I can’t help but think that the whole argument is moot.
After all, the laws of logic are necessary, and if we take the ontological step to consider them beings, they should be considered necessary beings. The whole point of the Argument from Contingency is to establish a necessary being (i.e., a god) to ground the existence of contingent being(s) (i.e., the cosmos). Hence, there’s no force in arguing that a god created logic. The idea of creating necessary beings doesn’t even seem meaningful.
Even Leibniz, who was both a brilliant religious thinker and philosopher if there ever was one, didn’t seem to think much of God creating logic.
However, we should not, as some have done, imagine that because eternal truths are dependent on God they must be arbitrary and dependent on his will—as Descartes seems to have thought, and after him M. Poiret. That is true only of contingent truths, the principle of which is suitability, or the choice of what is best; by contrast necessary truths depend solely on God’s understanding, of which they are the internal object.
Granted Leibniz thinks that the necessary truths depend on God for their existence, a view I wouldn’t endorse, but the force of the passage is that logic is independent of God’s willing.