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Free Will (Merged)
Posted: 06 September 2010 09:45 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2776 ]
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I still point out, while “(a) if determinism then not free will” is being accepted as a valid syllogism on this thread, even with that syllogism as fact, not determinism implies nothing about free will.  Though, the people arguing back and forth about determinism or not determinism have essentially agreed to turn (a) into an “if and only if”,  I still think we are in a universe that is not deterministic and not free will as a doublet, and that state is completely consistent with (a).

Human “will” is at the mercy of personal dice.

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Posted: 06 September 2010 10:58 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2777 ]
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qutsemenie,

qutsemnie - 06 September 2010 09:45 PM

  I still think we are in a universe that is not deterministic and not free will as a doublet, and that state is completely consistent with (a).

Human “will” is at the mercy of personal dice.

You’re in agreement with many on the thread. Libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism and indeterminism.

Stephen

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Posted: 07 September 2010 12:29 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2778 ]
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StephenLawrence - 06 September 2010 10:58 PM

qutsemenie,

qutsemnie - 06 September 2010 09:45 PM

  I still think we are in a universe that is not deterministic and not free will as a doublet, and that state is completely consistent with (a).

Human “will” is at the mercy of personal dice.

You’re in agreement with many on the thread. Libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism and indeterminism.

Stephen

Your latter claim is incompatible with proof.  wink

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Posted: 07 September 2010 02:38 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2779 ]
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Bryan - 07 September 2010 12:29 AM
StephenLawrence - 06 September 2010 10:58 PM

qutsemenie,

qutsemnie - 06 September 2010 09:45 PM

  I still think we are in a universe that is not deterministic and not free will as a doublet, and that state is completely consistent with (a).

Human “will” is at the mercy of personal dice.

You’re in agreement with many on the thread. Libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism and indeterminism.

Stephen

Your latter claim is incompatible with proof.  wink

I was expressing that it’s the view of many that this is the case.

Can we prove it? Not absolutely but just beyond reasonable doubt? Yeah I think we can.


Stephen

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Posted: 07 September 2010 05:17 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2780 ]
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after 186 pages, why would anyone argue you do have free will?

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Posted: 07 September 2010 10:51 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2781 ]
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Chudwick - 07 September 2010 05:17 PM

after 186 pages, why would anyone argue you do have free will?

Um, because it would be a fallacy to judge the outcome of the debate based on the number of pages?

Just maybe?

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Posted: 07 September 2010 11:04 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2782 ]
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Chudwick - 07 September 2010 05:17 PM

after 186 pages, why would anyone argue you do have free will?

I am discussing here because of 2 lurking dangers:

1. To exaggerate free will, make it some kind of magic, with its dangerous corollary that we are absolutely justified in killing (sometimes called ‘executing’) people because they did something wrong and are ‘absolute responsible’: they are unmoved movers. God is not far away then as unmoved mover of the universe, and as unmotivated motivator for our good deeds…

2. To deny free will at all, making us puppets in society, steered by some mad scientists (or dictators) who think they know exactly what is normal and ethically correct, and know how they can correct us. Out of their free will of course, based on what is absolute, scientific ethics. tongue rolleye

A little sharply said, just to make things clear. Number 2 is for you. That’s why I argue. If you want to argument why we have no free will, go ahead, read Stephen’s, Doug’s and my postings, and tell us what is wrong. Otherwise you are just saying something. Which you may, of course, but is kind of odd in a philosophy thread, where one is supposed to have arguments. So do not count on it that your point is rational when you can’t support your standpoint with arguments. You are free to choose. Aren’t you?

GdB

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Posted: 08 September 2010 10:18 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2783 ]
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GdB - 07 September 2010 11:04 PM
Chudwick - 07 September 2010 05:17 PM

after 186 pages, why would anyone argue you do have free will?

I am discussing here because of 2 lurking dangers:

1. To exaggerate free will, make it some kind of magic, with its dangerous corollary that we are absolutely justified in killing (sometimes called ‘executing’) people because they did something wrong and are ‘absolute responsible’: they are unmoved movers. God is not far away then as unmoved mover of the universe, and as unmotivated motivator for our good deeds…

Why wouldn’t compatibilist free will work just as well for justifying (for example) the death penalty?

If you think retributive justice requires “magic” free will then maybe you should argue the point.  Or else much of the rest of what you wrote is just irony.

2. To deny free will at all, making us puppets in society, steered by some mad scientists (or dictators) who think they know exactly what is normal and ethically correct, and know how they can correct us. Out of their free will of course, based on what is absolute, scientific ethics. tongue rolleye

A little sharply said, just to make things clear. Number 2 is for you. That’s why I argue. If you want to argument why we have no free will, go ahead, read Stephen’s, Doug’s and my postings, and tell us what is wrong. Otherwise you are just saying something. Which you may, of course, but is kind of odd in a philosophy thread, where one is supposed to have arguments. So do not count on it that your point is rational when you can’t support your standpoint with arguments. You are free to choose. Aren’t you?

GdB

(bold emphasis added)

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Posted: 08 September 2010 01:38 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2784 ]
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Bryan - 08 September 2010 10:18 AM

Why wouldn’t compatibilist free will work just as well for justifying (for example) the death penalty?

Once a person is exposed/influenced by a more positive method of handling whatever situation caused them to murder in the first place the idea is that this will change their future behavior.

IOW if the individual is taught alternate method of dealing with anger, like counting to ten, or walking away from the situation the knowledge will integrate itself into the decision making process. The output (resultant action) will be different then the original action because of the additional influence of knowing alternate possible actions to killing to deal with the situation.

However a person who is not aware of alternatives would more likely choose killing as the only possible decision they could make.

So a lack of “good” influences in the individuals past could be blamed for the actions of the individual. Knowing this, “good” influences can be introduced to the individuals realm of awareness thus affecting their future behavior. 

So we’d blame a lack of the good influences as the deterministic cause for the murder. However, punishment, education can alter future behavior.

However at the moment of decision, to kill or choose an alternate behavior, only what has come before is available to influence the final choice made.

So we wouldn’t blame the person, we’d only blame the lack of good influence and determine the correct personal experiences for the individual to undergo (punishment, education, etc…)

So we wouldn’t kill someone because of the lack of good influences in the past prior to the decision to murder. We’d blame the lack of good influences.

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Posted: 08 September 2010 11:10 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2785 ]
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Gnostikosis - 08 September 2010 01:38 PM
Bryan - 08 September 2010 10:18 AM

Why wouldn’t compatibilist free will work just as well for justifying (for example) the death penalty?

Once a person is exposed/influenced by a more positive method of handling whatever situation caused them to murder in the first place the idea is that this will change their future behavior.

That strategy is available to the compatibilist, isn’t it?

IOW if the individual is taught alternate method of dealing with anger, like counting to ten, or walking away from the situation the knowledge will integrate itself into the decision making process. The output (resultant action) will be different then the original action because of the additional influence of knowing alternate possible actions to killing to deal with the situation.

Your language (unintentionally, I think) suggests an ability to change the past.  That ability isn’t available to the determinist or the libertarian, let alone the compatibilist.  Other than what is available to none, the compatibilist claims everything of LFW except the ability to do otherwise in the exact same circumstances.  Knowing (next time a similar situation arises) alternate possible actions alters the circumstances, so it is perfectly compatible with compatibilist free will (not that I find the latter a convincing account of free will).

However a person who is not aware of alternatives would more likely choose killing as the only possible decision they could make.

Doesn’t that also hold true of the judge, jury and state’s executioner?

So a lack of “good” influences in the individuals past could be blamed for the actions of the individual. Knowing this, “good” influences can be introduced to the individuals realm of awareness thus affecting their future behavior. 

So we’d blame a lack of the good influences as the deterministic cause for the murder. However, punishment, education can alter future behavior.

However at the moment of decision, to kill or choose an alternate behavior, only what has come before is available to influence the final choice made.

So we wouldn’t blame the person, we’d only blame the lack of good influence and determine the correct personal experiences for the individual to undergo (punishment, education, etc…)

So we wouldn’t kill someone because of the lack of good influences in the past prior to the decision to murder. We’d blame the lack of good influences.

If the compatibilist doesn’t believe that CFW provides for personal responsibility then what’s the point?

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Posted: 09 September 2010 09:28 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2786 ]
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Bryan - 08 September 2010 11:10 PM

That strategy is available to the compatibilist, isn’t it?

Once the death penalty is carried there is no future for the individual were prior (prior to the next future event) influence can affectingly modify behavior. 

Your language (unintentionally, I think) suggests an ability to change the past.  That ability isn’t available to the determinist or the libertarian, let alone the compatibilist.  Other than what is available to none, the compatibilist claims everything of LFW except the ability to do otherwise in the exact same circumstances.  Knowing (next time a similar situation arises) alternate possible actions alters the circumstances, so it is perfectly compatible with compatibilist free will (not that I find the latter a convincing account of free will).

The influence occurs after the time of the initial offense going forward from that moment to change future behavior.

So event A is the original offense. Event C is a future event which with out an intermediary influence would result in the same “crime” taking place.

Event B (knowledge of positive methods to handle situation A) is introduced between event A and C by an outside source. So without the introduction of B the same result “crime” takes place. With the introduction of B into the chain of event we now have a future event of C occurring with both A and B influencing the decision with alters the result.

Doesn’t that also hold true of the judge, jury and state’s executioner?

Knowledge of a death penalty may prevent a third party from making the decision to murder. However that requires enforcement to be affective. Which means no future for the individual who committed the crime. So do we sacrifice one individual who murdered because of a lack of sufficient positive influences to basically introduce element B into the realm of influences that affect a non-related third party? Works for dictators and the like.

If the compatibilist doesn’t believe that CFW provides for personal responsibility then what’s the point?

I see it as partial responsibility of being the “cause” of the crime. However there is a great deal more that caused the criminal event to occur. Personal responsibility means what? Total responsibility? Obviously there are many outside influences which make up a personality. To invest total responsibility in a person denies the responsibility of all of the influences led to the person being who they were at the moment of the decision of committing the crime.

If we don’t consider all of the causality that led to the commission of the crime we can never fix the problem to where we can actually prevent any occurrence of it. Look at murder as a symptom of a disease. Killing the criminal may deal with the symptom but leads us no closer to curing the disease.

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Posted: 09 September 2010 10:45 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2787 ]
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Gnostikosis - 09 September 2010 09:28 AM
Bryan - 08 September 2010 11:10 PM

That strategy is available to the compatibilist, isn’t it?

Once the death penalty is carried there is no future for the individual were prior (prior to the next future event) influence can affectingly modify behavior.

Sure, but that has nothing at all to do with a difference between LFW and CFW, does it?  Are we to suppose a person with LFW would not be able to consider new methods for dealing with the temptation to kill?  And what if the determinist noted that signs indicated that a murderer was likely to continue murdering?  And suppose the determinists didn’t have layered litigation to worry about every time the death penalty was proposed?

Your language (unintentionally, I think) suggests an ability to change the past.  That ability isn’t available to the determinist or the libertarian, let alone the compatibilist.  Other than what is available to none, the compatibilist claims everything of LFW except the ability to do otherwise in the exact same circumstances.  Knowing (next time a similar situation arises) alternate possible actions alters the circumstances, so it is perfectly compatible with compatibilist free will (not that I find the latter a convincing account of free will).

The influence occurs after the time of the initial offense going forward from that moment to change future behavior.

OK, I suspected that your language probably didn’t reflect your intent.  But, as I said, the CFW advocate claims everything of LFW other than the ability to do otherwise.  So far you have no case for drawing behavior distinctions between one and the other based on the understanding of justice.

However a person who is not aware of alternatives would more likely choose killing as the only possible decision they could make.

Doesn’t that also hold true of the judge, jury and state’s executioner?

Knowledge of a death penalty may prevent a third party from making the decision to murder. However that requires enforcement to be (e)ffective. Which means no future for the individual who committed the crime. So do we sacrifice one individual who murdered because of a lack of sufficient positive influences to basically introduce element B into the realm of influences that affect a non-related third party? Works for dictators and the like.

Looks like we’re talking past each other.  I’m saying that if the judge, jury, etc. are not aware of alternatives then they are more likely to choose execution as the only possible decision they could make?
And where does LFW/CFW even enter into that?

If the compatibilist doesn’t believe that CFW provides for personal responsibility then what’s the point?

I see it as partial responsibility of being the “cause” of the crime. However there is a great deal more that caused the criminal event to occur. Personal responsibility means what? Total responsibility? Obviously there are many outside influences which make up a personality. To invest total responsibility in a person denies the responsibility of all of the influences led to the person being who they were at the moment of the decision of committing the crime.

How you see it is somewhat immaterial, for the issue is the supposed difference it makes to view things from the CFW perspective rather than the LFW perspective.  CFW advocates typically claim that their view allows for people to be held responsible for their actions.  It only muddies the water to start talking about agents only having “partial responsibility” with CFW as though it constitutes a difference in the degree of responsibility compared to LFW.

You make it sound like you’re a compatibilist with serious doubts about compatibilism.

If we don’t consider all of the causality that led to the commission of the crime we can never fix the problem to where we can actually prevent any occurrence of it. Look at murder as a symptom of a disease. Killing the criminal may deal with the symptom but leads us no closer to curing the disease.

OK, I’m looking.  But I don’t see the distinction between LFW and CFW in any of that.  I see the attempt to make a distinction between retributive justice and restorative or transformational justice.

It’s hardly the same comparison.

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Posted: 09 September 2010 02:40 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2788 ]
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Bryan - 09 September 2010 10:45 AM

Sure, but that has nothing at all to do with a difference between LFW and CFW, does it?  Are we to suppose a person with LFW would not be able to consider new methods for dealing with the temptation to kill?

You don’t have to consider anything but what would cause the person to consider new methods?

If it’s un-caused (the decision to consider new methods) then it would seem a matter of random chance whether he killed next time or not.

 

And what if the determinist noted that signs indicated that a murderer was likely to continue murdering?  And suppose the determinists didn’t have layered litigation to worry about every time the death penalty was proposed?

Then they haven’t identified, at least entirely, the cause. Human psychology is an on going learning process.

OK, I suspected that your language probably didn’t reflect your intent.  But, as I said, the CFW advocate claims everything of LFW other than the ability to do otherwise.  So far you have no case for drawing behavior distinctions between one and the other based on the understanding of justice.

Except that a compatibilist would see no reason to place ultimate responsibility solely on the individual committing the crime.

Looks like we’re talking past each other.  I’m saying that if the judge, jury, etc. are not aware of alternatives then they are more likely to choose execution as the only possible decision they could make?
And where does LFW/CFW even enter into that?

Education of the Judge and jury. They are in the circumstances of choosing to kill another human being. The same idea of introducing an outside influence applies.

How you see it is somewhat immaterial, for the issue is the supposed difference it makes to view things from the CFW perspective rather than the LFW perspective.  CFW advocates typically claim that their view allows for people to be held responsible for their actions.  It only muddies the water to start talking about agents only having “partial responsibility” with CFW as though it constitutes a difference in the degree of responsibility compared to LFW.

You make it sound like you’re a compatibilist with serious doubts about compatibilism.

I have doubts that I represent the only understanding of compatibilism so I’m just making it known I’m speaking only from my understanding.

The problem is that if you narrow the scope of responsibility to only the individual you lose the view of how the rest of the universe played it’s part in leading up the crime.

OK, I’m looking.  But I don’t see the distinction between LFW and CFW in any of that.  I see the attempt to make a distinction between retributive justice and restorative or transformational justice.

The main difference, which I noted sometime back is the assignment of ultimate responsibility.

I was told by the compatibilists at that time they thought the difference to be more complex. That maybe, however I think this still the outstanding difference that one can point out.

Otherwise really it maybe a matter of arguing fine points which can really go either way depending on one’s starting ideology.

[ Edited: 09 September 2010 05:45 PM by Gnostikosis ]
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Posted: 09 September 2010 03:50 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2789 ]
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Free will? more like wee frill!

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Posted: 09 September 2010 11:33 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2790 ]
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Gnostikosis - 09 September 2010 02:40 PM
Bryan - 09 September 2010 10:45 AM

Sure, but that has nothing at all to do with a difference between LFW and CFW, does it?  Are we to suppose a person with LFW would not be able to consider new methods for dealing with the temptation to kill?

You don’t have to consider anything but what would cause the person to consider new methods?

If it’s un-caused (the decision to consider new methods) then it would seem a matter of random chance whether he killed next time or not.

Meh.  It makes no sense, so far as I can tell, to say out of one side of your mouth that the ultimate responsibility attendant to LFW makes it easy (easier?) to justify the death penalty when the other side of your mouth is poised to sum up the results of LFW as “random chance.”  This makes it appear that you have a wishy-washy view of at least one of the two positions (LFW, CFW) and perhaps both.

If murder is random chance then we ought to execute absolutely everyone simply for the sake of protecting ourselves.  Nobody can be trusted!  grin

And what if the determinist noted that signs indicated that a murderer was likely to continue murdering?  And suppose the determinists didn’t have layered litigation to worry about every time the death penalty was proposed?

Then they haven’t identified, at least entirely, the cause. Human psychology is an on going learning process.

I was hoping you’d draw a conclusion related to the CFW view of justice rather than restating the proposition in different words.

OK, I suspected that your language probably didn’t reflect your intent.  But, as I said, the CFW advocate claims everything of LFW other than the ability to do otherwise.  So far you have no case for drawing behavior distinctions between one and the other based on the understanding of justice.

Except that a compatibilist would see no reason to place ultimate responsibility solely on the individual committing the crime.

What is this “ultimate responsibility” wrt the philosophy of justice?  Judges and juries in a retributionist system don’t discuss “ultimate responsibility.”  They discuss (implicitly if not explicitly) moral culpability.  Tell me how moral culpability differs between LFW and CFW under a normal understanding of CFW.

Looks like we’re talking past each other.  I’m saying that if the judge, jury, etc. are not aware of alternatives then they are more likely to choose execution as the only possible decision they could make?
And where does LFW/CFW even enter into that?

Education of the Judge and jury. They are in the circumstances of choosing to kill another human being. The same idea of introducing an outside influence applies.

And where does LFW/CFW even enter into that?

You make it sound like you’re a compatibilist with serious doubts about compatibilism.

I have doubts that I represent the only understanding of compatibilism so I’m just making it known I’m speaking only from my understanding.

The problem is that if you narrow the scope of responsibility to only the individual you lose the view of how the rest of the universe played it’s part in leading up the crime.

OK, I’m looking.  But I don’t see the distinction between LFW and CFW in any of that.  I see the attempt to make a distinction between retributive justice and restorative or transformational justice.

The main difference, which I noted sometime back is the assignment of ultimate responsibility.

I don’t find that supposed difference significant in the legal context.  I can be convinced if you can provide evidence, but it seems clear that simple moral responsibility is the key issue in traditional Western justice—not “ultimate responsibility.”  And obviously you can’t use the two interchangeably without emptying CFW of its responsibility.  And that was always the point of CFW.

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