Ok, Bryan - thanks for your patience and the response, hopefully this means you may bear with me a bit further.
As far as I see it, philosophical naturalism would not have a problem with QM. Let me add here, if it were not for this conversation, I would not have believed how many people argue tooth and nail that what is seen as uncaused is not possible, flat out, that to say otherwise is referred to as a dogma. This debate (outside of philosophical naturalism in many aspects) is all over the internet, I have read forum and blogs where people refer to Brian Greene as a fundamentalist and compare him with religious fundamentalist. What is also obvious is how complicated this issue gets. Also, what I see partly is the idea of forwarding the idea of recognizing two different contextual conceptions of cause, as I understand it.
That aside; lets take this sentence as factual: “Particle/antiparticle creation through random quantum fluctuation has been empirically verified through a variety of means.”
We will deal with the “uncaused” and philosophical naturalism. Now, from the definitions you offered of naturalism, we find such things as the “search for natural causes”. This is right and is the thrust of why there is no problem with philosophical naturalism with regards to QM - because it is only saying that nothing outside of nature is used to explain the phenomena, not that something can not be ‘uncaused’. It also recognizes that what is recognized now through science is only what is known now. This does not say one must hold that a phenomena will be shown to have cause, only that searching outside of nature to impart an explanation without foundation (no evidence) is useless. To falsify my assertion we must find where philosophical naturalism states that there must be a cause (not “searching for natural causes” . This is a big difference.
Philosophical naturalism does not take the positive assertion that in the case of quantum fluctuation there must be a cause (it accepts the empirical data as “uncaused” without problem because there is no assertion this is not a natural phenomena from the data - if there was - then this would also work to falsify philosophical naturalism). Though, I will not deny that this view is held by many naturalist, and they will in fact say what I mentioned above that to accept the phenomena as shown through empirical inquiry is a form of fundamentalism. In this regard, you are absolutely correct that many hold to defining “supernaturalism” out of existence, i.e. miracles are not possible because they are ‘supernatural’. I should also add that there are many that do postulate a “supernatural” from QM to then forward unsubstantiated claims (I am not saying this is what you are doing in any way).
Also, I’m still working this out.
Let me add here. There are philosophical naturalist that do in fact see a limitation to the argument from ‘natural law’ (as I have shown through Kauffman and Geire). I think it was summed up nicely from a blogger who called the idea of the acceptance of random quantum fluctuation dogma - “greedy reductionism”. I don’t think he would get an argument from Kauffman on that one.
We will deal with the “uncaused” and philosophical naturalism. Now, from the definitions you offered of naturalism, we find such things as the “search for natural causes”. This is right and is the thrust of why there is no problem with philosophical naturalism with regards to QM - because it is only saying that nothing outside of nature is used to explain the phenomena, not that something can not be ‘uncaused’. It also recognizes that what is recognized now through science is only what is known now. This does not say one must hold that a phenomena will be shown to have cause, only that searching outside of nature to impart an explanation without foundation (no evidence) is useless. To falsify my assertion we must find where philosophical naturalism states that there must be a cause (not “searching for natural causes” . This is a big difference.
First, I’m not so sure how big the difference is. One does not construct a worldview around a search for natural causes per se--that’s just a framework for epistemology. Descriptions of naturalism that strongly emphasize epistemology to the exclusion of the presuppositions of traditional naturalism seem to blur the line between metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism. I think in context the search for natural causes implies the expectation that all phenomena are amenable to explanation via natural laws of cause and effect (if there are no supernatural laws of cause and effect and every law of cause and effect is “natural” then “natural” is redundant in the preceding formulation and the statement itself is rendered vacuous).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, I was careful to make my questions fit the various definitions of naturalism that I located. Respecting the search for natural causes, my question was along the lines of whether “uncaused” is properly understood as a natural cause, and if the answer is “no” then the search for a natural cause is apparently a failure with respect to quantum particle formation.
Philosophical naturalism does not take the positive assertion that in the case of quantum fluctuation there must be a cause (it accepts the empirical data as “uncaused” without problem because there is no assertion this is not a natural phenomena from the data - if there was - then this would also work to falsify philosophical naturalism).
My problem with that, as you can imagine, is that it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of any “real” explanation that is incapable of being defined as “natural” if one is able to take the step of finding that uncaused events are natural.
Though, I will not deny that this view is held by many naturalist, and they will in fact say what I mentioned above that to accept the phenomena as shown through empirical inquiry is a form of fundamentalism. In this regard, you are absolutely correct that many hold to defining “supernaturalism” out of existence, i.e. miracles are not possible because they are ‘supernatural’. I should also add that there are many that do postulate a “supernatural” from QM to then forward unsubstantiated claims (I am not saying this is what you are doing in any way).
Isn’t it kind of stupid to paint an ideal as other than what the authoritarian males posited as the proper role for women (subjugated baby factories)?
It was probably just part of their ingenius plan--any woman hearing Proverbs 31 would probably realize that she could not attain the ideal and then meekly accept her (proper!) role as a mindless baby factory. Is that your reasoning?
I asked you a question about Mary, you have never answered, instead you threw pro-joke 31 at me (now I know for the reason I suspected you have), I dropped Mary (remember? the women subject? the taboo one that frightens the atoms out of you?) and started commenting on pro-joke 31. Since you are the one who brought it up I thought you maybe want to talk about, once more you have never directly answered my questions or comments. I pointed out a specific clip, you wondered if he (Lemuel) was expected to make the given directive into a national policy, to that I replied what do kings do? what is their job if it isn’t that of leading their countries (as in managing the regions that they govern, cities, etc.)? again you never answered that question. Also I asked another related question about pro-joke 31: 29 that of course I got no answer to. Now I am asking you, considering that:
1/- the joke claims that what is being said in it comes from very wise woman,
2/- this woman happens to be a mother of king (Lemuel)
3/- one of her wise directives to him is not to drink but instead let the miserable and poor do for the reasons stated in the verse
4/- knowing that she knows what her son does for a living, she went ahead and recommended that he does the above (that alone disqualifies her from telling women what to do since she clearly doesn’t give rat’s rear about society in general, why would she about women).
Taking the 4 above points into consideration, do you believe that she meant for him to apply the stated verse with his far distant cousins or the kids that bullied him when he was little or or, ....but not to act on that in the process of implementing a related policy?
In your own words can you tell me what she meant by that exactly? and also how does this translates to 31:29?
As as far as stupidity is concerned, I’d say I was brought up muslim, islam now is exactly where christianity was about 1000 years ago (btw, islam is nothing more than a cheap duplicate of christianity since several of its books and stories are simply duplicates of what is in the bible). I see myself as an ex-muslim, also as an ex-christian since I’ve been baptized and done Jesus in very obssessed way for few years before I got here. Prior to that, I took the korans I had and threw them in the dumpster with other related books and never looked back. But before, I heard worse than pro-joke 31, and you know how I reacted to it to demonstrate the stupidity that you are talking about? I joined the Air Force . I graduated with honors from the academy where I was trained. Later I joined the skydiving team for 2 years, did fewer really really cool humble jumps from tall enough altitudes than I would if I was with the US military. But the experience was still worthwhile and unfrogettable. I of course can’t talk for other women, but, personally Bryan, this is how I react to the kind of junk as the bible and cousin koran throw at me. I guess “stupidity” is good for a woman. Needless to say that I see some of my experiences including this one as true blessingS, that makes me what Bryan? BLESSED ? and I am not even married nor do I intent to that’s how useful your pro-joke 31 has been to me.
Isn’t it kind of stupid to paint an ideal as other than what the authoritarian males posited as the proper role for women (subjugated baby factories)?
It was probably just part of their ingenius plan--any woman hearing Proverbs 31 would probably realize that she could not attain the ideal and then meekly accept her (proper!) role as a mindless baby factory. Is that your reasoning?
I asked you a question about Mary, you have never answered,
Mriana eventually corrected you regarding one of your presuppositions (that Mary Magdalene was depicted as a prostitute) after I originally questioned your claim by inquiring as to its source (which book was I supposed to read to confirm it).
Your assertion regarding the mother of Jesus likewise contained a questionable premise (that “we” know the purpose of women in terms of the Bible). I’ve addressed that issue via Proverbs 31, and your response to that has appeared incoherent. It makes no sense, for example, for the male-dominated society to raise up an ideal that conflicts with what they see as the proper role of women.
Bryan, I think you made some good points. The ‘uncaused’ as we’ve discussed it is not a problem for philosophical naturalism. I say this while recognizing that it is an apparent problem for some. It is an odd state of affairs at an interesting level, because there is an apparent demand of a kind of ‘common sense’ notion by some naturalist that there is a cause, we just don’t know it yet, and damn you for saying otherwise - but, it depends in what context the arguments are raised - for instance, I do not see many arguments against someone for saying that subatomic particles occur uncaused in a debate about God (i.e. - we do not need to posit a creator - skip that and go for the universe as ‘uncaused’ - and here’s why) - but we find people who apparently have no problem with this line of argument suddenly say something being ‘uncaused’ is a form of dogma. Seriously odd
I’ve been meaning to ask you - what is your position of the “uncaused” as we’ve discussed it? At times I get the feeling you hold it to be not much of a theory?
Bryan, I think you made some good points. The ‘uncaused’ as we’ve discussed it is not a problem for philosophical naturalism.
I’m not convinced that you are correct. I’d like to see “philosophical naturalism” defined where “uncaused” is not a problem and where the world view remains coherent. If you run across a reasonably coherent definition that seems to meet that criterion please bring it to my attention.
I say this while recognizing that it is an apparent problem for some. It is an odd state of affairs at an interesting level, because there is an apparent demand of a kind of ‘common sense’ notion by some naturalist that there is a cause, we just don’t know it yet, and damn you for saying otherwise - but, it depends in what context the arguments are raised - for instance, I do not see many arguments against someone for saying that subatomic particles occur uncaused in a debate about God (i.e. - we do not need to posit a creator - skip that and go for the universe as ‘uncaused’ - and here’s why) - but we find people who apparently have no problem with this line of argument suddenly say something being ‘uncaused’ is a form of dogma. Seriously odd
I’ve been meaning to ask you - what is your position of the “uncaused” as we’ve discussed it? At times I get the feeling you hold it to be not much of a theory?
I think “uncaused” is indistinguishable from libertarian free will in principle in terms of statistics. The data would be compatible with either a libertarian free will theism or a deterministic/indeterministic hybrid universe (some phenomena caused and some uncaused). You can draw from that that I don’t believe that science can rule out a cause for the formation of quantum particles even if a lawful cause (one that enables predictions based on past conditions) is impossible in principle (because a lawful explanation for true randomness is counterintuitive if not flatly impossible).
Good stuff, Bryan. It is funny in a way, this problem you present. I’ve gone over stuff I haven’t read or heard in years, scouring the landscape. It has forced me to listen more closely, that’s how I discovered the debate over the ‘dogma’. There isn’t a clear definition to give. I could say - it is only a position to not inject the “supernatural” - no need to posit the “supernatural” (and so on - which doesn’t tell us much - accept as a reaction to people that do - which in turn is not much of a worldview from that perspective). But, I see where you are coming from with that. I can only say at this time - the worldview accepts what the science shows and in this case we have tentatively accepted the “uncaused” nature of subatomic particles. But, again - this is not fully agreed upon - and to some is a form of dogma - depending on the context of how it is discussed.
Hmm - “the worldview accepts what the science shows...............” Did I just talk myself into another hole?
On a personal note - I do not consider myself a humanist anymore because of long debates with certain fellow skeptics and ‘atheist’ over some of the positions of the ‘new atheist’. Now I am questioning the usefulness of philosophical naturalism because of a debate with a Christian. I’m seriously questioning any label, and the usefulness of hyped up positions that do what is argued against.
The ‘uncaused’ as we’ve discussed it is not a problem for philosophical naturalism.
Whether quantum states are caused or uncaused is really down to the quantum interpretation you chose. The interpretation does not matter since the results are the same. Arguably, off the top of my head, the consistent histories, many worlds, many worlds/decoherence, Bohm (hidden variables) all do not need uncaused states. Hence regalrdless of any other weakness in bryna’s argument it fails relying on referential opacity - choosing an interpretation that requires “uncaused” states
Simply put, quantum mechanics is not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with the methodological principles, indeed QM is one of the best examples of naturalism - it is incredibly unlikely we could have found it without naturalism - producing more accurate predictions than just about anything else.
The ‘uncaused’ as we’ve discussed it is not a problem for philosophical naturalism.
Whether quantum states are caused or uncaused is really down to the quantum interpretation you chose. The interpretation does not matter since the results are the same. Arguably, off the top of my head, the consistent histories, many worlds, many worlds/decoherence, Bohm (hidden variables) all do not need uncaused states. Hence regalrdless of any other weakness in bryna’s argument it fails relying on referential opacity - choosing an interpretation that requires “uncaused” states
Many thanks, faithlessgod. I’m not terribly sure I follow the argument though. If the results are the same, then the interpretation doesn’t matter, but part of the interpretation we have “uncaused”? How then would it matter what interpretation is used? Because there are examples where we can say “uncaused” is not needed, does this tell us we can show the “uncaused” is not a reality?
Simply put, quantum mechanics is not a problem for naturalism being quite consistent with the methodological principles, indeed QM is one of the best examples of naturalism - it is incredibly unlikely we could have found it without naturalism - producing more accurate predictions than just about anything else.
Good point. Though, I don’t know of another way that QM would have been discovered without science. Naturalism, at it’s base, being the view that science is the best way of understanding reality.
Many thanks, faithlessgod. I’m not terribly sure I follow the argument though. If the results are the same, then the interpretation doesn’t matter, but part of the interpretation we have “uncaused”? How then would it matter what interpretation is used? Because there are examples where we can say “uncaused” is not needed, does this tell us we can show the “uncaused” is not a reality?
Physicists prefer different interpretations as a methodological guide to help them to new insights, experiments and hopefully discoveries. and they like, everyone else, wants to know what it is all about. But they are specifically interpretations of QM and QM works regardless of the interpretation. Some interpretations are more radical and controversial than others and could lead to differing results but this has not happened yet and until or if they ever do, those will remain controversial. Homeopaths - to the degree they are seeking a scientific explanation of their practice - rely on such controversial interpretations, parapsychologists too…
If miracles are commonplace, then what is the reservation about believing in the works of Jesus?
from richarddawkins.net -
“During many ages there were witches. The Bible said so. The Bible commanded that they should not be allowed to live. Therefore the Church, after doing its duty in but a lazy and indolent way for 800 years, gathered up its halters, thumbscrews, and firebrands, and set about its holy work in earnest. She worked hard at it night and day during nine centuries and imprisoned, tortured, hanged, and burned whole hordes and armies of witches, and washed the Christian world clean with their foul blood. Then it was discovered that there was no such thing as witches, and never had been. One does not know whether to laugh or to cry.”
Mark Twain
Miracles are not commonplace. Superstition is commonplace.
If miracles are commonplace, then what is the reservation about believing in the works of Jesus?
If we grant that there is a god, for the purposes of this debate, we note that anthropologists to date have identified over 10000 gods. This means your prior probability of having the correct god is 0.0001, and this is conservative, anthropologists are likely to discover more gods rather than less and many more have been lost in time. Now what evidence can you produce that can increase the a posteriori probability over all other 9.999+ gods? That is if your choice of god is correct, what evidence would increase this probability - that is it cannot be evidence that could also be used to argue for any other god. This rules out revelation, miracles, sacred scripture, authority, sensus divinitus, argumentum ad populaum and so on. If you cannot show this then the odds that you have the right god are as close to zero (0.0001) as makes no difference.
If miracles were commonplace - and they are not, if they exist at all - they are often claimed by different sects and religions (indeed Benjamin Creme claims that all miracles are the work of the Maitreya) - and others dismissed as the works of the devil or not miracles at all by other theists, so how could you make this argument work?
If miracles are commonplace, then what is the reservation about believing in the works of Jesus?
Here’s a question: Why miracles of Jesus? Why not that of Moses, Isaiah, Elijah, Elisha, Joshua, Budda (not that he really did miracles, but had some teachings and actions similar to Jesus), Krishna (who had sayings much like Jesus), Horus, etc?
Since I’m studying for a final that includes the Buddha, here’s a run down of comparasions at my fingertips (From A Concise Introduction to World Religions: 1. he sits in the heavens where he waits until the earth needs a new buddha. (Yes, you could argue the last line makes it null and void if you want, but when the time is right, according to the Rapturist, Jesus sits up there until the time is right to return- paraphrasing. Not much different in my opinion.)
Comparing his birth 2. The night he was a born, a bright light illuminated the world, marking the holy event. 3. Both are conceived miraculously without sexual intercourse. (Here again it mentions the king had taken a vow of celibacy). 4. Both infants are born outside a house- Buddha in a grove and Jesus in a stable. 5. I’ve mentioned the bright light already, but they also both had sages foretell the infants’ future greatness. 6. In both cases the births are announced by angels.
Childhood into adulthood:
1. Few events are recorded (no big deal really) 2. The impresses his first teacher with his knowledge, Jesus impresses the rabbi at the temple with his knowledge/wisdom 3. When he’s 30 he begins a journey, which leads him to eventually gain disciples and teaching others. 4. He sits under a bodhi tree (wilderness for Jesus) Mara, the lord of death, plays a role not unlike that of Satan in Christianity. Mara attempts to tempt the Bodhisattva (eventually Buddha) to give up his mission. Mara tempts him with aspects of what the Christians refer to as sins, and finally offers to grant him any worldly wish. Doesn’t work of course. This continues for a month (Jesus’s 30 days and 30 nights) until the Bodhisattva works a miracle: the earthquake drives Mara away. 5. there was a night with three watches (Jesus in the Garden) and the third was just before dawn where he reaches total insight (Jesus reached insight before the night was over too).
OK you are getting the idea here and probably will brush it off, but be that as it may, my questions still stand: Why not one of the other greats of lore? Why Jesus, esp when many of the stories have the same outline/template?
If miracles are commonplace, then what is the reservation about believing in the works of Jesus?
If we grant that there is a god, for the purposes of this debate, we note that anthropologists to date have identified over 10000 gods. This means your prior probability of having the correct god is 0.0001, and this is conservative, anthropologists are likely to discover more gods rather than less and many more have been lost in time. Now what evidence can you produce that can increase the a posteriori probability over all other 9.999+ gods? That is if your choice of god is correct, what evidence would increase this probability - that is it cannot be evidence that could also be used to argue for any other god. This rules out revelation, miracles, sacred scripture, authority, sensus divinitus, argumentum ad populaum and so on. If you cannot show this then the odds that you have the right god are as close to zero (0.0001) as makes no difference.
I’ve touched on this answer earlier in the thread. Gods typically do not stand in isolation. They are attached to a world view. Gods associated with the more coherent world views are more likely correct than those that are not, unless the law of non-contradiction is not a dependable guide to truth. So, you group notions of god according to the world view represented. Those that represent an incoherent world view I suggest should be excluded from serious consideration.
If miracles were commonplace - and they are not, if they exist at all - they are often claimed by different sects and religions (indeed Benjamin Creme claims that all miracles are the work of the Maitreya) - and others dismissed as the works of the devil or not miracles at all by other theists, so how could you make this argument work?
What argument do you think I’m making, that making it work seems like a difficult proposition to you?
Those [gods that] represent an incoherent world view I suggest should be excluded from serious consideration.
I think YHWH should stay, though. A god that wants a man who gathers wood on the Sabbath put to death seems like a valid candidate to represent a coherent world view. I say YHWH is in.
. I graduated with honors from the academy where I was trained. Later I joined the skydiving team for 2 years, did fewer really really cool humble jumps from tall enough altitudes than I would if I was with the US military. But the experience was still worthwhile and unfrogettable. I of course can’t talk for other women, but, personally Bryan, this is how I react to the kind of junk as the bible and cousin koran throw at me. I guess “stupidity” is good for a woman. Needless to say that I see some of my experiences including this one as true blessingS, that makes me what Bryan?
that’s how useful your pro-joke 31 has been to me.
