds like a meaningless “chicken or the egg” type dilemma that has no real significant answer. That is, its a question of perspective whether or not genetic dispositions stem from morals or morals from genetic dispositions. Similarly, do we eat to live or live to eat? Either perspective is defensible.
Sorry this is not a justification for ignoring the genetic Euthyphro. This is not a chicken or egg dilemma. If you take the first horn of the dilemma then our morals are arbitrary, whatever the genes have decided can include everything including all the ways we can harm another such as rape and murder. Whence morality?
If you take the second horn, then this leaves the question what is morally good - and I have provided a candidate above.
[ Edited: 25 April 2008 06:22 PM by faithlessgod ]
Touch down! Now I see just what you are saying! And I actually agree with most of it (I think)!
[J]ust because they vary does not entail they are subjective. Plenty of models describe varying processes, there is nothing different here unless you can show why this [moral system] is different. This, here at this stage, is a description of what value is, not what it should be. Secondly states of affairs - fulfillment/thwarting - are objective not an inner psychological state - of satisfaction/frustration - that is subjective.
I will concede this. Though to take your example of the sadist and masochist: their desires are fulfilled and so their is no wrong done subjectively to either one of them, no desires thwarted, though from an non-sadomasochist’s point of view, this is an obviously abnormal and potentially immoral state of affairs unless of course the sadist’s and the masochist’s respective subjective attitudes are taken into account relatively. Aren’t we admitting that the morality of the situation is dependent on the subjective desires of the agent and the recipient, so as long as they are compatible? It still seems like we’d have to sort through situations case by case in order to assign them any moral verdict.
The answer here is to look at objectively at all the desires that are affected by the sadist’s desire, now since this brings about some desire thwarting, then it is morally bad.
So, by that rationale, any action that brings about any desire thwarting is morally wrong? This sounds quite contentious, almost like Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Surely there are many cases we can think of that would necessitate thwarting someone’s desires for the greater good. Or do we measure up all the fulfilled desires and thwarted desires in a utilitarian sort of way? If so, how do we quantify such a scale?
If that was the case you would not be a moral relativist unless you have a radically different conception of this to the norm grin
The words do not matter but it is what they refer to that count. You can use whatever words you like, if refer to the equivalent (or better - I am always looking for better objective models) what I mean by “desires”, “relations” and “states of affairs”.
I’m hesitant to throw relativism out completely because it still seems that we are forced to make moral judgments based on the subjective desires/values of the agents (and recipients) involved in each case, as I mentioned above and as your pointed out in the sadomasochist case.
If you take the first horn of the dilemma then our morals are arbitrary, whatever the genes have decided can include everything including all the ways we can harm another such as rape and murder. Whence morality?
If you take the second horn, then this leaves the question what is morally good - and I have provided a candidate above
Hmmm....arbitrary? Perhaps, but I don’t think this necessitates an endorsement of rape, murder, theft and other actions of harm. It seems as a species our genes are doing a pretty good job of weeding out certain behaviours which are detrimental to our survival as a species, behaviours that may have been advantageous in the past but are now obsolete. Societal Law comes in to reduce the amount of “spillage”, if you will, but I think for the most part, we are “programmed” to behave morally towards one another and are able to recognize actions that are “out of touch” with the broader scope of our genetic morality.
But if values are relations between desires (intended outcomes) and states of affairs (outside circumstances) then shouldn’t they be subjective? That is, varying depending on the agent?
This does not follow, just because they vary does not entail they are subjective. Plenty of models describe varying processes, there is nothing different here unless you can show why this is different. This, here at this stage, is a description of what value is, not what it should be. Secondly states of affairs - fulfillment/thwarting - are objective not an inner psychological state - of satisfaction/frustration - that is subjective.
I think baffledking let faithless off too easily, here.
bk clearly refers to the variation of value according to the agent (the definition of subjectivity), and faithlessgod’s response translates that to “just because they vary does not entail that they are subjective.” bk’s argument was not predicated on mere variation. What faithlessgod writes is true, but it seems to evade bk’s point.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
“Moral” includes all affected desires, whoever has them. So the moral empirical evaluation is with the same formula empirically applied where the desire itself is being is evaluated - according to the material effects of its fulfillment (or not) against the material effects on all other desires’ fulfillment or thwarting. Again this is 100% objective. There are no other facts of the matter.
So, you are saying that an action is evaluated for its consequences, that is, its ability to either fulfill or thwart one’s desired outcome? If it fulfills the desire, then it is morally right, if it thwarts it, it is morally wrong? Could you perhaps give another example of what you mean by this so I don’t get you wrong.
No, not quite. you need to differentiate between generic and moral value.
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another, the states of affairs that is the object of the desire is good for the sadist, but not morally good. There is not yet enough information until you know the desires of the recipient.
If the state of affairs involves a masochist, then the masochist’s desire is also fulfilled, it is good for the masochist, still this is not moral good. Looked at objectively there is not desire thwarting, so this is morally permissible.
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another - who is not a masochist and so their desire not to have pain is thwarted - then for this other person this is a prima facie bad - but is it morally bad for the sadist to do this?
The answer here is to look at objectively at all the desires that are affected by the sadist’s desire, now since this brings about some desire thwarting, then it is morally bad.
The sadist’s desire is not universally prescriptive, only conditionally so - with a consenting masochist. The latter being morally permissible.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
One can introduce “moral speak” here and so say that (generic) good/bad is such as to fulfill/thwart the desires of the kind in question. When it is a practical good this refers just to the state of affairs that is the target of the desire. When it is moral good/bad the states of affairs are all the desires that are affected by the desire under focus. However there are no additional facts of the matter that occur as a result of using such “moral speak”.
It seems to me that out positions are not so different after all in most regards; though our choice of words is different.
If that was the case you would not be a moral relativist unless you haev a radically different conception of this to the norm
The words do not matter but it is what they refer to that count. You can use whatever words you like, if refer to the equivalent (or better - I am always looking for better objective models) what I mean by “desires”, “relations” and “states of affairs”.
baffledking - 24 April 2008 04:04 PM
I’m saying that morality can be reduced to biology and that as such, it is relative to those biological structures it is derived from. I will read Hauser. Though I will say that the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t alarm me as much as it might seem it should. It sounds like a meaningless “chicken or the egg” type dilemma that has no real significant answer. That is, its a question of perspective whether or not genetic dispositions stem from morals or morals from genetic dispositions. Similarly, do we eat to live or live to eat? Either perspective is defensible.
Sorry this is not a justification for ignoring the genetic Euthyphro. This is not a chicken or egg dilemma. If you take the first horn of the dilemma then our morals are arbitrary, whatever the genes have decided can include everything including all the ways we can harm another such as rape and murder. Whence morality?
If you take the second horn, then this leaves the question what is morally good - and I have provided a candidate above.
(bold emphasis added)
When I saw that part in bold, I was happier than when GEICO settled my auto insurance claim.
Near as I can tell, faithlessgod was talking about the following:
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another, the states of affairs that is the object of the desire is good for the sadist, but not morally good. There is not yet enough information until you know the desires of the recipient.
If the state of affairs involves a masochist, then the masochist’s desire is also fulfilled, it is good for the masochist, still this is not moral good. Looked at objectively there is not desire thwarting, so this is morally permissible.
If a sadist fulfills his desire to inflict a pain on another - who is not a masochist and so their desire not to have pain is thwarted - then for this other person this is a prima facie bad - but is it morally bad for the sadist to do this?
The answer here is to look at objectively at all the desires that are affected by the sadist’s desire, now since this brings about some desire thwarting, then it is morally bad.
Why is some desire thwarting morally bad? If the sadist’s desires are thwarted (indirectly) by the moral badness of his desires, isn’t that also morally bad (as a specific instance of desire thwarting)? In other words, is good bad?
Touch down! Now I see just what you are saying! And I actually agree with most of it (I think)!
Great, I was seeking just understanding of my position, agreement is a bonus. As I said these ideas are work in progress and I want challenges based on understanding this position to identify issues with it. You raise some interesting points below.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
[J]ust because they vary does not entail they are subjective. Plenty of models describe varying processes, there is nothing different here unless you can show why this [moral system] is different. This, here at this stage, is a description of what value is, not what it should be. Secondly states of affairs - fulfillment/thwarting - are objective not an inner psychological state - of satisfaction/frustration - that is subjective.
I will concede this.
Thanks
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
Though to take your example of the sadist and masochist: their desires are fulfilled and so their is no wrong done subjectively to either one of them, no desires thwarted,
Lets be careful here. When you say wrong do you mean moral wrong or just wrong? We know their desires are objectively fulfilled, we do not know if they are subjectively satisfied (they may not be - “he did not hit me hard enough”!) but that is not our concern.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
though from an non-sadomasochist’s point of view, this is an obviously abnormal and potentially immoral state of affairs
But this situation is nothing to do with them. If they choose to make it so, and they want to condemn such behaviour then they are operating with their own desire thwarting desires ( and with “moral speak” as I have defined it they are morally wrong for doing so).
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
unless of course the sadist’s and the masochist’s respective subjective attitudes are taken into account relatively.
This is an unnecessary step IMHO. An observer need only note that two desires that are normally prima facie wrongs are, in this case, harmonious and mutually fulfilling. That is all they need to observe. You and I might not find such acts appealing but then we (I assume) do not want to participate in such behaviour and no-one is forcing us to.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
Aren’t we admitting that the morality of the situation is dependent on the subjective desires of the agent and the recipient, so as long as they are compatible?
You add the qualifier “subjective” which is redundant here and can only mislead. All the contents of desires are subjective in the sense that there are no free floating desires. Without desires there are no reasons for action, without reasons for action there is no moral reasoning. Now it is the objective analysis that I am emphasizing here without judging whether I would want to have such a desire (FYI I don’t). That is not my business unless it leads to desire thwarting.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
It still seems like we’d have to sort through situations case by case in order to assign them any moral verdict.
I am a particularist and so this is not an issue. Generalisations are possible, but we have to start with actual situations.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
The answer here is to look at objectively at all the desires that are affected by the sadist’s desire, now since this brings about some desire thwarting, then it is morally bad.
So, by that rationale, any action that brings about any desire thwarting is morally wrong?
This is the additional “moral speak” step that I added that also did not provide any additional facts of the matter. Whether one deems some desire thwarting morally wrong or not, objectively there is desire thwarting.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
This sounds quite contentious, almost like Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
Two points. Of course it is contentious because one can now analyse and judge any cultures or individuals morality in terms of desire thwarting - but then truth is not democratic so no surprise there! Second I do not see any evidence for Categorical imperatives, my analysis here leads to only hypothetical imperatives such as a general if you want to reduce desire thwarting then condemn and punish agents who do this.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
Surely there are many cases we can think of that would necessitate thwarting someone’s desires for the greater good.
Aha! “Greater good” act utilitarianism? Hmmm. In the real world there are many situations where there are a clash of desires including a clash of desire thwarting desires, these situations may not magically be resolved using this approach, instead in provides the objective framework within which to reason through the situation and come up wiht tentative answers and maybe a provisional solution.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
Or do we measure up all the fulfilled desires and thwarted desires in a utilitarian sort of way? If so, how do we quantify such a scale?
One of my objections to traditional utilitarianism is what I call the demographic bias. The above approach identifies desire thwarting without such a bias. In real-world situations the demographic bias needs to be taken into account as a pragmatic not moral factor.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
If that was the case you would not be a moral relativist unless you have a radically different conception of this to the norm grin
The words do not matter but it is what they refer to that count. You can use whatever words you like, if refer to the equivalent (or better - I am always looking for better objective models) what I mean by “desires”, “relations” and “states of affairs”.
I’m hesitant to throw relativism out completely because it still seems that we are forced to make moral judgments based on the subjective desires/values of the agents (and recipients) involved in each case, as I mentioned above and as your pointed out in the sadomasochist case.
You are imposing a post hoc value to falsely justify your relativism, not to judge others. The above model works with tolerance better IMHO - why interfere with what two consenting adults do in private? We only need to look at situations where the desire fulfilment is imposed on others who would have their desires thwarted. To not judge those, objectively, is not tolerance but a value that lets others “get away with murder”.
baffledking - 26 April 2008 01:35 PM
If you take the first horn of the dilemma then our morals are arbitrary, whatever the genes have decided can include everything including all the ways we can harm another such as rape and murder. Whence morality?
If you take the second horn, then this leaves the question what is morally good - and I have provided a candidate above
Hmmm....arbitrary? Perhaps, but I don’t think this necessitates an endorsement of rape, murder, theft and other actions of harm. It seems as a species our genes are doing a pretty good job of weeding out certain behaviours which are detrimental to our survival as a species, behaviours that may have been advantageous in the past but are now obsolete. Societal Law comes in to reduce the amount of “spillage”, if you will, but I think for the most part, we are “programmed” to behave morally towards one another and are able to recognize actions that are “out of touch” with the broader scope of our genetic morality.
Well looking at history and the present day issues I think you are taking a panglossian view on this. Arbitrary here simply means there is no outer citeria to judge what the genes have done for us. You argument is adding that a selective outer criteria IMHO.
[quote author="faithlessgod"]Two points. Of course it is contentious because one can now analyse and judge any cultures or individuals morality in terms of desire thwarting - but then truth is not democratic so no surprise there! Second I do not see any evidence for Categorical imperatives, my analysis here leads to only hypothetical imperatives such as a general if you want to reduce desire thwarting then condemn and punish agents who do this.
If the general acts to thwart the desires of others (to thwart desires), doesn’t that make him the worst desire-thwarter in the scenario?
Perhaps he’s a meta-thwarter and that makes it OK?
I thought Bryan made a good, if brief, point about the paradoxical nature of desire thwarting.
I do not argue for an EN reduction to genes, indeed I argue against that. Nor have I heard how such a reduction is relative - without equivocating over “relative” in yet another way!.
If not from genes, then where do morals originate? And they are relative in as much as they are dependent on the genes of the animal.
States of affairs exist, desires exists and the relations between them exist. That is all there is to it. As for other candidates, I agree that they are no such thing - intrinsic values, categorical imperatives, divine command etc.
This seems like you would categorize morality with such things as economics, customs and etiquettes. Non-natural, social phenomenon of the sort. It seems odd to neglect the biological origins of these things, though.
Hmm, from subjective value you can derive meta-values, surely these are still subjective?
Not quite. From meta-values, that is, biologically programmed “desires” or “laws of behaviour” (in the mathematical sense) subsequent, subjective morals are developed.
I do not see how such things as natural laws can exist, there is no objective support for this? Now since you are a moral relativist you surely hold there is not objective support for such laws too? So who are you arguing against?
Well, it would be a theory. But there is overwhelming evidence that almost all creatures follow certain guidlines such as: pain is to be avoided, pleasure is to be sought, procreation is good, death is to be avoided etc....these may be candidates for the meta-values from which all other morals stem.
This is an unnecessary step IMHO. An observer need only note that two desires that are normally prima facie wrongs are, in this case, harmonious and mutually fulfilling. That is all they need to observe. You and I might not find such acts appealing but then we (I assume) do not want to participate in such behaviour and no-one is forcing us to.
Isn’t this precisely what would give rise to the subjectivity and therein, relativity of morals?
This is the additional “moral speak” step that I added that also did not provide any additional facts of the matter. Whether one deems some desire thwarting morally wrong or not, objectively there is desire thwarting.
Agreed. This is why I am beginning to see the sense in taking a moral-nihilistic stance.
You are imposing a post hoc value to falsely justify your relativism, not to judge others. The above model works with tolerance better IMHO - why interfere with what two consenting adults do in private? We only need to look at situations where the desire fulfilment is imposed on others who would have their desires thwarted. To not judge those, objectively, is not tolerance but a value that lets others “get away with murder”.
But just that fact that such sadomascohistic acts (or any other acts) are occuring somewhere in the world is going to thwart the desires of many people who simply don’t like the idea of these acts being carried out anywhere by anyone. And inaction is certainly a form of action in that it has desire thwarting consequences.
Well looking at history and the present day issues I think you are taking a panglossian view on this. Arbitrary here simply means there is no outer criteria to judge what the genes have done for us. You argument is adding that a selective outer criteria IMHO.
Panglossian. Good word. Well, we do know to a large extent precisely what the functions of certain genes are by studying those creatures, human or otherwise, of the same species who do not have the genes in question and the differences that occur because of this lack.
I thought Bryan made a good, if brief, point about the paradoxical nature of desire thwarting.
Well I am ignoring Bryan’s posts but had a look at his last post and do not see what point you think he is making. Legal and military actions can of course be desire thwarting but that is beyond morality as in social forces but can be made consistent with such an approach. For example imprisoning someone is a prima facie wrong, it is justified on the basis of preventing further desire thwarting acts by that person given that social conditioning failed to work. It is a second level safety net. Military actions would be a third level safety net. As for how legal justice systems work, we first need to clarify the social elements of morality and then we can examine these. In essence though these do revolve around the questions of what are legitimate and military desire thwarting actions to prevent other desire thwarting. There is no paradox as such.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
If not from genes, then where do morals originate? And they are relative in as much as they are dependent on the genes of the animal.
You are equivocating over relative again. One can easily say that something is relative to something else but then the term loses all usefulness and specificity. Second I fail to see how morality can come from genes, which you attempt tpo answer at the end here Morals originate from the interaction of value imposing agents with each other.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
This seems like you would categorize morality with such things as economics, customs and etiquettes. Non-natural, social phenomenon of the sort. It seems odd to neglect the biological origins of these things, though.
Huh? this explicitly natural not non-natural - hence it is called ethical naturalism - and it is, for us humans, biologically based, why on earth would you think I argue against that? Desires exist and they are biological dispositions of biological agents. what else could they be?
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
Not quite. From meta-values, that is, biologically programmed “desires” or “laws of behaviour” (in the mathematical sense) subsequent, subjective morals are developed.
I do not follow what these meta-values are. Are they value as ends or value as means? What else could they be? Are you meta-values ends and all other “subjective” values means? And why if so are the subsequent values subjective and in what way?
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
Well, it would be a theory. But there is overwhelming evidence that almost all creatures follow certain guidlines such as: pain is to be avoided, pleasure is to be sought, procreation is good, death is to be avoided etc....these may be candidates for the meta-values from which all other morals stem.
Aha! These are what I call desires-as-ends. One can (morally) reason over the means to realizing these ends and also over new desire-as-ends that are optional which we, as humans, have the capacities to develop.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
This is an unnecessary step IMHO. An observer need only note that two desires that are normally prima facie wrongs are, in this case, harmonious and mutually fulfilling. That is all they need to observe. You and I might not find such acts appealing but then we (I assume) do not want to participate in such behaviour and no-one is forcing us to.
Isn’t this precisely what would give rise to the subjectivity and therein, relativity of morals?
Could you explain why, I cannot see this. I have just presented a third person objective analysis which is extendable beyond this example of course. Where does it become first person and subjective? Where is the relativity - where are the other “existing” values these are supposedly relative to?
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
This is the additional “moral speak” step that I added that also did not provide any additional facts of the matter. Whether one deems some desire thwarting morally wrong or not, objectively there is desire thwarting.
Agreed. This is why I am beginning to see the sense in taking a moral-nihilistic stance.
This approach comes out of Mackie’s Error Theory which has been called nihilism or skepticism, however he stopped one step too short. I have presented an alternative success theory for what moral terms can actually refer to in the real world.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
You are imposing a post hoc value to falsely justify your relativism, not to judge others.
The above model works with tolerance better IMHO - why interfere with what two consenting adults do in private? We only need to look at situations where the desire fulfilment is imposed on others who would have their desires thwarted. To not judge those, objectively, is not tolerance but a value that lets others “get away with murder”.
You have not answered my main objection here
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
But just that fact that such sadomascohistic acts (or any other acts) are occuring somewhere in the world is going to thwart the desires of many people who simply don’t like the idea of these acts being carried out anywhere by anyone. And inaction is certainly a form of action in that it has desire thwarting consequences.
Yes but you then evaluate those desires of these other people and they are clearly desire-thwarting desires. Lots of people do not like what others do, if that was not the case there would be no need for moral reasoning! It is the way they like or dislike those acts that is evaluable themselves.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
Well looking at history and the present day issues I think you are taking a panglossian view on this. Arbitrary here simply means there is no outer criteria to judge what the genes have done for us. You argument is adding that a selective outer criteria IMHO.
Panglossian. Good word. Well, we do know to a large extent precisely what the functions of certain genes are by studying those creatures, human or otherwise, of the same species who do not have the genes in question and the differences that occur because of this lack.
We do not yet have the relevant details to make such an analysis here AFAICS. Anyway these are distal causes we should be focused on the actual proximate biological causes namely desires - and mostly those that are epigenetic - amenable to influence by social forces. If a desire and its realization is fixed by the genes then it is outside the scope of morality (of course dysfunctional variants need to be dealt with in society)
I thought Bryan made a good, if brief, point about the paradoxical nature of desire thwarting.
Well I am ignoring Bryan’s posts but had a look at his last post and do not see what point you think he is making. Legal and military actions can of course be desire thwarting but that is beyond morality as in social forces but can be made consistent with such an approach. For example imprisoning someone is a prima facie wrong, it is justified on the basis of preventing further desire thwarting acts by that person given that social conditioning failed to work.
Social conditioning was likewise the attempt to thwart the accused’s desire to thwart the desires of others, I suppose.
Does the desire-thwarting of the many outweigh the desire-thwarting of the few?
It is a second level safety net. Military actions would be a third level safety net.
How is military action justified on the basis of protection from desire-thwarting? Wouldn’t the bigger nation (as long as it was substantially unified in purpose) always be right in war by virtue of having more desires potentially thwarted? Unless of course the whole affair is condemned by the desires of the neutral nations that the two warring nations not be at war in the first place?
As for how legal justice systems work, we first need to clarify the social elements of morality and then we can examine these. In essence though these do revolve around the questions of what are legitimate and military desire thwarting actions to prevent other desire thwarting. There is no paradox as such.
Isn’t it premature to deny the existence of a paradox prior to clarifying the social elements of morality and resolving questions about what are legitimate military desire-thwarting actions?
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
If not from genes, then where do morals originate? And they are relative in as much as they are dependent on the genes of the animal.
You are equivocating over relative again. One can easily say that something is relative to something else but then the term loses all usefulness and specificity.
How is he equivocating over relative? If one guy is programmed by his genes to think murder good while another is programmed by his genes to think murder wrong then why is this not moral relativism in the customary sense?
Second I fail to see how morality can come from genes, which you attempt tpo answer at the end here Morals originate from the interaction of value imposing agents with each other.
I think he’d suggest that the first values were genetically determined, and I don’t see how you can dismiss it out of hand (unless you’re trying to work your way aloft via hand-waving). The upshot of the argument would be that whatever morality you end up with on the basis of genetics is, within a naturalistic framework, the result of chance. Ergo, the system is arbitrary at its root and you end up on the horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma all over again. Did genes give us our values because the the values are right, or are the values right because our genes gave them to us?
And he asked you where morality comes from if not from the genes. You gave him no answer except to hint that he’d have to bear the burden of proof to convince you that morality could come from genes. The issue of the ultimate source for values within your proposed system does directly impact its metaphysical foundation. As such it should be addressed without delay.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
This seems like you would categorize morality with such things as economics, customs and etiquettes. Non-natural, social phenomenon of the sort. It seems odd to neglect the biological origins of these things, though.
Huh? this explicitly natural not non-natural - hence it is called ethical naturalism - and it is, for us humans, biologically based, why on earth would you think I argue against that? Desires exist and they are biological dispositions of biological agents. what else could they be?
How does one get “biological dispositions” other than from one’s genes?
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
Well, it would be a theory. But there is overwhelming evidence that almost all creatures follow certain guid(e)lines such as: pain is to be avoided, pleasure is to be sought, procreation is good, death is to be avoided etc....these may be candidates for the meta-values from which all other morals stem.
Aha! These are what I call desires-as-ends. One can (morally) reason over the means to realizing these ends and also over new desire-as-ends that are optional which we, as humans, have the capacities to develop.
If one doesn’t want to morally reason over the means of realizing those ends then you might be thwarting their desires.
baffledking - 04 May 2008 08:54 AM
This is an unnecessary step IMHO. An observer need only note that two desires that are normally prima facie wrongs are, in this case, harmonious and mutually fulfilling. That is all they need to observe. You and I might not find such acts appealing but then we (I assume) do not want to participate in such behaviour and no-one is forcing us to.
Isn’t this precisely what would give rise to the subjectivity and therein, relativity of morals?
Could you explain why, I cannot see this. I have just presented a third person objective analysis which is extendable beyond this example of course. Where does it become first person and subjective? Where is the relativity - where are the other “existing” values these are supposedly relative to?
Person A painfully whips person B
The scenario above may be morally good or apparently morally bad depending simply on the subjective desires of A and B. Baffledking is perfectly reasonable in asking his question, for your model appears to preserve subjective morality and present it in supposedly objective terms.
I’d like to know whether faithlessgod thinks his system results in true moral statements like “X is wrong” instead of merely “J thinks X is wrong.”
I do not read Bryan’s posts normally but due to a crytic quote from jholt it seems I have no choice here but to examine what Bryan is saying:
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
Social conditioning was likewise the attempt to thwart the accused’s desire to thwart the desires of others, I suppose.
No it is to discourage having those desires in the first place
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
Does the desire-thwarting of the many outweigh the desire-thwarting of the few?
No. This is not utilitarianism which suffers from demographic accidents that do lead to the above issues.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
Isn’t it premature to deny the existence of a paradox prior to clarifying the social elements of morality and resolving questions about what are legitimate military desire-thwarting actions?
No the difference is only in the means of dealing with desire thwarting behaviours. Once you understand how this works on the social level, which your questions indicate you do not, then we can look at these other levels.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
How he equivocating over relative? If one guy is programmed by his genes to think murder good while another is programmed by his genes to think murder wrong then why is this not moral relativism in the customary sense?
A double no. Moral relativism is usually relative to cultural values with the fallacious inference of normative relativism. If values were relative to genes then this would be independent of culture and normative relativism would not hold. How are people are “programmed” to murder or not murder - how do genes incorporate what is defined culturally as illegal killing?
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
Second I fail to see how morality can come from genes, which you attempt tpo answer at the end here Morals originate from the interaction of value imposing agents with each other.
I think he’d suggest that the first values were genetically determined, and I don’t see how you can dismiss it out of hand (unless you’re trying to work your way aloft via hand-waving).
I have not dismissed it out of hand. I have argued for a proximate biological basis and against the arbitrariness of using genes as the basis for moral values.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
The upshot of the argument would be that whatever morality you end up with on the basis of genetics is, within a naturalistic framework, the result of chance. Ergo, the system is arbitrary at its root and you end up on the horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma all over again. Did genes give us our values because the the values are right, or are the values right because our genes gave them to us?
Well duh! Now you are repeating my argument against gene based morality.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
And he asked you where morality comes from if not from the genes. You gave him no answer except to hint that he’d have to bear the burden of proof to convince you that morality could come from genes. The issue of the ultimate source for values within your proposed system does directly impact its metaphysical foundation. As such it should be addressed without delay.
And it already has been addressed - based on desires and their fulfillment.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
How does one get “biological dispositions” other than from one’s genes?
Are you a genetic determinist? Look up developmental biology. Genes are certainly one factor in this process but not the only one.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
If one doesn’t want to morally reason over the means of realizing those ends then you might be thwarting their desires.
There can be multiple actions that can lead to a desired state of affairs. Some of these actions are (other) desire thwarting and some are not. That is the point here.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
Could you explain why, I cannot see this. I have just presented a third person objective analysis which is extendable beyond this example of course. Where does it become first person and subjective? Where is the relativity - where are the other “existing” values these are supposedly relative to?
Person A painfully whips person B
The scenario above may be morally good or apparently morally bad depending simply on the subjective desires of A and B. Baffledking is perfectly reasonable in asking his question, for your model appears to preserve subjective morality and present it in supposedly objective terms.
Stating these are “subjective” here is redundant. It is a third person objective analysis. You still have not answered as to where where these other values are for it be be culturally relative. There is no subjective morality here just desires fulfilling or thwarting as occurs. There are no additional moral facts.
Bryan - 07 May 2008 09:32 AM
I’d like to know whether faithlessgod thinks his system results in true moral statements like “X is wrong” instead of merely “J thinks X is wrong.”
Yes it does in the usual sense of a moral fact. What obligations and prohibitions anyone would have in a specific situation - with no exceptions. And you can generalize this, but you do not get absolutes of course.
