Well since there is a particularly boring thread that is diverting most posters attention I thought rather than dwell there I would be controversial here
As a methodological naturalist I look at the problem of morality as I would any other problem. I am looking for the best currently available approach that eliminates errors and minimizes mistakes in seeking answers. Instead I see too much philosophizing and going around in circles. As Dennet says “Philosophy is what you do when you don’t yet know what the right questions to ask are”. I want to get beyond arid philosophy and beyond the false dichotomies which generate poor questions and inadequate or problematic answers. So here I present a theory that I only tentatively endorse but it is better than any other I have seen to date. I have my own objections to it - but these are in the guise of improvements rather than demolishment of such an approach - but I will present it as positively and concisely as possible to see what objections you guys come up with. The more the merrier!
What is value? First one must distinguish between value and valuable. We are looking at the context not the content. We are also looking at value not yet moral value. So with these constraints how does value work? It seems most here would agree that value is mind-dependent. I agree. Without humans there is no value (lets ignore other animals for now). Without a valuer there is no value. On the basis of methodological naturalism this would be asking what is the valuing capacity of human brains. That is it is equivalent to studying other types of cognitive capacities such as vision etc. (where cognitive is meant broadly to include sensation, perception, affect -emotion- and volition). So some neurological processes bring this valuing capacity about. We know much about the brain but there is much still to understand here. Nonetheless we can explore the products of such currently not fully known processes, the same as we can know about sub-atomic particles by their traces in cloud chambers. A minimal model would be that the motivational states of brain are to effect states of the world, which can include other people and oneself. One can call these states desires, preferences or interests but for conciseness I will stick to desire. Desires (and their negations aversions, I will collectively refer to these as desires unless differentiation is required) are about either keeping and bringing about a states of the world (desires) or stopping or preventing states of the world (aversions). Value is the relation between such states of mind or brain -desires and states of the world. There are many definitions of good or bad in these terms but I prefer Mackie’s good= “such as to satisfy the requirements of the kind in question” and bad="such as to frustrate the requirements of the kind in question”. (These definitions are a short hand convenience and nothing more. If you dont like them one can always use the right hand side versions, however you will know what I mean when I use these here). However following Griffin I prefer fulfillment and thwarting as objective statements of facts as to whether an objective requirement has been so fulfilled or thwarted, where the subjective satisfaction and frustration may or may not occur with a particular requirement. The content of a desire is a subjective state of the mind but it is also an objective state of the brain. The requirements generated by such desires are objective and their fulfillment and thwarting is objective. In other words desires are real, the states of the world that result are real and these relations are real. The same as science, mathematics and logic uses relational thinking unproblematically there is no reason to suppose otherwise here.
What is the value of value?
1. When done with respect to itself.
a) One can be seeking to see if the desire is actually fulfillable - if not it has a false value (however real it feels to the person under it’s sway)
b) The desire might be fulfillable but one has mistaken beliefs as to how to fulfill it that make it practically difficult or impossible due to such errors , one is operating with mistaken values one could say.
c) Does one really want or will one actually appreciate the fulfillment. This is knowing oneself and operating wiht what Griffin calls (including a and b) informed desires. Without such consideration one might be have misvalued the desire’s importance. Indeed all these three sub-points are about misvaluing such relations.
2.When done in reference to ones own set of desires one is talking about prudential good and bad. If a desire thwarts ones other desires then this is prudentially bad. As in knowing that smoking is bad for you. Mere knowledge of prudential good and bad is not sufficient to change ones behavior as any smoker (or ex-smoker) knows. Prudence is the way of evaluating one’s own desires - whatever the content of that desire is.
3.What about with respect to other people? This is the same process except it is other’s desires that one’s desire may thwart or fulfill. This becomes moral good and bad when it is all other desires without any double standard or preferential emphasis. Hence, following Fyfe a moral good (bad) is a desire that fulfills (thwarts) or tends to fulfill (thwart) other desires. All this can be analyzed objectively. There are, of course, still challenges as to best identify the desires (of other people) that might be affected, the scope - who is affected - and the degree and strength of these effects and so on but this provides the grounds or framework within which moral debate can productively occur. Like methodological naturalism in general “absoluteness” and “certainty” do not apply such analysis is provisional, fallible and progressive -as our knowledge including that of errors and mistakes improves. Actions, consequences, laws, rights and so on can be evaluated indirectly in terms of the desires affected.
That is the barest skeleton but answers the question in another thread that, yes, there can there be moral facts.
Fire way -)
[ Edited: 22 February 2008 12:05 PM by faithlessgod ]
Hmm ... interesting, but I don’t think I’d say that value is mind-dependent. If anything, I’d say it’s biology dependent. “Value” goes all the way down the biological scale. Biological fitness and biological function are both teleological concepts, and neither requires the possession of a mind.
Of course, moral value is different from the biological sort of value that I am discussing here. However my sense is that moral value is parasitic on the biological sort.
However my sense is that moral value is parasitic on the biological sort.
I am probably misunderstanding this whole thing, but I thought you said elsewhere that you were a moral realist. Is it possible to be a moral realist and at the same time make the statement you just have?
However my sense is that moral value is parasitic on the biological sort.
I am probably misunderstanding this whole thing, but I thought you said elsewhere that you were a moral realist. Is it possible to be a moral realist and at the same time make the statement you just have?
How is my claim at odds with moral realism? I’m a biological realist too, after all.
Okay. You said that biological fitness and biological function are both teleological concepts and moral value is their parasite and I certainly agree with that. But how can something (the “moral value” in this case) be teleological but not relative at the same time? Is there no correlation between a “moral value” and a “moral law”?
(If I am not making any sense please tell me, and I’ll stop...)
Okay. You said that biological fitness and biological function are both teleological concepts and moral value is their parasite and I certainly agree with that. But how can something (the “moral value” in this case) be teleological but not relative at the same time? Is there no correlation between a “moral value” and a “moral law”?
(If I am not making any sense please tell me, and I’ll stop...)
Well, I’m not quite understanding you, which isn’t the same as saying you’re not making sense ...
Let’s break this down into three issues:
(1) Moral values are parasitic on biological values: this is true in the same rough sense that biological facts are parasitic on facts of biochemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of chemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of physics. That is, there is a certain reductionism here. However, that said, I do not think that moral values literally reduce to biological values. The case is much more complex. But I do think that the only things with objective values are living things, or things that are used and created by living things; that’s to say that without living things there would be no value of any sort. And since living things are all biological things that’s also to say that without biological things there would be no value of any sort.
But again, that isn’t to say that value is relativist, at least in the standard sense of the term, any more than biology is relativist.
(2) Teleology and relativism: I don’t see the link there. “Teleological” just means that it’s directed at some end or other. In the hierarchy of the sciences, the first place you see discussion of end-direction is in biology, where the relevant “end” is in genetic propagation. Genes that increase fitness just are those genes that should tend to propagate better in a given environment than the competition. This is an objective fact about the world and the genes that interact in the world.
(3) “Moral value” vs. “moral law”: I’m not convinced there’s any significant difference between them, in the sense that one can talk about moral values (we value free speech), or one can talk about moral laws (we believe one shouldn’t restrict speech), and one can translate back and forth between those manners of speaking. Or at least I would have thought so.
(1) Moral values are parasitic on biological values: this is true in the same rough sense that biological facts are parasitic on facts of biochemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of chemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of physics. That is, there is a certain reductionism here. However, that said, I do not think that moral values literally reduce to biological values. The case is much more complex. But I do think that the only things with objective values are living things, or things that are used and created by living things; that’s to say that without living things there would be no value of any sort. And since living things are all biological things that’s also to say that without biological things there would be no value of any sort.
But again, that isn’t to say that value is relativist, at least in the standard sense of the term, any more than biology is relativist.
Just to make sure that I understand this, I’ll use this analogy: if all matter disappeared, there would be no gravity, even though the law of gravity in encoded in our universe. Is this right?
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
(2) Teleology and relativism: I don’t see the link there. “Teleological” just means that it’s directed at some end or other. In the hierarchy of the sciences, the first place you see discussion of end-direction is in biology, where the relevant “end” is in genetic propagation. Genes that increase fitness just are those genes that should tend to propagate better in a given environment than the competition. This is an objective fact about the world and the genes that interact in the world.
It is a teleology to say that dinosaurs evolved to be big and hence strong, right? But this is relative as there is clearly no law that “big is better than small.” If dinosaurs were strong because they were big, they also didn’t survive because they were big.
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
(3) “Moral value” vs. “moral law”: I’m not convinced there’s any significant difference between them, in the sense that one can talk about moral values (we value free speech), or one can talk about moral laws (we believe one shouldn’t restrict speech), and one can translate back and forth between those manners of speaking. Or at least I would have thought so.
I am not sure how different they are. But if I use your example, according to a moral law I believe in a free speech, but if certain information could endanger, let’s say, the survival of our planet, and if we assume that we are the only life in the universe, than the value in having free speech would be a negative one, as the very same existence of a free speech according to a moral law could no longer be propagated.
Just to make sure that I understand this, I’ll use this analogy: if all matter disappeared, there would be no gravity, even though the law of gravity in encoded in our universe. Is this right?
I suppose that’s right, although “encoded in our universe” sounds a bit odd to my ear. It’s part of the laws that govern matter. No matter, no gravity ... but if matter, then gravity.
George - 22 February 2008 03:08 PM
It is a teleology to say that dinosaurs evolved to be big and hence strong, right? But this is relative as there is clearly no law that “big is better than small.” If dinosaurs were strong because they were big, they also didn’t survive because they were big.
I’m not following you here. One can’t say anything so vague as that “dinosaurs evolved to be big.” That’s pretty much meaningless, really. One might be able to say that the Tyrannosaurus Rex evolved large, serrated teeth in order to tear meat. Or that a certain dinosaur evolved a large nasal cavity in order to make loud noises, etc.
George - 22 February 2008 03:08 PM
I am not sure how different they are. But if I use your example, according to a moral law I believe in a free speech, but if certain information could endanger, let’s say, the survival of our planet, and if we assume that we are the only life in the universe, than the value in having free speech would be a negative one, as the very same existence of a free speech according to a moral law could no longer be propagated.
Right; there are many different views on what constitute moral laws or moral values. One might well say that there are a hierarchy of such laws or values, such that greater ones trump lesser ones. So for instance we allow for free speech, but not when it endangers lives ... e.g., you are not free to shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater.
One might well say that there are a hierarchy of such laws or values, such that greater ones trump lesser ones. So for instance we allow for free speech, but not when it endangers lives ... e.g., you are not free to shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater.
I have always thought that if moral law did exist (in the Platonic way) that it would have to be something very simple. Something that consists of hierarchies (e.g. free speech) seems to me to be a product of a long process. What could such a principle be that all (all life?) would unquestionably have to obey?
I have always thought that if moral law did exist (in the Platonic way) that it would have to be something very simple. Something that consists of hierarchies (e.g. free speech) seems to me to be a product of a long process. What could such a principle be that all (all life?) would unquestionably have to obey?
I don’t think so, not even when it comes to Plato. Why should moral value be simple? Human relations aren’t, neither are human societies.
Anyhow morality is one thing and biological value (fitness) is something else. The former may be grounded in the latter, in some vague sense, but that isn’t to say that “all life” has to follow some sort of moral law. What could that mean? That ants “shouldn’t” kill one another? What sense is there to a moral law which is literally incomprehensible to the beings to which it is purported to pertain? No, moral laws, if there are such, only pertain to rational beings. Of course, there is a scale of rationality, and some animals are more or less rational; for this reason they too are aware of moral “shoulds” and “shouldn’ts”. E.g., vampire bats ostracize members who do not share blood with the less fortunate.
Hmm ... interesting, but I don’t think I’d say that value is mind-dependent. If anything, I’d say it’s biology dependent. “Value” goes all the way down the biological scale. Biological fitness and biological function are both teleological concepts, and neither requires the possession of a mind.
Of course, moral value is different from the biological sort of value that I am discussing here. However my sense is that moral value is parasitic on the biological sort.
1. Mind-dependence is the standard philosophical terminology. I argue it is abused in ethics as this does not necessarily lead to typical moral subjectivism and that is an unjustified step I do not take
2. I am a realist and naturalist about value it is reducible to relationships between desire and states of the world. Desires are name for the motivational brain states - however they work - and these are real and objective. That is where I take this notion of mind-dependence and no further.
3. I go no further in terms of biology, I am look at proximate and not distal processes. Obviously everything I am arguing for is both biologically based and consistent with evolution, but at this point in time there is no need to go further than cognitive science and neuroscience in trying to understand these processes. If you mean biological organisms are the only ones that have a teleological capacity then I agree. (But remember the teleology is an overused term in biology especially evolution. It is certainly not needed and easily abused in evolutionary thinking.)
4. I already wanted to exclude for now animals but did not say some version of this is applicable to them.
5. Moral value is different from biological value (the relationship between desires and proto-desires and states of the world) and is parasitic on it in the way that I have shown.
All I am trying to do at this stage is a meta-ethical and descriptive analysis of the possibility of moral facts.
Well, I’m not quite understanding you, which isn’t the same as saying you’re not making sense ...
Let’s break this down into three issues:
(1) Moral values are parasitic on biological values: this is true in the same rough sense that biological facts are parasitic on facts of biochemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of chemistry, and that they are parasitic on facts of physics. That is, there is a certain reductionism here. However, that said, I do not think that moral values literally reduce to biological values. The case is much more complex. But I do think that the only things with objective values are living things, or things that are used and created by living things; that’s to say that without living things there would be no value of any sort. And since living things are all biological things that’s also to say that without biological things there would be no value of any sort.
Agree
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
But again, that isn’t to say that value is relativist, at least in the standard sense of the term, any more than biology is relativist.
Agree again!
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
(2) Teleology and relativism: I don’t see the link there. “Teleological” just means that it’s directed at some end or other.
Yup
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
In the hierarchy of the sciences, the first place you see discussion of end-direction is in biology, where the relevant “end” is in genetic propagation. Genes that increase fitness just are those genes that should tend to propagate better in a given environment than the competition. This is an objective fact about the world and the genes that interact in the world.
Disagree. This is a convenient and effective way of talking about and modelling genes but this not real. Evolution is not progressive nor teleological.
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
(3) “Moral value” vs. “moral law”: I’m not convinced there’s any significant difference between them, in the sense that one can talk about moral values (we value free speech), or one can talk about moral laws (we believe one shouldn’t restrict speech), and one can translate back and forth between those manners of speaking. Or at least I would have thought so.
Moral Law and Rights are useful terms but it is a mistake to take an essentialist, foundational or absolutist stance to them (I am guessgin we agree on this?). They are derivative or parasitic on moral value. But lets clear on descriptive moral facts for now.
I suppose that’s right, although “encoded in our universe” sounds a bit odd to my ear. It’s part of the laws that govern matter. No matter, no gravity ... but if matter, then gravity.
And if there are no valuers, there is no value.
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 02:24 PM
I’m not following you here. One can’t say anything so vague as that “dinosaurs evolved to be big.” That’s pretty much meaningless, really. One might be able to say that the Tyrannosaurus Rex evolved large, serrated teeth in order to tear meat. Or that a certain dinosaur evolved a large nasal cavity in order to make loud noises, etc.
In a sense yes.
dougsmith - 22 February 2008 03:44 PM
George - 22 February 2008 03:08 PM
I am not sure how different they are. But if I use your example, according to a moral law I believe in a free speech, but if certain information could endanger, let’s say, the survival of our planet, and if we assume that we are the only life in the universe, than the value in having free speech would be a negative one, as the very same existence of a free speech according to a moral law could no longer be propagated.
Right; there are many different views on what constitute moral laws or moral values. One might well say that there are a hierarchy of such laws or values, such that greater ones trump lesser ones. So for instance we allow for free speech, but not when it endangers lives ... e.g., you are not free to shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater.
In the hierarchy of the sciences, the first place you see discussion of end-direction is in biology, where the relevant “end” is in genetic propagation. Genes that increase fitness just are those genes that should tend to propagate better in a given environment than the competition. This is an objective fact about the world and the genes that interact in the world.
Disagree. This is a convenient and effective way of talking about and modelling genes but this not real. Evolution is not progressive nor teleological.
Evolution works to propagate the genes of those features which are most fit to their environment. To that extent, evolution is teleological. (Viz., my examples of the serrated teeth and large nasal cavities—these evolved to aid in exploiting particular biological niches). This is not perfect; sometimes the less fit genes propagate. E.g., we can all appreciate the possibility that the more fit genes get blasted by a lightning bolt. But generally speaking, it’s true.
Evolution is not “progressive”, in the sense that it’s not aiming at any ultimate goal. Also, just because some animal appears late in the phylogenetic tree does not imply that it is any “better” than animals that appeared earlier.
FWIW, I do see some inchoate relation between (moral) value and desire. But what precisely is it? I know that philosophers like David Lewis have suggested that we morally value what we “want to want”; but there are some problems with this view that led other philosophers to counter that this amounted to a “Cosa Nostra” theory of ethics. E.g., ethics is what we want ethics to be. For an objectivist I think we want to say more, either by pulling moral value away from desire, or by making a theoretically sophisticated account of desire that can stand being linked up to moral value. E.g., for someone like Socrates, we always desire the good, even if we don’t really know what the good is. (On this account, moral failing always amounts to ignorance, BTW).
