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Is morality consistent with the Humanism perspective?
Posted: 11 April 2010 04:14 PM   [ Ignore ]
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Bryan - 04 April 2010 09:34 AM

But I don’t see how an atheist/skeptic can justify knowing broad moral prescriptions that are real in a manner consistent with atheism/skepticism.  It seems to me that the process entails the sort of magic that atheist/skeptics frown on in others. 

Could you explain what you mean?

And yes Bryan, I know you used “atheism/skepticism” but I’d rather focus on the essence rather than get lost in name games.

Is morality consistent with the Humanism perspective?

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Posted: 11 April 2010 08:16 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 1 ]
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citizenschallenge - 11 April 2010 04:14 PM
Bryan - 04 April 2010 09:34 AM

But I don’t see how an atheist/skeptic can justify knowing broad moral prescriptions that are real in a manner consistent with atheism/skepticism.  It seems to me that the process entails the sort of magic that atheist/skeptics frown on in others. 

Could you explain what you mean?

And yes Bryan, I know you used “atheism/skepticism” but I’d rather focus on the essence rather than get lost in name games.

Is morality consistent with the Humanism perspective?

Humanism is not exclusive to atheists and skeptics.  More often “secular humanism” is applied to that portion of humanists who reject traditionally religious foundations for morality.  As a result, I can’t explain what I mean in terms of your latter question.  Of course morality is consistent with the humanist perspective, just as morality per se is consistent with atheism.

Dealing only with humanists from the atheist/skeptic camp, I doubt that their world views or philosophical presuppositions allow much purchase for a knowable moral realism.  By that I mean that while an atheist or skeptic might perfectly well avoid lying in accordance with societal mores (for example), it is quite another thing to establish a reasonable metaphysical basis for real moral truth.  Take lying, for example.  What is it about the natural world or about physical processes that allows for a concept of the way things ought to be but perhaps are not?  And how would one go about discovering moral “oughts” via the normally accepted epistemological methods of atheists and skeptics?  I don’t see how the atheist/skeptic can reach that point without taking (at the very least) a Kierkegaardian leap of faith.

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Posted: 12 April 2010 12:04 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 2 ]
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Bryan - 11 April 2010 08:16 PM

Dealing only with humanists from the atheist/skeptic camp, I doubt that their world views or philosophical presuppositions allow much purchase for a knowable moral realism.  By that I mean that while an atheist or skeptic might perfectly well avoid lying in accordance with societal mores (for example), it is quite another thing to establish a reasonable metaphysical basis for real moral truth.  Take lying, for example.  What is it about the natural world or about physical processes that allows for a concept of the way things ought to be but perhaps are not? And how would one go about discovering moral “oughts” via the normally accepted epistemological methods of atheists and skeptics? I don’t see how the atheist/skeptic can reach that point without taking (at the very least) a Kierkegaardian leap of faith.

Seems to me a sense morality begins at conception (I don’t say birth, because a lot has happened before birth, including a relationship between the mother with that little being in her womb).  After birth I believe the basis for one’s sense of morality is established within the first couple years and then reinforced in the following preadolescent years.

Whereas reflections upon the greater world (that lead to atheism/skepticism) don’t really kick in until after the morality “tool kit” has been established.  This leads me to think the foundations of morality are instilled by family in an endless spiral of generations.  Seems to me God is tacked onto that tool kit, but is not necessary for that moral tool kit.

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Posted: 12 April 2010 12:19 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 3 ]
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I find myself shocked to see that, if I understand his position correctly, I agree with Bryan.  ohh

I don’t think a “metaphysical basis for real moral truth” exists at all, of course, so while atheists (or more correctly philosophical naturalists, I think) cannot find one because there’s isn’t one out there, theists simply “find” in reality whatever morality they wish to find there. I think there is some cross-cultral consistency among moral codes because the biological underpinnings of all human beliefs and desires is the same, but within the range of variation allowed by our nature we pretty freely make stuff up and then justify it as “universal” or as an intrinsic feature of reality through a process of rationalization.

Unfortunately, because the majority of humanity believes in metaphysical reality and likes the idea of having their personal or culturally preferred moral value system as the one true or natural one, the idea that such a universal and “objective” foundation for morality can and should exist seems to infect most atheists/naturalists as well. The spectre of complete amorality or social chaos is often raised as the inevitable alternative to having universal moral codes founded in a metaphysical reality, despite the evidence that such justifications for particular moral systems have hardly prevented what most of us see as immoral behavior on a large scale historically, and despite the fact that there is no evidence that peopel who do not believe in a metaphysical foundation for reality behave any less “morally” than anyone else.

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Posted: 12 April 2010 01:42 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 4 ]
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mckenzievmd - 12 April 2010 12:19 PM

... because the majority of humanity believes in metaphysical reality ...

Brennen, the issue of the objectivity or not of moral properties has nothing to do with a general belief in “metaphysical reality”. Anyone who believes in anything real ipso facto believes in “metaphysical reality”.

The issue regarding moral properties is their ability (or not, as the case may be) to be objectively true, i.e. to be anything more than mere opinion. And then one might say that in order for such properties to be real there must be some objective “metaphysical reality” to them, in the sense that their truth value must supervene upon some independent state of affairs. Though it would also be the case on a subjectivist, relativist moral view, such as the one you propound, that that view also depends on a “metaphysical reality” as regards moral truths: viz., the reality that they are subjective, supervening upon the beliefs of each individual with moral opinions.

Either way there is a “metaphysical reality” to them. Probably what you mean to say is that those who believe in objective moral truths must believe in their essential ontological independence from human opinion, such that the moral truths do not depend on individual or societal agreement. But that is different from claiming simply that they involve some sort of metaphysical reality.

At any rate, skepticism is itself an epistemic position, derived from reason. All reason depends on certain bedrock postulates, such as deduction, induction, and inference to the best explanation. These themselves are not justifiable by experiment; experiment assumes them to be true. So in order for any skeptical system to get off the ground it must make certain assumptions. In the same way that one cannot deductively justify induction, one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. So either “ought” statements must be universally fallacious (or up to personal whim, which I take to be functionally the same thing), or they must be independently justified by reason. Insofar as the humanist position begins with the sorts of “inalienable human rights” that we find in places like our Declaration of Independence, it must be asserting that these rights, and this humanist morality, are justified by reason. The fact that they are not justified by experiment does not imply that they are not amenable to any sort of justification, just as mathematical proofs are not justified by experiment, but by reason.

I should also add that whatever moral properties or objective moral truths may be, they cannot be justified by appeal to God or any higher power. That we’ve known since Plato’s Euthyphro argument. The status of objective moral truths must be justified by appeal to reason itself (even reason deepened by worldly experience), or to nothing. If the latter, then they are basically illusions, akin to fashion.

[ Edited: 12 April 2010 01:44 PM by dougsmith ]
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Posted: 12 April 2010 02:36 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 5 ]
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mckenzievmd - 12 April 2010 12:19 PM

I find myself shocked to see that, if I understand his position correctly,

I have a sense that morality is tied to a feeling of connection and responsibility, which is developed from a being’s first moments within their mother.
my ‘position’ was only a description of what I sense.

I actually don’t have a ‘position’, I’m really more interested in reading what you folks have to say about it, than defending anything.

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Posted: 12 April 2010 06:43 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 6 ]
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Doug,

Thanks for the lesson. grin

Obviously, I’m using philosophical terminology sloppily and inaccurately here. I tend to think of “metaphysical” as simply implying “beyond physical reality,” and in that limited sense I don’t see how moral truths can have any basis in anything beyond physical reality because I don’t happen to think there is anything but physical reality. Morality is a feature of human thought and behavior and as such is based, IMHO, on the physical nature of what humans are, primarily on features of our brains that emerged as the result of evolution and natural selection. It only exists because we exists, and it is what it is because we are what we are.

I have never understood the idea of “inalienable rights.” myself. In practice, of course, all rights are “alienable” and are frequently denied those not in a dominant social position by those who have the power to grant or deny them. The theory that somehow these rights exist independantly of whether they are actually granted to anyone seems to me less a theory of reality than an expression of a wish. If they do not exist independant of human opinion in the mind or intentions of God (which is how I imagine the Founders thought of their existence), then I cannot see how they could exist except as anything other than conventions of behavior subject to all the things that dictate human beliefs, desires, and power relations. That they ought to be considered universal and inalieanable is, of course a moral position I hold in practice, but this seems to me really just an expression of my own desires, not a “fact” of reality in any deeper sense.

I certianly agree that any rational position on any question must contain assumptions, and that justification of these assumptions is best accomplished through reason and appeal to empirical data rather than appeal to a supernatural authority or some such. Still, even if one can effectively justify a particular position (such as the empirical or skeptical approach to epistemology) or moral precept (such as the idea that wanton violence is bad) based on the argument and evidence concerning the pros and cons of the position or precept if put into practice (skepticism yields more reliable knowledge, wanton violence impedes the general fulfillment of people’s desires), I don’t see how this act of justification makes the concepts one is arguing for any more “objective” or independant of human beliefs and desires, which are biologically constrained within certain limits but relatively arbitrary within those limits.

I think the dichotomy you present between “real” or “objective” moral truths and mere fashion is a bit of a false one. Clearly, moral truths that are rationally derived and can be supported by empirical evidence of their success in achieving their aims are superior to mere arbitrary whims. Yet even these better truths are still wholly contingent on what people want and believe, and they have no meaning beyond this. As our wants and beliefs change (within the possible limits set on them), so do the precepts change. Mathematics don’t change in this way because they fundamentally concerns aspects of reality that exist outside of human beliefs,desires, and behavior. But moral truths do not concern any reality outside of these things, so they cannot have the same status of independance or objectivity that mathematical precepts have.

Sorry that I am not more fluent with the language or familiar with the history of philosophy concerning this subject. I’m sure you must feel like a professional physicist debating quantum mechanics with a high school kid!  red face

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Posted: 12 April 2010 11:28 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 7 ]
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Reading such discussions it always strikes me that it’s all so learned and requiring extensive backgrounds to even keep abreast -
But, morals are actually a down-home basic part of the rudest human’s life. 
Now, thinking on it, could morals be intimately tied to biology.  I ask this because I keep coming back to what I wrote earlier:

I have a sense that morality is tied to a feeling of connection and responsibility,
which is developed from a being’s first moments within their mother, then family, then tribe.

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Posted: 13 April 2010 12:03 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 8 ]
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None of the definitions of “moral” mentions what I believe to be a most fundamental consideration. That of “beneficial” or “detrimental”
In that context, on might argue that someone is acting morally (regardless of motive) when his actions are beneficial to others and someone is acting immorally (regardless of motive) when his actions are detrimental to others.
Of course, when we speak of matter/energy, the term moral becomes meaningless. There is only conversion, where the event of creation of something is always accompanied by an event of destruction of another thing.

[ Edited: 13 April 2010 12:14 AM by Write4U ]
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Posted: 13 April 2010 04:22 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 9 ]
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mckenzievmd - 12 April 2010 06:43 PM

Doug,

Thanks for the lesson. grin

Obviously, I’m using philosophical terminology sloppily and inaccurately here. I tend to think of “metaphysical” as simply implying “beyond physical reality,” and in that limited sense I don’t see how moral truths can have any basis in anything beyond physical reality because I don’t happen to think there is anything but physical reality. Morality is a feature of human thought and behavior and as such is based, IMHO, on the physical nature of what humans are, primarily on features of our brains that emerged as the result of evolution and natural selection. It only exists because we exists, and it is what it is because we are what we are.

I have never understood the idea of “inalienable rights.” myself. In practice, of course, all rights are “alienable” and are frequently denied those not in a dominant social position by those who have the power to grant or deny them. The theory that somehow these rights exist independantly of whether they are actually granted to anyone seems to me less a theory of reality than an expression of a wish. If they do not exist independant of human opinion in the mind or intentions of God (which is how I imagine the Founders thought of their existence), then I cannot see how they could exist except as anything other than conventions of behavior subject to all the things that dictate human beliefs, desires, and power relations. That they ought to be considered universal and inalieanable is, of course a moral position I hold in practice, but this seems to me really just an expression of my own desires, not a “fact” of reality in any deeper sense.

I certianly agree that any rational position on any question must contain assumptions, and that justification of these assumptions is best accomplished through reason and appeal to empirical data rather than appeal to a supernatural authority or some such. Still, even if one can effectively justify a particular position (such as the empirical or skeptical approach to epistemology) or moral precept (such as the idea that wanton violence is bad) based on the argument and evidence concerning the pros and cons of the position or precept if put into practice (skepticism yields more reliable knowledge, wanton violence impedes the general fulfillment of people’s desires), I don’t see how this act of justification makes the concepts one is arguing for any more “objective” or independant of human beliefs and desires, which are biologically constrained within certain limits but relatively arbitrary within those limits.

I think the dichotomy you present between “real” or “objective” moral truths and mere fashion is a bit of a false one. Clearly, moral truths that are rationally derived and can be supported by empirical evidence of their success in achieving their aims are superior to mere arbitrary whims. Yet even these better truths are still wholly contingent on what people want and believe, and they have no meaning beyond this. As our wants and beliefs change (within the possible limits set on them), so do the precepts change. Mathematics don’t change in this way because they fundamentally concerns aspects of reality that exist outside of human beliefs,desires, and behavior. But moral truths do not concern any reality outside of these things, so they cannot have the same status of independance or objectivity that mathematical precepts have.

Sorry that I am not more fluent with the language or familiar with the history of philosophy concerning this subject. I’m sure you must feel like a professional physicist debating quantum mechanics with a high school kid!  red face

No worries! I hope to at least illuminate the issues.

But basically, metaphysics is the basic structure of reality that one proposes: the things that exist and the way they interrelate. A physicalist’s metaphysics then, include all and only the objects, properties and relations that one finds in a physics textbook. And then one’s “ontology” is just a subset of one’s metaphysics: one’s ontology is just the objects one believes exists. (In this case, quarks, etc.; or perhaps vibrating strings).

Re. the dichotomy between objective moral truths and fashion: either something exists or it does not. If it does not exist, then we are discussing illusions. End of story.

If, on the other hand, there is some objective matter we can point to (e.g., re. morality) that shows that some ways of putting it are “superior” to others, then that may be what makes something objectively moral, and something else not.

It’s the same if we discuss the existence of mental states. Mental states do not exist in physics. So a very austere skeptic can and will say that there are no mental states. (They are fictional). Or there are no biological properties. Or there are no cultures.

Since I believe that there are real regularities in nature that can be captured scientifically with those property-terms, I believe there’s reason to say that those things exist. In the same way, since I believe there are some objectively “better” and “worse” ways to construct a moral system, I believe there’s reason to say that moral properties exist.

But in the final analysis, all of this depends on assumptions that must be accepted or rejected. There is no way to prove logically that minds exist to a physicalist eliminativist, just as there is no way to prove that moral properties exist to one who takes them as personal whim.

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Posted: 13 April 2010 07:05 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 10 ]
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I’m still a bit tripped up by your use of “exist” and “objective” here. It seems like whether or not they apply depends, of course, on how they are defined, and as with “metaphysics” I’m not sure we’re defiing them the same way.

Do moral truths exist? And do they have an “objective” existence or are they illusions? Well, if you mean are there principles for guiding human behavior that are always true regardless of what people believe or desire, than I would say no. We’ve talked before about mathematical principles, like the Pythagorean theorem, which exist objectively and independantly regardless of what humans think and believe because they are intrinsic features of physical reality. If this is your criteria for saying something exists or is real, then I would say moral truths do not exist int his sense.

However, sometimes you seem to equate the notion of relative merit with existence or reality. If it can be shown that one moral principle is “better” than another in some way, than there must be some real, objective truth of the matter. I would argue, of course, that the “better” includes assumptions derived from our desires and beliefs, so again there is some inherent subjectivity here, but since all positions require making some assumptions (even seemingly trivial ones like, “reality exists”), I am willing to say that given a few simple assumptions one can rationally demosntrate the superiority of on moral principle over another. In this sense, I would say such principles do exists and are real, but that is different from the sense above, which supposes their existence independant of human notions, which I don’t accept.

Perhaps you are using “objective” differently than we lay folks? It seems to me when most people use the term, they mean something like “always true everywhere for everyone regardless of what people think or believe.” Like the laws of math. This seems impossible to me. But you seem to mean merely “demonstrably variable in the quality of their effects given a few simple assumptions” which I certainly can accept. If we assume that people being happy is “better” than people being unhappy, then we can grade the relative success of different moral principles in terms of facilitating or impeding happiness and say that some are better than others (utilitarianism, if I’m not mistaken). If this is the only criteria you have for “real” or “objective” then I don’t see it as controversial or objectionable, as I would the first defintion.

The question of mental states does seem the same in that whether you grant them the status of “real” depends on what you mean. They do exists in physics in the sense that they are patterns of electrical and chemical activity in the brain. And it may someday be possible to identify which such pattterns correspond to which subjective experiences, so I wouldn’t say they are illusions. But at present since we cannot demonstrate them reliably and objectively to others, and thus cannot prove their existence in that way, one can argue that they aren’t real, though I don’t see the point in doing so. Still, like the question of morality, mental states cannot exist independantly of human minds, so they depend for their existence and their qualities on our existence and our qualities, like moral truths.

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Posted: 13 April 2010 11:00 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 11 ]
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dougsmith - 12 April 2010 01:42 PM

At any rate, skepticism is itself an epistemic position, derived from reason. All reason depends on certain bedrock postulates, such as deduction, induction, and inference to the best explanation. These themselves are not justifiable by experiment; experiment assumes them to be true. So in order for any skeptical system to get off the ground it must make certain assumptions. In the same way that one cannot deductively justify induction, one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. So either “ought” statements must be universally fallacious (or up to personal whim, which I take to be functionally the same thing), or they must be independently justified by reason.

OK so far ...

Insofar as the humanist position begins with the sorts of “inalienable human rights” that we find in places like our Declaration of Independence, it must be asserting that these rights, and this humanist morality, are justified by reason.

For example?  Where is one of the “inalienable human rights” justified by reason in a manner that you would accept?

I should also add that whatever moral properties or objective moral truths may be, they cannot be justified by appeal to God or any higher power. That we’ve known since Plato’s Euthyphro argument. The status of objective moral truths must be justified by appeal to reason itself (even reason deepened by worldly experience), or to nothing. If the latter, then they are basically illusions, akin to fashion.

You give the Euthyphro dilemma far too much credit.  But we’ve been over that before (iirc) and there’s no need to delve into it here.

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Posted: 13 April 2010 12:27 PM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 12 ]
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Bryan
You give the Euthyphro dilemma far too much credit.  But we’ve been over that before (iirc) and there’s no need to delve into it here.

“Rachels presents another element of the Natural Law Theory that seems to be quite useful in the evaluation of morality.  The world is designed in a fashion that, should all things function as they ought to, we can achieve absolute harmony.  This is one distinctive feature of the Natural Law Theory.  Natural laws explain how things exist normally, but they also clarify how things should be.  Most birds for example have the ability to fly and it is right for them to do so.  It would be wrong for a bird to be born without wings because their flying characteristic would be inhibited.  That which is considered natural behavior is morally right, while anything unfitting or dysfunctional is unnatural and regarded as morally wrong.  For us to be fitting enough judges to adjudicate what is natural and what is not, Rachels shows how the third portion of the Natural Law Theory explains our credentials as human beings.

It is not necessarily wrong for a bird to be born without wings. Penquins, Ostrich, Kiwis are flightless birds and their wings are adapted to other purposes. Thus the argument of natural morality which holds that it is moral for a bird to be able to fly is not always correct.
I believe Natural law cannot be moral in a human sense. They govern how things work or they do not. Choice is not an option. Without choice the question of morality becomes moot.

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Posted: 14 April 2010 01:11 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 13 ]
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Write4U - 13 April 2010 12:27 PM

It is not necessarily wrong for a bird to be born without wings.

I agree.  I provided the link for its description of the dilemma, not for the criticisms it included.  Like I said, I don’t see any need to discuss it in this thread, but if you missed earlier discussion you can start a new one in which I will reiterate what I see as the problems with Doug’s view of the dilemma.

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Posted: 14 April 2010 04:22 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 14 ]
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mckenzievmd - 13 April 2010 07:05 AM

However, sometimes you seem to equate the notion of relative merit with existence or reality. If it can be shown that one moral principle is “better” than another in some way, than there must be some real, objective truth of the matter. I would argue, of course, that the “better” includes assumptions derived from our desires and beliefs, so again there is some inherent subjectivity here, but since all positions require making some assumptions (even seemingly trivial ones like, “reality exists”), I am willing to say that given a few simple assumptions one can rationally demosntrate the superiority of on moral principle over another. In this sense, I would say such principles do exists and are real, but that is different from the sense above, which supposes their existence independant of human notions, which I don’t accept.

Perhaps you are using “objective” differently than we lay folks? It seems to me when most people use the term, they mean something like “always true everywhere for everyone regardless of what people think or believe.” Like the laws of math. This seems impossible to me. But you seem to mean merely “demonstrably variable in the quality of their effects given a few simple assumptions” which I certainly can accept. If we assume that people being happy is “better” than people being unhappy, then we can grade the relative success of different moral principles in terms of facilitating or impeding happiness and say that some are better than others (utilitarianism, if I’m not mistaken). If this is the only criteria you have for “real” or “objective” then I don’t see it as controversial or objectionable, as I would the first defintion.

I do mean “objective” in that sense: “always true everywhere for everyone regardless of what people think or believe.” This is the sense in which it was objectively wrong for the Nazis to massacre the Jews, even though (for the purposes of argument) we will assume that all Nazis believed it was right.

This is the central sort of case that leads one to insist that moral beliefs are objective, in that sense. For if moral beliefs were dependent upon people’s opinions, one would be forced to assert that for the Nazis it was OK to massacre the Jews. That is, that our beliefs and their beliefs were identically (un)reasonable, and there was no choosing between them, only fashion.

(And yes, I know that this invokes Godwin’s Law, but I’m too lazy to come up with another analogy).

Now, re. “better”: yes, this will need to include assumptions about us. Some of these will of necessity be posits. As with any system of reason, some premises will not themselves be amenable to further justification. But NB: asserting that moral truths are objective is not asserting that moral truths are simple or easily discoverable, nor that they have the form of absolute commands (“Thou shalt not ...”). It may be that all moral truths are conditional. I don’t know.

Re. the question as to how to rationally justify human rights: I believe that in Kant he asserted that they were derived from the very concept “person”. Though again, somewhere there will have to be posits, as in any rational system.

And Write4U, the passage you quote is ludicrous. E.g.: “The world is designed in a fashion that, should all things function as they ought to, we can achieve absolute harmony.” I think anyone looking at the natural world objectively would have to say that though it may be beautiful, the suffering that goes on as things function normally cannot be called literally harmonious, not in an ethical sense anyhow. Nature may be beautiful at times, but it is also “red in tooth and claw”. If there were a God, he would be responsible for it all.

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Posted: 14 April 2010 09:04 AM   [ Ignore ]   [ # 15 ]
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I do mean “objective” in that sense: “always true everywhere for everyone regardless of what people think or believe.” This is the sense in which it was objectively wrong for the Nazis to massacre the Jews, even though (for the purposes of argument) we will assume that all Nazis believed it was right.

This is the central sort of case that leads one to insist that moral beliefs are objective, in that sense. For if moral beliefs were dependent upon people’s opinions, one would be forced to assert that for the Nazis it was OK to massacre the Jews. That is, that our beliefs and their beliefs were identically (un)reasonable, and there was no choosing between them, only fashion.

Could you point me to sources for some of the defenses for such an assertion, or perhaps sumarize them yourself? I can’t see any justification for this approach other than personal feelings or intuitions. In your example, we believe genocide is immoral, so we must assert it is always immoral everywhere for everyone. Why? Just because we feel it is?

I honestly have trouble understanding how we can support this kind of reasoning without heading down the path of anyone who wants to declaring any precept they care about universal and innately true for everyone, which leads to just as chaotic a lack of distinction between opposing moral principles as relativism is supposed to lead to. Can we not choose between moral truths the way we choose between scientific truths—accepting those which work best in practice as “true enough” without having to argue that they are absolutely and incontrovertibly true in all cases? Wouldn’t this avoid both the presumed weakness of relativism (that all truths must be taken as equally valid, so that none are really valid) and of this assertion of universal objective truth (that anyone can make such a claim for any position, so it gives us no better tool for distinguishing between such claims than relativism does)?

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Militant Agnostic: I don’t know, and neither do you!

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