dougsmith - 23 February 2008 09:32 AM

FWIW, I do see some inchoate relation between (moral) value and desire. But what precisely is it?

Well I gave you a tentative and plausible answer to this. What do you think?

dougsmith - 23 February 2008 09:32 AM

I know that philosophers like David Lewis have suggested that we morally value what we “want to want”; but there are some problems with this view that led other philosophers to counter that this amounted to a “Cosa Nostra” theory of ethics. E.g., ethics is what we want ethics to be.

These both sound to subjectivist for my (our?) liking.

dougsmith - 23 February 2008 09:32 AM

For an objectivist I think we want to say more, either by pulling moral value away from desire, or by making a theoretically sophisticated account of desire that can stand being linked up to moral value.

As I attempted to do. Still awaiting a response on that.

dougsmith - 23 February 2008 09:32 AM

E.g., for someone like Socrates, we always desire the good, even if we don’t really know what the good is. (On this account, moral failing always amounts to ignorance, BTW).

I had not yet got onto obligation and moral motivation but no it is plain false that we always desire the good even if we know what it is. It is good not to smoke and better than smoking but one can still desire and do smoke (if you are a smoker and agree that is better not to smoke).  More significantly there can be a clash between prudential and moral good and one of the challenges of a normative theory is to show how to deal with that.

Well I suspect I’m not fully understanding your answer to this question, but it sounded like you were simply saying that something was valuable if we desired it; e.g., that value simply reduces to desire. That can’t be right, so as I say, I have to assume I’m being dense in not understanding your picture.

dougsmith - 23 February 2008 11:06 AM

Well I suspect I’m not fully understanding your answer to this question, but it sounded like you were simply saying that something was valuable if we desired it; e.g., that value simply reduces to desire. That can’t be right, so as I say, I have to assume I’m being dense in not understanding your picture.

No I am not

1. This is a minimal theory not a complete theory of value. Clearly we value things, people,ideas, stories, events and so on from the past and present as well as those motivational and future-looking states of brain I am labeling as desire

2. However the only type of values that matter in terms morality are those that can effect other people via their interactions, and to the degree these complete values effect actions these are captured in the desires that anyone does in fact have and act upon.

3. Values are not reducible to desire. Value is the relation between desires and states of the world. Change the state of the world and keep the desire constant and the relation and hence value can change. Similarly fix the state of the world and change the desire and the relation can change and then so the value can. For example given that desires create requirements and in one state of the world the requirement is fulfilled, another it is not yet fulfilled and in another it is thwarted, the relation and hence the values are different. That is why this thread is called morality is relational, although I have not talked about moral values in this post, just generic value.

Still not getting your picture. Give me a particular example or two of how moral value works.

dougsmith - 24 February 2008 09:32 AM

Still not getting your picture. Give me a particular example or two of how moral value works.

No first you need to understand value works before we get to moral value. If you don’t get this model of value discussing moral value is pointless since it is parasitical on value. What is it you do not understand about the 3 points that I just made or my introductory post? Just a vague “still not getting your picture” is hardly helpful to discussion.

faithlessgod - 24 February 2008 10:10 AM

No first you need to understand value works before we get to moral value. If you don’t get this model of value discussing moral value is pointless since it is parasitical on value. What is it you do not understand about the 3 points that I just made or my introductory post? Just a vague “still not getting your picture” is hardly helpful to discussion.

Not helpful to discussion? What do you mean? I asked for an example or two.

dougsmith - 24 February 2008 10:12 AM

faithlessgod - 24 February 2008 10:10 AM

No first you need to understand value works before we get to moral value. If you don’t get this model of value discussing moral value is pointless since it is parasitical on value. What is it you do not understand about the 3 points that I just made or my introductory post? Just a vague “still not getting your picture” is hardly helpful to discussion.

Not helpful to discussion? What do you mean? I asked for an example or two.

To repeat myself I want to first get clear on value that is shared understanding if not agreement - before we tackle moral value. I have given you a theory of value and the only feedback is you do not get it. What statements and argument have I presented that you agree or disagree with and so on? Then we can go on to discuss moral value.

Anyway judging from other’s comments I thought you have some exposure to philosophy and science and so you should have no problem understanding the theory of value presented, it is hardly original.

I do have a doctorate in philosophy, yes.

dougsmith - 24 February 2008 11:15 AM

I do have a doctorate in philosophy, yes.

Right well as you might check from http://www.centerforinquiry.net/forums/viewthread/3658/ I have a disagreement with someone (big surprise on a forum ) I have made arguments and claims they have responded with specific criticisms and I have attempted to respond to theirs. I have no problem and indeed would be most interested to hear your criticisms but have heard none really to date save “I don’t get it”. You did made one specific claim which I pointed out is a mis-interpretation namely that “value is reducible to desire” and I answered that and again you said “I don’t get it”. If you have a Phd in Philosophy why don’t you at like one and actually criticize my argument, however poor you think it is. This is what I asked in my first post. Until you do I have no feedback to tune in to and to propose suitable examples as you asked that might move beneficially the discussion on. I am not going to keep on going and all I get back from you is “I don’t get it”. I am sure you did not get your Phd by such tactics did you?

dougsmith - 23 February 2008 09:26 AM

Evolution works to propagate the genes of those features which are most fit to their environment. To that extent, evolution is teleological.

No evolution by natural selection is a descriptive not a normative theory. It is a useful fiction and a powerful tool for biologists to think that way in solving issues in natural evolution (there is no other kind) but evolution is not actually teleological in any form, that was the great insight of Darwin and still remains so today.

Faithlessgod, based on my understandings of Doug and your philosophies, I suspect you are in similar agreement on the topic you have presented.  If I am wrong about my next hypothesis, I apologize.  (FWIW) I suspect you are quick to find arguments in which to sharpen your teeth, which leads to insulting language and in effect all parties’ loose out on constructive dialogue and shared information.

I am intrigued by this thread and would like to get involved.  This topic is a challenging discourse and I would like to look into it later, when I have more time to dissect.  I am sure both the presenter and the reader can benefit from an alternative explanation.  If not for Doug; would you mind humoring me, a non doctoral philosopher, by elaborating on this concept?

retrospy - 25 February 2008 11:33 AM

Faithlessgod, based on my understandings of Doug and your philosophies, I suspect you are in similar agreement on the topic you have presented.  If I am wrong about my next hypothesis, I apologize.  (FWIW) I suspect you are quick to find arguments in which to sharpen your teeth, which leads to insulting language and in effect all parties’ loose out on constructive dialogue and shared information.

I suppose my nickname of “trigger happy” is not for no reason

retrospy - 25 February 2008 11:33 AM

I am intrigued by this thread and would like to get involved.  This topic is a challenging discourse and I would like to look into it later, when I have more time to dissect.  I am sure both the presenter and the reader can benefit from an alternative explanation.  If not for Doug; would you mind humoring me, a non doctoral philosopher, by elaborating on this concept?

Fine. I will start again hopefully avoiding some cul de sacs that I possibly introduced previously.

1. In order to understand what a moral fact is one needs to understand moral value - moral good and bad
2. In order to understand moral value one needs a theory, or equivalent, of value - generic value. Some argue like Randian Objectivists and some religionists that they are the same thing - but if they are this needs to be established not just assumed - but most do not and I will take the latter as the default position. Survival values are different to aesthetic values and these are both different to prudential value and so on.
3. Arguably to some degree all biological organisms could said to operate with values. Here we are focused on human values which I assume are based on these yet undefined biological values.
4. What is unique to humans is the type of brains we have, so we can focus on certain brain states, for now.
5. Which brain states? Well those that bring about or could bring about actions that affect the states of the world including states of affairs, events, objects, people and oneself.
6.  Whatever you call these states is arbitrary, I suggested desires but this might be misleading so lets drop it for now. The question is how do you detect them. Similar to tracing from cloud chamber paths back to sub-atomic particles, I suggest that these brain states lead to requirements - a less problematic term I hope - and these requirements in theory if not always in practice can be determined and are objective.
7. What is significant about these requirements is whether they are or can be fulfilled or thwarted. This can also be considered objectively.
8. Following Mackie and Griffin one can define generic good (bad) as “such as to fulfill (thwart) requirements of the kind in question”. That is this type of value is a relation between states of brain and states of the world. Change the states of brain or change the states of the world and the relation changes and so can the value. And these are all ontologically objective. Another way fo stating what the requirements is that these are the conditions of fulfillment of the brain state under question.
9. Such forward looking states of brain do not yet appear to be a complete theory of value, what about the past and the present? Well however they work to the extent they have any affect, it will be indirectly on the requirement generating states of brain and that is all that is needed here.

This is the first step so lets stop here and consider this. So here I have only presented a tentative theory of limited value, specifically to do with how humans could and actually act and here value is the relation between humans and the targets of their actions.

Doug,
Sorry to jump into the discussion in media res, but I’ve been away. I am one of those who’s asserted that “value” implies a “valuer” that has a mind. I don’t see biological or evolutionary imperatives as the same thing as “values,” but perhaps I’m misunderstanding you. I wouldn’t say that an ant “values” mates, food, etc because to me the word connotes conscious, reflective thought. But perhaps you are using “value” more like “interests” and then making the distinction of “moral value” as opposed to “biological value” whereas I am limiting the use of “value” to the moral context only?

As for moral value being parasitic on biology, it’s an interesting diea. I would say that all needs and desires ultimately depend on biology, of course, and in the sense you describe can be reduced to physics. But of course the connection is often indirect, and I wonder if it makes sense to think about moral values in terms of proximate causes as much as ultimate causes. A person who chooses to renounce reproductiona nd even basic sustenance for religious reasons is acting out complex behavioral tendancies informed, ultimately, by biology but hard to understand as directly related to biological or evolutionary imperatives, so looking at things only at that level may not be the most informative way to proceed. What do you think?

Faithless,
So if I understand you correctly, you’re saying that the brain states we commonly call desires/aversions can be fulfilled or thwarted, and that moral values consist of the relation between these brain states and the states of the world that either fulfills or thwarts them. And that what you would call an objective, even empirical approach to morals would be to identify these states and analyze the relationship between them and the conditions or states of the world that either fulfill or thwart them. Obviously, there is a lot more to this (how do we characterize and identify brain states, how do we decide whether the fulfillemtn of a given desire is a good or a bad thing, etc), but I want to make sure I udnerstand your basic starting point before we go into details. Am I in the ballpark?

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

Sorry to jump into the discussion in media res, but I’ve been away. I am one of those who’s asserted that “value” implies a “valuer” that has a mind. I don’t see biological or evolutionary imperatives as the same thing as “values,” but perhaps I’m misunderstanding you. I wouldn’t say that an ant “values” mates, food, etc because to me the word connotes conscious, reflective thought. But perhaps you are using “value” more like “interests” and then making the distinction of “moral value” as opposed to “biological value” whereas I am limiting the use of “value” to the moral context only?

Right; I was following the prior discussion about values being linked to the fulfillments of desire-states. There clearly are objective values for any biological organism: those things that benefit its flourishing. To begin with, any biological organism values sustenance and reproductive possibilities.

This picture, of course, depends implicitly on the background value of all biological entities which is survival and reproduction. All value begins in biology.

But yes, this is not moral value. It’s something more basic.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

As for moral value being parasitic on biology, it’s an interesting diea. I would say that all needs and desires ultimately depend on biology, of course, and in the sense you describe can be reduced to physics. But of course the connection is often indirect, and I wonder if it makes sense to think about moral values in terms of proximate causes as much as ultimate causes. A person who chooses to renounce reproductiona nd even basic sustenance for religious reasons is acting out complex behavioral tendancies informed, ultimately, by biology but hard to understand as directly related to biological or evolutionary imperatives, so looking at things only at that level may not be the most informative way to proceed. What do you think?

Right, I follow where you’re going which is why I said before that there is no simple reduction of moral value to biological drives. We may value contraception, and even morally value low birth-rates. All of that is clearly contra-biology.

But the question is whether there is some indirect reduction of a system or module of valuation (let’s call it the desire center or “will") to biological drives. Then that center can plug into other centers of reasoning that may allow for desires and values that are not encompassed in a simpler biological model.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

Doug,
Sorry to jump into the discussion in media res, but I’ve been away.

Please do, the more the merrier.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

I am one of those who’s asserted that “value” implies a “valuer” that has a mind.

I agree although I am not tied to particular terms. Since Doug seemed to be having difficulty with this I just tried to bypass that by going straight to a brain and biology. It makes not difference to me. Without a brain there is not mind of course.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

I don’t see biological or evolutionary imperatives as the same thing as “values,” but perhaps I’m misunderstanding you. I wouldn’t say that an ant “values” mates, food, etc because to me the word connotes conscious, reflective thought.

Value is quite a flexible term which can be a problem. I was trying to zoom in on the relevant notion of value whose framework could serve to characterize moral value.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

But perhaps you are using “value” more like “interests” and then making the distinction of “moral value” as opposed to “biological value” whereas I am limiting the use of “value” to the moral context only?

I argue that one cannot limit value purely to the moral sphere without some prior and more basic notion of value on which moral value is predicated. On the other hand I have just said that I am limiting this broader notion of value to that which is in fact relevant to the moral sphere. I am trying to get some shared understanding first on this specific notion of value.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

As for moral value being parasitic on biology, it’s an interesting diea. I would say that all needs and desires ultimately depend on biology, of course, and in the sense you describe can be reduced to physics. But of course the connection is often indirect, and I wonder if it makes sense to think about moral values in terms of proximate causes as much as ultimate causes.

I agree. The proximate causes are all we need at this stage. Since there is nothing I have argued that is contra biology that is all that is needed.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

A person who chooses to renounce reproductiona nd even basic sustenance for religious reasons is acting out complex behavioral tendancies informed, ultimately, by biology but hard to understand as directly related to biological or evolutionary imperatives, so looking at things only at that level may not be the most informative way to proceed. What do you think?

Rather than say “biological or evolutionary imperatives” it is more evolutionary (which is distal) and developmental (which is more proximate). Nothing here is contra evolution but it lacks much power to contribute to these proximate causes. Of course, evolution has either directly selected the capacity for such proximate causes or they are side effects of other aspects that were selected for. First lets clear about these relevant proximate causes then we can go and examine evolutionary issues, if any.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

Faithless,
So if I understand you correctly, you’re saying that the brain states we commonly call desires/aversions can be fulfilled or thwarted, and that moral values consist of the relation between these brain states and the states of the world that either fulfills or thwarts them.

No, this is generic value not moral values. I did make a statement about moral values in the last paragraph of my first post in this thread but since then have been dwelling on this more basic generic value.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

And that what you would call an objective, even empirical approach to morals would be to identify these states and analyze the relationship between them and the conditions or states of the world that either fulfill or thwart them.

Yes but this is still only a framework for generic value. The type of value depends on what states of the world are being fulfilled, moral value is one type among many which looks at a specific type of states of the world.

mckenzievmd - 25 February 2008 09:14 PM

Obviously, there is a lot more to this (how do we characterize and identify brain states, how do we decide whether the fulfillemtn of a given desire is a good or a bad thing, etc), but I want to make sure I udnerstand your basic starting point before we go into details. Am I in the ballpark?

Yes you are with some clarifications if you don’t mind. With respect to identifying brain states please note my analogy between desires and requirements versus sub-atomic particles and cloud chamber traces . It is not a decision as to whether the fulfillment of a desire is a good or bad thing but a definition, the desire-fulfillment is internally generically good, desire-thwarting is internally generically bad. Since definitions are arbitrary but what I am describing here is real you don’t need to use good and bad and talk about desire-fulfillment and desire-thwarting instead or you can accept these stipulative definitions for the purpose of debate in this thread. It questions of prudential and moral value that are external evaluations of these existing desires that is what I think you meant in your above paragraph.  Remember as such this is a relation between the desire and the states of the world and it is this relation that is the value.